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Several questionable officer involved shootings and perceived abuses of authority
disproportionately involving minority citizens have resulted in public outcry, protests, and
nationwide scrutiny of police in recent years. The resulting police legitimacy crisis has prompted
agencies to rapidly equip officers with body-worn video cameras (BWCs). BWC advocates
lauded the findings of an early study that attributed significant reductions in use of force
incidents and citizen complaints to the devices and it is this and a handful of other short-term
studies upon which the claims of these benefits are predicated. However, subsequent research
has produced mixed findings and the sustainability of any reductions remains questionable. The
limited knowledge concerning the impact of BWCs on the aforementioned outcomes is
problematic considering the potential negative impact of unrealistic expectations and the expense
of BWC program maintenance. The objective of this dissertation is to address gaps in the extant
research by exploring the impact of an incremental deployment of the devices on the frequency
and severity of use of force incidents and the frequency and outcome of citizen complaints while
controlling for staffing, volume of officer-initiated enforcement contacts, and the Ferguson
incident. Utilizing 86-months of secondary data collected from the Newport News, Virginia
Police Department (NNPD) a vector autoregressive multivariate time series analysis indicates
that BWCs were a significant factor in a substantial sustained reduction in use of force and a
substantial sustained increase in exonerated complaint dispositions at the NNPD.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
We know that on a daily basis, officers perform their jobs with distinction and provide
great service. They risk their lives, and this does not always receive the attention it
deserves. The good and hard work of police officers in America is being overshadowed
by the occurrence of what have been referred to as ‘lawful but awful’ incidents.
- Police Executive Research Forum, 2016, p. 119
Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, Eric Garner, Freddie Gray, Alton Sterling, and Philando
Castile—well-known names of African American males killed in questionable police use of
force incidents since 2014—are examples of high-profile “lawful but awful” incidents referred to
in the epigraph above. These and many other questionable uses force (both lethal and non-lethal)
and other abuses of authority disproportionately involving minority citizens have resulted in
public outcry, protests, and nationwide scrutiny of police.1 In response to the growing police
legitimacy crisis, President Obama appointed the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing to examine the issues and make recommendations for reform. In its final report the
President’s Task Force indicated that the legitimacy crisis is the most urgent issue facing
policing in the U.S. today and recognized the potential of body-worn cameras (BWCs) to
improve agency transparency and officer accountability (President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, 2015). Based on these perceived benefits, in December 2014, President Obama
committed $75 million in federal grant funding to help local law enforcement agencies equip
their officers with BWCs (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2014).

1

The terms police/police officer used hereinafter to refer to all law enforcement
agencies/officers with general policing responsibilities and arrest powers (e.g., municipal police
departments, sheriff’s departments, state police/highway patrol agencies, special jurisdiction
agencies such as transit police, etc.).
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Following the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown by a Ferguson, Missouri, police officer
(which was not captured on video), the benefits of BWCs received substantial media attention
and entered public discourse. The dialogue has focused on the increased transparency and
improved officer behavior that the devices are presumed to produce (Schneider, 2018). Bodyworn camera advocates assert that improved officer behavior manifests in reduced use of force
incidents and citizen complaints (White, 2014). Proponents and early implementers of BWCs
lauded the findings of a few small studies demonstrating these positive effects, and it is these few
studies on which the aforementioned claims are predicated (Farrar & Ariel, 2013; Mesa Police
Department, 2013).
The first U.S. study to measure the impact of BWCs on use of force and citizen
complaints was conducted at the Rialto, California, Police Department in 2012 and is frequently
cited by BWC advocates (Ariel, 2017). Farrar (who was the Rialto Chief of Police at the time
the study was conducted) and Ariel (2013) reported that BWCs reduced use of force incidents by
more than 50 percent and citizen complaints by 90 percent. However, these rather impressive
reductions represent relatively small raw counts in an agency of 115 sworn officers—a decrease
from 60 use of force incidents in the 12 months preceding the study to 25 during the 12-month
trial, and 28 complaints in the 12 months preceding the study to 3 during the 12-month trial
period (Farrar & Ariel, 2013).
Since the Rialto study, scholars have investigated these claims with more rigorous
research generating mixed results, but the U.S. studies that have been published are generally
limited to the examination of use of force and citizen complaint frequency in randomized
controlled trials of relatively short duration. Questions regarding sustainability of any reductions
in these outcomes, potential changes in the level of force employed (frequency of suspect injury),
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and potential changes in the proportion of exoneration and sustained complaint dispositions
remain largely unaddressed. Furthermore, few studies have examined a potential reduction in
officer-initiated activity, a “de-policing” effect, which some argue might occur when officers are
equipped with the devices and could be a factor in use of force and citizen complaint reductions.
Likewise, while police officer recruitment and retention difficulties have been widely reported in
recent years (Morison, 2017), extant BWC studies have not controlled for potential patrol
personnel shortages.
Despite the sparse evidence of their efficacy to reduce use of force and citizen
complaints, law enforcement agencies across the country are rapidly implementing BWCs.
According to a report generated by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 32 percent of U.S. police
departments had begun implementation of the devices by 2013, which was more than one year
prior to shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri (Reaves, 2015). Just two years
later a survey of Major Cities Chiefs and Major County Sheriff’s (2015) association member
agencies indicated that 95 percent had adopted BWCs, were in the process of implementing
them, or intended to implement them in the near future. The ramifications of unrealistic
expectations concerning the impact of BWCs cannot be overstated. Such unmet expectations
would likely exacerbate the current police legitimacy crisis. Therefore, more research is urgently
needed to examine the impact of the devices.
The current study of the Newport News, Virginia, Police Department’s implementation
and four years of experience with BWCs seeks to contribute to the limited body of BWC
literature in these areas, specifically, whether BWCs have a significant impact on the frequency
of use of force incidents, level and severity of force employed, and the frequency and
dispositions of citizen complaints when simultaneously considering staffing and volume of
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officer-initiated enforcement activity.
Statement of the Problem
Police officers are the most visible agents of government who, under a theoretical social
contract, are entrusted with the power to use coercive force—including physical force up to and
including deadly force within lawful parameters—to keep order through the enforcement of law
(Bittner, 1974). The controversy generated by the authority to coerce compliance with lawful
orders, detain, and arrest, using physical force to do so, if necessary, is compounded by the
ability of officers to exercise considerable discretion in the course of their enforcement activity
(Walker, 1993). Moreover, police officers have a great deal of autonomy because they are
frequently geographically separated from supervision (Weitzer, 2015). Police officers are
expected to bring their coercive power to bear on myriad situations involving crime and/or
disorder to achieve some sort of resolution (Bittner, 1974). They are expected to exercise sound
judgment and make thoughtful and proper decisions concerning matters of life and liberty of
citizens within the confines of a complex set of laws, often in rapidly evolving, stressful
confrontations with offenders and other hostile persons, including split-second decisions to use
physical force. Their decisions and actions are judged by police command staff and
administrators through the lens of agency policy, the judiciary through the lenses of
constitutional requirements, statutes, and case law, and most importantly, in the court of public
opinion.
Public perceptions of use of force, abuse of authority, and the consequences.
While competence in addressing crime is one component in citizen satisfaction with the
police, how officers perform their law enforcement duties is paramount. However, “regardless of
what true crime trends exist or how officers are actually interacting with community members,
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the citizens’ perceptions are the basis of their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with police” (Kyle &
Schafer, 2016, p. 287). Gallagher and colleagues (2001) assert that public opinion of the police is
developed through a complex nexus of influences, but that process related factors are most
impactful. For more than a decade before the Ferguson incident, criminal justice scholars and
practitioners alike have observed that citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy in the U.S. were
less than ideal, particularly poor among minorities, and increasingly linked with the concept of
procedural justice (Mazerolle, Bennett, Davis, Sargeant, & Manning, 2013).
Extensive research has demonstrated that the theoretical construct of procedural justice is
a critical factor in citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy and explains both the source of the
problem and the solution (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Tyler, 2014). Procedural justice in the context
of policing is simply treating every individual in a fair and respectful manner and allowing
citizens to have a voice during interactions with officers. According to Tyler (2014), “Procedural
justice can be viewed as a means to attaining legitimacy (the belief that the police ought to be
allowed to exercise their authority to maintain social order, manage conflicts and solve problems
in their communities…)” (p. 9). Conversely, procedural injustices, even perceived injustices,
have a negative impact on police legitimacy. Whether actual or perceived, unnecessary or
excessive use of force and other forms of abuse of authority have serious consequences.
While use of force in police-citizen contacts is relatively rare, when such instances do
arise, they bring to the forefront what is arguably the most controversial aspect of the police role,
and citizens are rightfully concerned with why, how, and against whom police use force.
Although most use of force incidents are determined to be legally justified, as Brandl (2018)
aptly states, “[e]ven when it is necessary and justified, the use of force never photographs well”
(p. 245). In many instances when a use of force is ruled justified in accordance with agency
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policy and legal parameters, many citizens do not share the same sentiment. This is especially
true when deadly force is used against an unarmed subject, or a given non-lethal use of force
appears to be unnecessary or excessive, hence the public outcry and civil unrest following the
shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and the subsequent clearance of the
officer involved from any wrongdoing (Kahn & Martin, 2016), and the public outrage following
police use of a Taser on an 86-year-old man in Kingstree, South Carolina (Wootson, 2017).
Likewise, citizens are concerned with other types of police abuse of authority, including
“verbal/psychological abuse” and “legal abuse/violation of civil rights abuse” (Carter, 1985, p.
322). The 2009 arrest of Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates Jr. for disorderly conduct by
Cambridge, Massachusetts, police, which drew the comment “police acted stupidly” from
President Obama, is one example of a perceived abuse of authority (Cooper, 2009). The arrest of
an emergency room nurse in Salt Lake City, Utah, for obstruction when she refused an officer’s
order to draw blood from an unconscious suspect (an action prohibited by hospital policy without
a search warrant) is another (Wang & Hawkins, 2017).
These are but a few examples of questionable uses of force and other possible abuses of
authority that have received substantial negative attention from the public. Advancements in
video recording technology that enable anyone with a cell phone to record any event and
instantly disseminate or even stream those recordings through social media has exacerbated the
police legitimacy problem. Citizen captured videos of perceived police mistreatment of citizens
have produced public skepticism concerning police enforcement activities and justification for
uses of force (Brucato, 2015). This skepticism and increased scrutiny are fueled in part by video
recordings that capture only a fraction of an incident, which leaves viewers to speculate about the
ethicality of, and justification for, an officer’s actions. Yet, many videos capture behavior that
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leaves little doubt about officer misconduct. Social media sites such as YouTube contain
numerous citizen-captured video recordings of police officers engaging in questionable uses of
physical force, making questionable arrests, and threatening and/or treating citizens
disrespectfully. Furthermore, many minority citizens relate encounters with police that suggest
the contact may have been the result of racial profiling (Epp, Maynard-Moody, & HaiderMarkel, 2014). Actual physical abuses of authority (unnecessary and excessive force), nonphysical abuses of authority (verbal/psychological abuse and legal abuse/violation of civil rights
abuse), or public perception of either produce considerable negative consequences. Of course,
humanitarian concerns are of utmost importance given that the lives and liberty of citizens are at
stake, but there are two other serious ramifications, the fiscal impact and damage to police
legitimacy.
First, citizen complaints concerning police abuses of authority can have a serious fiscal
impact. For instance, of the six cases named at the outset, lawsuits filed against police agencies
in five have resulted in large settlements or judgments: $1.5 million in the Michael Brown case
(Patrick, 2017); $6 million in the Tamir Rice case, $5.9 million in the Eric Garner case, $6.4
million in the Freddie Gray case (Berman & Lowery, 2016); and $3 million in the Philando
Castile case (Smith, 2017). According to Elinson and Frosch (2015):
The 10 [U.S.] cities with the largest police departments paid out $248.7 million last year
[2014] in settlements and court judgments in police misconduct cases, up 48% from
$168.3 million in 2010… Those cities collectively paid out $1.02 billion over those five
years in such cases, which include alleged beatings, shootings, and wrongful
imprisonment.
According to Balko (2014), settlements and judgments stemming from police misconduct cases
have cost the City of Chicago almost half a billion dollars in the last 10 years ($84.6 million in
2013 alone), and in the City of Baltimore:
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Over the past four years, more than 100 people have won court judgments or settlements
related to allegations of brutality and civil rights violations. Victims include a 15-year-old
boy riding a dirt bike, a 26-year-old pregnant accountant who had witnessed a beating, a
50-year-old woman selling church raffle tickets, a 65-year-old church deacon rolling a
cigarette and an 87-year-old grandmother aiding her wounded grandson. Those cases
detail a frightful human toll. Officers have battered dozens of residents who suffered
broken bones—jaws, noses, arms, legs, ankles—head trauma, organ failure, and even
death, coming during questionable arrests. Some residents were beaten while handcuffed;
others were thrown to the pavement. And in almost every case, prosecutors or judges
dismissed the charges against the victims—if charges were filed at all.
In fact, the Cato Institute’s (2012) National Police Misconduct Reporting Project calculated that
settlements and judgments in police misconduct cases totaled $346,512,800 nationwide in 2010.
Moreover, juries are increasingly more sympathetic to victims of police abuse of authority. On
February 16, 2018 a Baltimore County, Maryland jury awarded $38 million to the family of a
woman shot and killed by police (Stevens, 2018). While staggering, the fiscal impact is but one
of the negative consequences.
Second, and of more concern, is the negative impact on police legitimacy, which is
invaluable in a democratic society and difficult to restore when it is tarnished. A substantial and
growing body of research demonstrates that perceptions of fairness and treating citizens with
respect and dignity, the primary elements of procedural justice, are most impactful in terms of
public opinion of the police. For example, while it is obvious that a citizen who is treated
disrespectfully by an officer is highly likely to view such an interaction as unjust and leave the
encounter with a negative opinion of the police, Epp and colleagues (2014) found that when an
officer stops an African American citizen and he or she either fails to explain the reason for the
stop, or cites a seemingly trivial reason, the citizen is likely to feel they are being victimized.
Historically, the relationship between police and minorities, African Americans in particular, has
been strained. However, the advances in technology and media exposure of perceived
unnecessary or excessive force and other abuses of authority have increased this tension, which

9
largely constitutes the current legitimacy crisis (Kochel, 2019).
A 2016 poll conducted by Pew Research Center found that 75 percent of Whites believed
that police treated racial and ethnic minorities equally, but 67 percent of African Americans did
not believe that to be the case. Similarly, three-quarters of Whites believed that police were using
the right amount of force in most situations while 67 percent of African Americans disagreed.
Furthermore, the poll revealed that about two-thirds of African Americans believed police
officers were not held accountable for misconduct while an equal proportion of Whites believed
they were (Morin & Stepler, 2016). The Black Lives Matter movement and numerous public
protests reflect these findings.
Procedural injustices, or even the perception thereof, erodes police legitimacy. Not only
in terms of the individual who had the negative experience personally but will likely impact the
opinions of others vicariously (Brunson, 2007). Negative perceptions of police legitimacy impact
citizens’ willingness to obey the law, report crimes, identify as witnesses, or otherwise cooperate
and partner with police to address crime (Tyler, 2006). The fact that public opinion of police is
very poor among African American citizens is especially problematic as many high crime areas
are heavily minority populated, thus police effectiveness in addressing those crime problems is
likely hindered. Thus, minimizing use of force and officer behaviors that generate citizen
complaints is crucial.
Body-Worn Cameras, a Potential Solution?
BWCs are small, self-contained, digital video recording devices that attach to an officer’s
shirt, or are mounted on glasses, hats, or a headband and are a notable advancement from earlier
forms of video recording technology utilized by police. In-car video systems, which have been in
use by police since the 1980s, only capture activity immediately in front of a police vehicle,
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seriously limiting their utility for recording police-citizen interactions in their entirety. The small
size of BWCs, hands-free portability, and ability to operate and store video for full tours of duty
overcome the limitations of in-car video systems. Video recording is initiated and ended by the
officer manually activating/deactivating the camera; however, most BWCs on the market
continuously record on a 15 second to 2-minute loop (depending on the product) in order to
capture and preserve events immediately preceding camera activation (Hung, Babin, & Coberly,
2016). While BWCs allow officers to potentially record all police-citizen interactions, each
agency sets forth its own policy regarding what types of police-citizen encounters officers are
required to record, and conversely, what types they are prohibited from recording (The
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights & Upturn, 2017). The devices store all the
captured video, which is typically downloaded into a server system or to a cloud-based storage
service at the end of each shift by placing the camera in a dual-purpose cradle/port that also
charges the BWC’s battery. BWCs and their video data storage systems generally prevent
editing, deleting, copying, or altering recorded video before or after download, except for
redaction of copies by authorized persons to fulfill FOIA requests (Hung et al., 2016; Miller,
Toliver, & Police Executive Research Forum, 2014).
While BWCs have received considerable attention in the U.S. recently, they were first
piloted in the U.K. as early as 2005 (White, 2014). Although some pilot programs had already
begun in the U.S., the devices first received attention in media coverage following the July 2013
Federal District Court decision in Floyd v. City of New York. In Floyd, the court ruled that the
New York City Police Department engaged in a discriminatory pattern or practice in their “stop
and frisk” program disproportionately targeting African American males. As a remedy, the court
ordered NYPD to equip officers in the highest offending precincts with BWCs to enhance
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oversight and prevent racial profiling (Goldstein, 2013).
Several high-profile police use of force incidents have occurred since the Floyd decision,
in turn raising awareness of BWCs. The August 9, 2014 shooting death of Michael Brown in
Ferguson, Missouri, was particularly pivotal. Brown, an unarmed African American teenager,
was shot and killed by white Ferguson Police Officer Darren Wilson during an enforcement
contact in which Brown was a suspect. The Michael Brown incident was not captured on video
as the Ferguson Police Department was not so equipped, and the accounts of Officer Wilson and
witnesses differed markedly (Fantz, 2014; United States Department of Justice, 2015). These
conflicting reports, combined with the lack of video, raised public suspicions. The ruling of the
U.S. Department of Justice (2015) that Officer Wilson’s use of force was justified exacerbated
this situation. The skepticism and suspicion surrounding the Michael Brown shooting and other
questionable use of force incidents and perceived abuses of authority resulted in increased
scrutiny of police by the public, civil rights advocacy organizations, and politicians. Demands for
more transparency have prompted calls to equip police officers with BWCs (Lum, Koper,
Merola, Scherer, & Reioux, 2015; President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015).
Presumably, the video captured by the devices would be made available to the public in
order to increase transparency. The availability of video for public inspection in questionable
cases of police enforcement activity (especially questionable use of force incidents) is
increasingly important to public perceptions of police legitimacy (Stanley, 2014). Proponents of
BWCs argue that if every police officer were equipped with a device that, with few exceptions
(perhaps due to legitimate mechanical failure, or intentional sabotage by an officer), any police
enforcement encounter with a citizen could be subject to review. Questions concerning the
appropriateness or legality of any police officer action would no longer be answered based
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primarily on official officer accounts of an incident but would be determined by the objective
examination of the captured video; swifter investigations of complaints and more conclusive
dispositions are anticipated as a result (Harris, 2010). BWC advocates assert that the new level of
transparency generated by the devices would increase police accountability, which should
elevate public perceptions of police legitimacy. However, many scholars and practitioners argue
that the increased transparency and accountability generated by BWCs is the catalyst for a much
more impactful benefit of the devices: improved police officer behavior consistent with the
tenets of procedural justice, which is purportedly manifest in reduced use of force incidents and
citizen complaints.
A theoretical framework has been proffered to explain this anticipated impact of BWCs,
including theories that address the dynamics of coercive actions, deterrence theory, and objective
self-awareness theory (Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015). Ariel and colleagues (2015) contend
that a combination of situational, psychological, and organizational factors influence a police
officer’s decision to use force, and potentially to abuse their authority. BWCs are anticipated to
have an impact on all three. The devices are not only thought to deter officers from hastily using
force or engaging in misconduct, but many claim that BWCs also serve as a stimulus to behave
in a professional and courteous manner, which has been referred to as a “civilizing effect”
(White, 2014), and described as procedurally just conduct (Hedberg, Katz, & Choate, 2017).
This notion is derived from objective self-awareness theory. Ariel and colleagues (2015) assert
that the devices produce a state of objective self-awareness that enhances the deterrent effect.
Based on this theoretical framework, which is supported by the results of the Rialto study
and a few other small randomized controlled trials, some BWC advocates answer the question
posed in this section’s heading, “are BWCs a potential solution?” with a resounding “yes.”
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However, considering there have been a limited number of studies published that examined the
impact of BWCs on use of force and/or citizen complaints, the majority of which have been
randomized controlled trials of relatively short duration, and that they have produced mixed
results, there is little evidence to date for the efficacy of BWCs to positively affect officer
behavior. In contrast, one international study found that use of force incidents increased with the
implementation of BWCs (Ariel et al., 2016). Noticeably missing from the literature are adequate
controls for a potential de-policing effect and potential personnel shortages, both of which would
likely impact use of force and citizen complaint rates. These gaps in the research are a salient
issue due to the aforementioned importance of realistic expectations concerning BWC efficacy,
and the substantial expense of BWC programs.
While the $75 million in grant funding that the Obama administration committed to
equipping police officers with BWCs is a substantial investment, it is insignificant compared to
the total expenditures required to establish and maintain BWC programs across the country. For
example, the City of Duluth, Minnesota, equipped 110 officers with BWCs which are generating
between 8,000 and 10,000 videos per month. They store most videos for 30 days and their 3-year
contract for storage fees is $78,000 (Bakst & Foley, 2015). The City of Baltimore estimated
video storage costs associated with full implementation of BWCs at the Baltimore Police
Department of approximately $2.6 million per year (Newcombe, 2015). The five-year contract
between Axon (a company formerly known as Taser and a major manufacturer of BWCs and
provider of video storage and management services) and the City of San Diego alone included
1,000 cameras with a purchase price of $267,000 and $3.6 million for maintenance and video
storage (Bakst & Foley, 2015). Moreover, these expenses do not include the human resource
costs associated with managing the video recordings and redacting them as necessary to fulfill
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FOIA requests, nor for the additional time required for officers to download and catalog the
captured video (Major Cities Chiefs and Major County Sheriffs, 2015). For instance, according
to Bakst and Foley (2015), storage fees for 150 BWCs at the Berkeley, California, Police
Department are approximately $45,000 a year. In addition to those fees, the program will require
assigning up to two full time employees to manage the video, and it will require officers to spend
up to 30 minutes per shift dealing with recorded video. Bakst and Foley (2015) calculate the
latter as the equivalent of the total hours worked by five full-time officers annually. The mixed
empirical evidence is of concern considering the expense of BWC programs and limited police
agency budgets. Although the initial purchase of the devices appears to be manageable, the
associated program maintenance costs are a large recurring line item sure to draw resources away
from other initiatives and endeavors, and these costs grow exponentially as the number of
cameras increases.
The Purpose and Significance of the Study
The Newport News, Virginia, Police Department’s (NNPD) experience with BWCs
offers a unique opportunity to address the gap in the research identified above and granted the
researcher unfettered access to their internal data necessary to make such a contribution to the
literature. NNPD is a mid-size East coast police department of 440 sworn officers and 153 nonsworn personnel serving a population of approximately 180,000. The command staff of NNPD
began implementation of BWCs in May 2013, more than one full year prior to the Ferguson
incident and the intense nationwide scrutiny of police that followed, because they recognized that
the devices would be beneficial in increasing transparency, resolving citizen complaints, and
reducing liability. More importantly, the implementation of this innovative technology was well
underway prior to the intense attention that BWCs have received and the pressure to equip police
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officers with the devices. NNPD’s deployment of BWCs to all 284 patrol personnel occurred
incrementally in several waves spanning 3 years beginning with a 10 BWC pilot in May 2013
and an additional 44 of the devices by December of that year, another 30 by the end of 2014, 175
more during 2015, and the final 25 BWCs in the first half of 2016. This staggered rollout of the
devices was due to budget constraints, which is not uncommon for larger agencies.
The objective of the study is to explore the impact of the devices on the frequency and
severity of use of force incidents and the frequency and outcome of citizen complaints while
controlling for staffing and volume of officer-initiated enforcement contacts. The current quasiexperimental study utilizes secondary data collected from the Newport News, Virginia Police
Department for an 86-month period: May 2010 through June 2017; 36 months prior to the
beginning of BWC implementation and the 50 months following, which includes 12 months post
full implementation. The data includes computer assisted dispatch data, use of force data, citizen
complaint data, and officer payroll data. A series of t tests, autoregressive, integrated, moving
average (ARIMA) and vector autoregression (VAR/VARX) time series analyses are employed to
address the following research questions:
Research Questions
1. What were the effects of BWCs on use of force?
1a. If the frequency of use of force incidents was reduced, was the reduction
sustained?
1b. If the frequency of use of force incidents was reduced, was there an incremental
decline with waves of BWC implementation, or did any decline plateau or decay
over the course of implementation?
1c. Was there a change in the severity of force used (citizen injuries)?
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1d. Did BWCs have a significant impact on these outcomes when simultaneously
considering staffing and volume of officer-initiated enforcement activity?
2. What were the effects of BWCs on citizen complaints?
2a. If the frequency of citizen complaints was reduced, was the reduction sustained?
2b. If the frequency of citizen complaints was reduced, was there an incremental
decline with waves of BWC implementation, or did any decline plateau or decay
over the course of implementation?
2c. Was there a change in the proportion of sustained complaints compared to those
unfounded, unsubstantiated, or in which the officer was exonerated?
2d. Did BWCs have a significant impact on these outcomes when simultaneously
considering staffing and volume of officer-initiated enforcement activity?
Overview of the Dissertation
The dissertation is presented as follows. Chapter 2 begins with an overview of use of
force, abuse of authority, and citizen complaints, followed by a review of relevant literature
regarding the theoretical framework offered by BWC advocates as the basis for their claims. The
chapter continues with a review of extant research that has examined the impact of BWCs on use
of force and citizen complaints and concludes with a review of the literature regarding a potential
de-policing effect. Chapter 3 presents the research methods, including details regarding the study
site, data collection, conceptualization and operationalization of the dependent, independent, and
control variables, and a description of the statistical techniques utilized for the analysis. The
results of the analysis are presented in Chapter 4, followed by a discussion of the conclusions,
implications, and future research needs in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The focus of the current study is the presumed impact of BWCs on police officer
behavior, which in turn is believed to reduce use of force and citizen complaints. The anticipated
impact on officer behavior and subsequent outcomes is based on a theoretical framework that
includes social interactionist theory of coercive actions, deterrence, and objective self-awareness
theories. While this study is not a test of theory, a review of the applicable literature regarding
this framework is helpful to establish the basis for the claims made by BWC proponents
concerning the benefits of the devices (Farrar & Ariel, 2013; Ariel, Farrar & Sutherland, 2015).
Thus, this chapter begins with an overview of use of force, abuse of authority, and citizen
complaints, followed by a review of the theoretical framework, which, BWC proponents suggest,
supports the notion that equipping officers with the devices will deter them from escalating
enforcement encounters and increase their professionalism and courtesy. This anticipated
positive impact on officer behavior is presumed to manifest in reduced use of force incidents and
citizen complaints. Presentation of the extant published studies that examined the impact of
BWCs on use of force and citizen complaints follows, and the chapter concludes with a
discussion of a potential confounding factor, a possible de-policing effect.
Use of Force, Abuse of Authority, and Citizen Complaints
While most instances of police use of force are determined to be appropriate, and officers
are authorized to use force and expected to do so when it is justified to enforce the law and
maintain public safety, the legal parameters for the justification of use of force are vague. Even
legally justified uses of force can, and often are perceived by citizens as an abuse of authority
and can have a negative impact on police legitimacy. While unnecessary, inappropriate, and/or
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excessive force are serious abuses of authority, there are other forms that are extremely harmful
as well. Verbal and legal abuses can have a serious negative impact on the victim including
psychological harm and unjust negative consequences in matters of life and liberty.
Identifying the correlates of use of force and abuse of authority and estimating the
frequency of these phenomena accurately has been elusive. First, researchers have substantial
methodological difficulty studying the behavior of police officers, especially unethical and/or
illegal behaviors (Hickman & Poore, 2016; Son & Rome, 2004). Second, no consistent method
of data collection on use of force incidents exists across law enforcement agencies, and although
citizen complaints are often used as a proxy measure for police abuses of authority, there is good
reason to believe that many such abuses go unreported (Lersch, 2002). Thus, police abuse of
authority, especially the less serious forms, likely occurs much more frequently than the volume
of citizen complaints indicates.
Regardless of whether a citizen subjected to a perceived unjust use of force or other
abuse of authority files a complaint, their attitudes concerning police are negatively impacted as
are those of others who witness and similarly perceive such an encounter and those with whom
the encounter is communicated (Kochel, 2019; Son, Tsang, Rome, & Davis, 1997). Thus, any
use of force incident or perceived abuse of authority, whether it generates a citizen complaint or
not, is potentially damaging to police legitimacy. The sections that follow provide an overview
of the relevant concepts, frequencies, and correlates of use of force, abuse of authority, and
citizen complaints.
Use of force.
There is some ambiguity regarding what constitutes police use of force and a universal
definition has been elusive. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (2001) defines use
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of force as “that amount of effort required by police to compel compliance from an unwilling
subject” (p. 1). The Police Foundation (2016) defines it as “the means of compelling compliance
or overcoming resistance to an officer’s commands in order to protect life or property or to take a
person into custody” (p. 1). Garner, Schade, Hepburn, and Buchanan (1995) asserted that police
use of force should be defined as “behaviors by individuals that intentionally threaten, attempt,
or inflict physical harm on others (Reiss & Roth, 1993, p. 2),” which is, in essence, the National
Academy of Sciences definition of “violence” (p. 152). Whether police use of force refers to the
application of physical force only, or includes other forms of non-physical coercion, varies
across the literature.
The Newport News Police Department’s (2017) use of force policy, which is utilized for
the conceptualization of use of force in this study, defines force as follows:
Deadly Force: Any use of force that is reasonably likely to cause death. Non-Deadly
Force: Any use of force other than that which is considered deadly force. This includes
any physical effort used to control or restrain another, or to overcome the resistance of
another (p. 1).
While the NNPD (2017) use of force policy defines use of force in terms of physical contact, it
notes that verbal commands may legally constitute force:
All officers who encounter a situation where the possibility of violence or resistance to
lawful arrest is present should, if possible, attempt to defuse the situation through advice,
warning, and verbal persuasion. NOTE: Verbal directions can legally qualify as use of
force. In the event that a situation escalates beyond the effective use of verbal techniques
to defuse the situation, officers are authorized to employ Department trained or approved
compliance techniques…if resistance escalates, officers are authorized to respond in
accordance with their training in reasonable force options (p. 2).
However, the NNPD (2017) policy requires officers to complete a use of force report only for
physical uses of force excluding low level control holds in which there is no complaint of injury
and the subject did not engage in “defensive or active resistance against the officer” (p. 8).
Official use of force reports are frequently used to measure use of force when it is conceptualized
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as physical actions despite the obvious limitation of potential underreporting (Garner et al.,
1995). This limitation, combined with the inconsistency in the conceptualization and
measurement of use of force and issues associated with direct observation and survey methods,
makes estimating the frequency of occurrence difficult.
Frequency of use of force.
At the outset it is important to note that no reliable national data collection method for
police use of force exists, neither for deadly nor non-lethal, and studies conducted to estimate the
frequency of police use of force have operationalized force differently utilizing a variety of
metrics (Garner, Hickman, Malega, & Maxwell, 2018; Nix, Campbell, Byers, & Alpert, 2017).
Nevertheless, extant research utilizing both citizen and police administrative surveys as methods
of estimation indicates that the threat and/or use of non-lethal physical force is a relatively rare
occurrence in police-citizen contacts overall (Adams et al., 1999; Eith & Durose, 2011; Garner et
al, 2018). According to a 2015 Bureau of Justice Statistics report in which data from the 2002,
2005, 2008, and 2011 Police-Public Contact Surveys (PPCS) were examined, a little more than
1.5 percent of citizens surveyed reported that officers threatened to use force or actually used
force on them during an encounter with police (Hyland, Langton, & Davis, 2015). However,
estimations of the frequency of use of force can be misleading when comparing the occurrence to
all police-citizen contacts, considering a substantial portion are not enforcement contacts and the
majority do not involve arrest (Eith & Durose, 2011). In addition, citizen self-report surveys such
as the PPCS exclude those incarcerated in local jails or prisons, a population likely to contain a
substantial number who experienced police use of force (Hickman, Piquero, & Garner, 2008).
Use of force rates in relation to arrests are arguably a more informative indicator of
frequency. According to Garner and colleagues (2002), prior research has indicated that force is
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used in 0.8% to 58.1% of arrests, and this wide range is due to the variety of operational
definitions of use of force in the literature. However, utilizing officer completed reports in a
sample of 7,512 arrests at six different agencies they found that physical force (which included
only actual application of physical force, excluded light control holds, and did not include threat
of force – e.g., displaying/pointing a weapon) ranged from 12.7% to 22.9% of arrests (Garner,
Maxwell, & Heraux, 2002). Hickman and colleagues (2008) utilized both PPCS data and the
Survey of Inmates in Local Jails (SILJ) to estimate the frequency of nonlethal force used in
arrests. According to Hickman et al. (2008), “We estimate that the police use or threaten to use
force in 1.7% of all contacts and in 20.0% of all arrests” (p. 563). Consistent with previous
studies, they found that the largest proportion of use of force incidents were at the lowest levels
of severity. Hickman et al. (2008) also noted that “males, youths, and racial minorities report
greater rates of police use of force” (p. 563). Notwithstanding the measurement issues, a
considerable amount of literature has been published on the correlates of use of force, and these
variables have frequently emerged as significant predictors.
Correlates of use of force.
Comprehensive reviews of the extensive empirical research literature regarding the
correlates of use of force have been conducted by Sherman (1980), Riksheim and Chermak
(1993), National Research Council (2004), and Klam and Tillyer (2010). Five different factor
categories were utilized as an organizing framework in these reviews, which include
characteristics of the community and the organization, situational variables associated with the
encounter, and characteristics of both the individual officer and suspect. Bolger (2015)
conducted a meta-analysis of use of force studies published from 1995 to 2013 examining the
variables identified in the aforementioned reviews and found that while none of the community
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characteristics were significant, “those variables that tap into what occurs during an encounter
and characteristics of the potential target of force seem to have the greatest impact on the
likelihood of force being used” (p. 483). Significant encounter related variables included the
seriousness of the offense, whether an arrest was made, whether the suspect resisted arrest,
whether there was conflict between citizens, the number of officers on scene, and whether the
encounter was officer initiated; suspect characteristics that emerged as significant included race,
sex, demeanor, socio-economic class, and intoxication (Bolger, 2015).
While offense seriousness, arrest, resisting arrest, and conflict between citizens can all be
considered legal factors and appropriate considerations in the use of force calculus under certain
circumstances, clearly the race, sex, socio-economic class, demeanor, and intoxicated state of the
suspect, or the mere presence of more officers absent resistance or an eminent threat of physical
harm to themselves, other officers, or citizens, are inappropriate extralegal factors and should not
have any impact on an officer’s decision to apply physical force. These findings add to the
already problematic nature of determining the justification for a given use of force.
Justification for use of force.
Each use of force incident must be assessed according to its unique circumstances and
through the lens of the objective reasonableness standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court
in the 1989 Graham v. Connor decision, which states:
The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of
a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight… The
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are
often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation
(p. 490).
It is important to note that the Graham decision sets the minimum standard or threshold for
justification of use of force and it is vague. While most use of force incidents are determined to
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be legally justified in accordance with the objective reasonableness standard, there is often
disagreement about the ‘reasonableness” of a given use of force (Alpert & Smith, 1994; Pew
Research Center, 2014; Worden, 1995). The 20/20 hindsight prohibition creates ambiguity,
which drives much of this disagreement, and it undoubtedly masks some abuses of authority.
Regarding the 20/20 hindsight prohibition, Lyle and Esmail (2016) note that policing “is
the only occupation that provides such relief from remedy for actions that does not contemplate
or provide for analysis of decision making under a postmortem review” (p. 179). For example,
they point out that pilots must make split-second decisions as well, and mistakes can have
catastrophic consequences. When an aviation accident or incident occurs, a thorough
investigation is conducted to determine the causes. Pilots are not afforded immunity for errors.
The same can be said of medical professionals and myriad other professions. Policing is of
course unique in that enforcement of the law involves danger of physical harm from subjects
who are compelled to avoid apprehension, and failure to make split-second decisions to defend
oneself can cost an officer their life. However, through poor judgment and errors an officer can
construct circumstances that require the use of force, a phenomenon that Fyfe (2005) termed the
split-second syndrome.
According to Fyfe (2005), “unnecessary violence occurs when well-meaning officers
prove incapable of dealing with the situations they encounter without needless or too hasty resort
to force” (p. 207). He argues that when officers rush into situations and confront suspects
without utilizing cover and concealment, they often place themselves in a situation that requires
a rapid decision to use force with limited information. Fyfe further asserts that incompetence
often leads to escalation rather than de-escalation of tense encounters. The 20/20 hindsight
prohibition in the Graham decision reinforces the split-second syndrome; by ignoring an
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officer’s decisions and actions prior to the moment of the force decision, the actual necessity to
use force in a given enforcement contact is not ascertained (Fyfe, 2005).
While the Graham decision requires the objective analysis of only the information
available to the officer at the moment he or she decided to use force, there is an unavoidable
subjective element in one’s assessment. Alpert and Smith (1994) referred to it as “subjective
objectivity,” and it makes consensus on whether a given use of force is reasonable or
unnecessary/excessive highly unlikely. They argue that such judgments are shaped by one’s
experiences and attitudes. Therefore, individual police officers may view the dynamics of an
enforcement encounter and the necessity of a given use of force differently depending on their
previous experience and training, and likewise, citizens may judge the reasonableness of the
same incident entirely differently than police and disagree with one another (Alpert & Smith,
1994). This subjectivity is evident in the following example cited by Ariel and colleagues
(2015):
Adams (1996: 53) cites a famous disagreement between a team of field researchers led by
Reiss (1968) and a panel of experts from the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1976), which aptly describes the
measurement problem. The two teams could not agree on what constitutes “improper useof-force”, even though they were both scrutinizing the same incidents. Though dated, the
problem they encountered still persists today (p. 514).
In summation, the police are empowered to use non-negotiable coercion, including
physical force when necessary, and ultimately there will always be some circumstances in which
force is justified in police work (Bittner, 1990; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). However, as Adams
(2005) points out, “the amount of force used should be proportional to the threat and limited to
the least amount required to accomplish legitimate police action” (p. 451). Unfortunately, that is
not always the case. Moreover, there is widespread public perception that biases often impact
enforcement decisions, including the application of physical force, through consideration of
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extralegal factors. As Weisburd, Greenspan, Hamilton, Bryant, and Williams (2001) asserted,
“the potential abuse and actual abuse of such authority remain both a central problem for police
agencies and a central public policy concern” (p. 12). This continues to be the case nearly two
decades after that statement was made.
Abuse of authority.
The term “police brutality” has been and continues to be commonly used to describe
officer misconduct involving inappropriate or unlawful exercise of police powers. According to
Reiss (1968), “[w]hat citizens mean by police brutality covers the full range of police
practices…” (p. 11). He listed behaviors ranging from the use of profanity to abuses of power
including unlawful searches and unwarranted use of force. However, Carter (1985) argued that
the term “brutality” is nebulous, failing to capture the different behaviors it is meant to represent,
and that “abuse of authority” is more descriptive. Carter’s (1985) abuse of authority typology
includes three categories of abuse: Physical abuse/excessive force, verbal/psychological abuse,
and legal abuse/violation of civil rights. According to Carter (1985), “The underlying construct
in the typology is that a police officer has exercised power by virtue of his/her office in a manner
that is not consistent with law or ethical cannons” (p. 323). Carter’s typology provides a clearer
conceptualization of the three forms of abuse, however, determining whether a police officer’s
behavior and actions in a given encounter are a legitimate exercise of his or her authority or are
an abuse of their powers can be difficult. While the difficulty of determining the reasonableness
of a given use of force has been addressed, determining whether an officer’s behavior and
actions constitute verbal/psychological abuse or legal abuse/violation of civil rights can be
equally problematic. For example, while there is little doubt that a 2017 incident in which an
Orlando, Florida officer threatened a man with bodily harm, and arrest, and challenged him to
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physically resist in a profanity laced tirade constituted abuse of authority (Von Ancken, 2017),
the 2013 arrest of a motorist by a University of Central Florida (UCF) police officer is
questionable. In the latter case a white male UCF officer was citing an African American female
for an inoperative brake light and she refused to roll her window down completely per the
officer’s request. The woman asked the officer to pass the citation through the partially rolleddown window instead. After a brief verbal exchange the officer ordered the woman to exit her
vehicle using forceful verbal commands. Ultimately, when she failed to comply, the officer
broke the window, forced the woman to the ground, and arrested her (Weiner, 2014). The
woman filed a complaint against the officer alleging that the officer abused his authority and that
she believed the incident was racially motivated. Although she was not required to sign a citation
per Florida law, the officer was exonerated following an internal investigation. The UCF Police
Department released the officer’s body-worn camera captured video of the incident, which
subsequently went viral on social media and became the subject of heated public controversy.
Brunson and Miller’s (2005) research provides further examples of verbal/psychological
and legal/violation of civil rights abuses of authority. Their qualitative study was based on
interviews of 40 young African American men in St. Louis, Missouri regarding their personal
and vicarious experiences with police officers. Most of the sample reported being subjected to
harassment, disrespect, verbal abuse, and either experiencing unwarranted searches and physical
force or witnessing such incidents (see also, Brunson, 2007; Gau & Brunson, 2010). While
ridiculing, harassing, using profanity toward, or searching a citizen without legal justification are
clearly abuses of authority, as indicated in the UCF incident above, determining whether
aggressive verbal commands, threats, exigent circumstances for warrantless searches, and
detention/arrests are reasonable can be problematic in many cases. Often, even when such
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actions are determined to be in accordance with departmental policy and legally justified by
authorities, they are viewed as an abuse of authority by citizens, and thus might be classified as
“lawful but awful” incidents or practices. The potential for officers to engage in biased policing,
and perception of many citizens that it likely occurs frequently, complicates these judgments.
Bias-based policing is a form of abuse of authority that may span all three categories of
Carter’s typology and has been defined as “practices by individual officers, supervisors,
managerial practices, and departmental programs, both intentional and nonintentional, that
incorporate prejudicial judgments based on sex, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
economic status, religious beliefs, or age that are inappropriately applied” (Ioimo, Tears,
Meadows, Becton, & Charles, 2007, p. 271). However, this definition does not necessarily
contain an exhaustive list. Factors such as political leanings, membership in an organization, and
behavior or appearance that violates societal norms could be included as well (Kappeler, Sluder,
& Alpert, 1998; National Research Council, 2004). In short, any such extralegal factors that an
officer or agency inappropriately applies in making impactful discretionary choices, such as the
decision to make an investigatory stop, constitutes bias-based policing.
Correlates & frequency of abuse of authority.
Carter (1994) asserted that any given abuse of authority is either intentional or reactive.
As the term suggests, intentional abuse “is that which is overtly and consciously imposed by the
officer. Conversely, reactive abuse exists in response to stimuli or conditions without any overt,
conscious decision to inflict the abuse” (Carter, 1994, p. 275). He described intentional abuses of
authority as retaliation for some perceived provocation or a punishment for a specific action or
behavior, whereas a reactive abuse of authority is unintentional although it may be precipitated
by similar stimuli. According to Carter a combination of stressors, which include life threatening
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stressors, social isolation stressors, organizational stressors, functional stressors, personal
stressors, physiological stressors, and psychological stressors, can trigger either. One of these
major stressors is citizen disrespect toward officers and refusal to defer to their authority.
An extensive body of research examining the impact of citizen demeanor on police
officer behavior has consistently found that citizens who are disrespectful towards police are
treated more punitively (cf., Klinger, 1994). In fact, Engel, Tillyer, Klahm, and Frank (2012)
document 50 studies that linked citizen demeanor to police officer behavior, which they assert
was unchallenged until Klinger’s (1994) study of police-citizen encounters in Miami-Dade,
Florida. Klinger argued that in previous studies citizen demeanor had been operationalized in
such a way that illegal behaviors were included (e.g., non-compliance with lawful orders,
disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, etc.), and when such behaviors were excluded, citizen
demeanor would not be a significant factor in officer decision making/conduct. The results of
Klinger’s study supported his assertion. However, Engel and colleagues (2012) point out that
citizen demeanor was a significant predictor of police officer behavior in an additional seven
“post- Klinger” studies, which operationalized citizen demeanor per his suggestion (see Engel et
al., 2012). In addition, recent studies have demonstrated that citizen demeanor is a factor in
police officers’ assessments of threat (Nix, Pickett, Wolfe, & Campbell, 2017), and decisions to
escalate to forceful verbal commands (James, James, & Vila, 2018).
The colloquialism “contempt of cop” refers to this type of demeanor—a display of
disrespect, hostile attitude, and or challenge to an officer’s authority. Van Maanen (1978)
documented that officers referred to citizens who failed to defer to their authority in this way as
“assholes” and observed that they were often treated harshly. Natapoff (2017) argues that
citizens who commit “contempt of cop” are often arrested on charges of disorderly conduct,
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obstructing an officer, or other types of vaguely defined violations for nothing more than failing
to adhere to the officer’s conception of proper comportment. Moreover, Holmes (2016) argues
that these individuals are often charged with resisting arrest as well.
In terms of improper force (unnecessary or excessive), Harris (2009) conducted a
systematic review of the research literature and concluded that “[w]hat research there is suggests
that situational factors have the most substantive impact on police use of improper force within
police-citizen encounters…” (p.25). Similar to the correlates of use of force in general, studies
have found that citizens who are intoxicated, antagonistic toward officers, and/or of lower socioeconomic class are significantly more likely to be subjected to improper force and those odds are
increased with the presence of citizen onlookers or more officers (Friedrich, 1980; Reiss, 1968;
Worden, 1995). Thus, the literature regarding improper use of force suggests that a suspect’s
demeanor could indeed trigger this type of abuse of authority, especially when combined with
one or more of the other aforementioned factors.
These studies involving observation of police-citizen encounters all indicated that the use
of improper force is relatively infrequent. Reiss (1968) reported the highest percentage of
improper uses of force at 2.4% of the police-citizen encounters observed, while Friedrich (1980)
and Worden (1995) reported 1.8% and 1.3% respectively. However, Harris (2009) points out that
the accuracy of these results should be viewed with a fair amount of skepticism due to the rather
low scientific rigor of these few studies. Moreover, although these studies are all dated, one
cannot rule out the likelihood of officer reactivity to the observers, which raises questions
concerning the validity of the results as well.
Several theoretical perspectives have been applied in an attempt to identify the correlates
of other abuses of authority (verbal/psychological abuse and legal abuse/violation of civil rights).
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Some of these involve the asymmetry of police-citizen interactions, which speaks to officer
reactions to citizen demeanor and “contempt of cop,” and other situational factors that might lead
officers to pursue a “just” outcome through unethical or unlawful means (such as unlawful
searches), which has been referred to as “noble cause corruption” (Klockars, 1980). Bias, either
implicit or explicit, is also commonly proposed as a correlate.
The potential for prejudice or stereotypes and implicit bias to impact an officer’s
decisions is rooted in their power to engage in selective enforcement, which is to choose when,
where, and how to enforce which laws and, according to Davis (1969), “such power goes to
selection of parties against whom the law is enforced…” (p.163). Although all of the
aforementioned extra-legal factors that an officer might consider in his or her selection of whom
to engage in an enforcement contact and/or how they treat the subject of an enforcement
encounter are of concern, race is clearly inappropriate and the most problematic. According to
Epp and colleagues (2014):
Whether their choices are biased by race depends on how they see the social world: who
is seen as ‘suspicious,’ ‘out of place,’ or simply ‘unusual’ determines who is stopped,
questioned, and pressed for consent to be searched. Unfortunately, a large body of
research demonstrates that most people in the contemporary United States, police officers
included, cannot help but assume that racial minorities are more likely to be dangerous or
engaged in criminality (p. 40).
The stereotype described above is applied to African Americans in particular, and the practice of
effecting investigatory traffic or pedestrian stops based on racial stereotypes is commonly
referred to as “racial profiling.”
Extensive research has shown that minority citizens (young African American males in
particular) are disproportionately subjected to intrusive proactive enforcement contacts (Smith,
Rojek, Petrocelli, & Withrow, 2017). For example, Faggan and Davies (2000) found that African
Americans were subjected to stop and frisks at a rate five times higher than whites in New York
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City. A considerable number of studies have found that African Americans are also
disproportionately subjected to investigatory traffic stops (see Smith et al., 2017; Epp et al., 2014
for review). According to Brunson and Miller (2005), “young black men are widely viewed as
‘symbolic assailants’ in the popular imagination (Quillian and Pager 2001), in the criminal
justice system broadly (Bridges and Steen 1998; Kennedy 1997) and among the police
specifically (Anderson 1990; Skolnick 1994)” (p. 615), and they argue that being
disproportionately targeted for proactive enforcement contacts has deleterious impact on
minority views concerning police legitimacy in general (see also Epp et al., 2014).
Verbal/psychological abuse and legal abuse/violation of civil rights are believed to be
more pervasive than physical abuse, however, the actual frequency is even more difficult to
accurately estimate. For example, Brunson and Miller (2005) found that:
Complaints of persistent harassment and disrespectful treatment were the most
widespread in our interviews, and came from both delinquent and non-delinquent young
men. These youths described repeated instances of being verbally abused by officers’ use
of antagonistic language, name calling, profanity, and derogatory remarks; and also
protested against the physically invasive nature of police stops, including public cavity
and strip searches (p. 635).
Citizen complaints are most often used as a proxy measure of all forms of abuse of authority, but
have some serious limitations.
Citizen complaints.
While citizen complaints are often used as a proxy measure for inappropriate, unethical,
or unlawful behavior (officer abuse of authority), Terrill and McCluskey (2002) point out that
there are different perspectives regarding what they actually indicate. First, they are indicative of
the citizen’s perceptions about what occurred and, in many cases, may not be a reliable source of
data about the appropriateness of an officer’s behavior in a given encounter. Second, it may be a
means of retaliation for a sanction received by a citizen from an officer and contain
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embellishments of the facts. Third, they may be an indicator of real or potentially problematic
officer behavior. Lastly, citizen complaints may be an indicator of officer productivity.
Another methodological problem with using citizen complaints as a proxy measure for
officer abuse of authority is the likelihood of under-reporting. There are several reasons why
officer abuse of authority may go unreported via citizen complaint: The system for filing a
complaint employed by a given department may be cumbersome and time consuming, some
citizens might fear reprisal (e.g., if the evidence is weak perhaps a criminal charge of filing a
false report), and some citizens may believe that officers protect one another and filing a
complaint would be futile (Brandl, Stroshine, & Frank, 2001). In any event, citizen complaints
are problematic in terms of police legitimacy (Terrill & Paoline, 2015) and each deserves prompt
and authentic investigation.
Investigations of citizen complaints result in one of four dispositions: unfounded,
unsubstantiated, sustained, or exonerated (Novak, Cordner, Smith, & Roberg, 2017). In the first
case, unfounded, investigators determine that there is evidence that contradicts the allegations
made by the citizen—that the complaint is inaccurate or fabricated. The second possible
disposition, unsubstantiated, indicates that there is not sufficient evidence to corroborate the
complainant’s allegations. Complaints are sustained when investigators have discovered enough
evidence to support the complainant’s allegations. The fourth disposition, exoneration, is
assigned when there is evidence that the allegations against the officer are true, but the officer’s
actions were justified, within department policy, and lawful.
The bulk of the research literature concerning citizen complaints has focused on an
individual unit of analysis—complaint prone officer correlates. Much less attention has been
given to macro-level analysis of complaint types, frequency, and dispositions. However, Novak
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and colleagues (2017) summarized some relevant studies, which included Independent
(Christopher) Commission (1991), Dugan and Breda (1991), Petterson (1991), Walker (1998),
Wallace (1990), and Law Enforcement News (1989). The results of these studies indicate that
while less than 1 percent of citizens actually file a complaint, between 10 and 15 percent believe
that they have a legitimate complaint. Second, the rate of complaints and the proportion of
complaints sustained varies widely by agency, but excessive force complaints are generally
sustained at a lower frequency than other types. Third, a large proportion of complaints in a
given agency are generally filed against a relatively small proportion of officers who are younger
and have little experience (Novak et al., 2017). Research regarding individual correlates has also
generated evidence indicating that officers who engage in more proactive (officer-initiated) and
aggressive enforcement activities also receive more citizen complaints (Lersch, 2002; Lersch &
Mieczkowski, 1996). A recent study of citizen complaints in eight cities conducted by Terrill and
Ingram (2016) found that “improper force and discourtesy were the two most frequent
complaints in six of the eight city departments” (p. 171), 20% and 22% respectively, and that
11% of all complaints were sustained across the eight departments. They also found that male
and minority citizens were more likely to file complaints, but that complaints filed by African
Americans were less likely to be sustained.
The notion that police officer behavior can influence citizen behavior and ultimately the
outcome of an encounter is central to the potential efficacy of BWCs to reduce use of force
incidents and citizen complaints. Citizens are much less likely to defer to police authority and
more likely to resist when officers are disrespectful or overly aggressive at the onset of an
encounter (Mastrofski, Reisig, & McCluskey, 2002; Terrill, 2003). For example, research has
demonstrated that police officer use of profanity in encounters with citizens has a negative
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impact on officer credibility (Baseheart & Cox, 1993), and can increase citizen perceptions of
excessive force (Patton, Asken, Fremouw, & Bemis, 2017). Such behavior on the part of police
officers may provoke resistance or even an assault in an enforcement encounter. The next section
presents the theoretical framework that predicts the outcome of police-citizen transactions and
how BWCs may alter those transactions and outcomes by increasing professionalism and
courtesy and reducing use of force and abuses of authority.
Theoretical Underpinnings for BWC Impact on Officer Behavior
The theoretical framework that follows explains the transactional nature of police-citizen
enforcement contacts and the dynamics that can result in the undesirable outcomes detailed in the
previous section. Then the two theories which have been proffered to explain how and why the
utilization of BWCs is expected to result in reduced use of force and citizen complaints are
presented. This theoretical framework consists of social interactionist theory of coercive actions,
deterrence, and objective self-awareness theories.
Dynamics of the police-citizen encounter.
The assumption that officer conduct is often a significant factor in how a citizen reacts to
an enforcement contact is foundational for the belief that equipping officers with BWCs should
reduce use of force and citizen complaints. Worden (1995) asserted that “officers not only
respond to situations but also help to create them; sometimes, officers’ choices early in policecitizen encounters can contribute to the emergence of circumstances that require the use of force”
(p. 39), and research supports this assertion. For example, Bayley’s (1986) study of Denver
patrol officers revealed that when officers initially listened to citizens and sought information by
asking questions, that force was less likely than when they initiated encounters with more
coercive tactics. Mastrofski, Snipes, and Supina’s (1996) Richmond, Virginia study found that
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citizens treated disrespectfully by officers were significantly less likely to comply with the
officer’s requests. In another study utilizing data obtained through systematic social observation
of Indianapolis, Indiana and St. Petersburg, Florida patrol officers in the Project on Policing
Neighborhoods, Terrill (2003) found that police-citizen encounters that began with a coercive
approach increased the likelihood of suspect resistance and additional use of force. In the latter
study Terrill employed a broad conceptualization of force that included not only physical actions,
but verbal commands as well. Terrill (2005) argues that Tedeschi and Felson’s (1994) social
interactionist theory of coercive actions explains the aforementioned phenomena.
Tedeschi and Felson’s social interactionist theory of coercive actions.
Tedeschi and Felson (1994) define coercive actions in broad terms; they state that “a
coercive action is an action taken with the intent of imposing harm on another person or forcing
compliance” (p. 348). The authors assert that there are three types of coercive actions, conveying
threats, the use of physical force, and punishment, which are intended to force another to comply
with the demands of the coercer through threatened or the actual inflicting of harm. Harm is
categorized into three forms, physical, social, and deprivation of resources. Physical harm refers
to the threat or actual application of physical use of force to inflict pain, social harm refers to
damaging one’s social identity, status, and/or self-esteem through insults, ridicule, use of
derogatory language, or any other action to embarrass or humiliate the target person, and
punishment includes any action taken with the intent to harm the target person in order to restore
the coercer’s vision of justice. The authors view the motivations to engage in coercive actions
and the goals the actor hopes to achieve through a social interactionist lens. According to
Tedeschi and Felson (1994), “a social interactionist perspective emphasizes social conflicts,
power and influence, social identities, and retributive justice. Although this social psychological
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approach emphasizes situational factors, it includes cognitions, preferences, and emotions as
important features of social actions” (p. 160).
The theory posits four basic tenets: The first, that coercive actions are intended to
accomplish one or more of three goals: “(a) to control the behavior of others, (b) to restore
justice, and (c) to assert and protect identities” (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994, p. 348). The second,
one or more of the three types of coercive actions will accomplish one of these goals. Third, the
actor weighs costs and benefits of coercive actions, and while anticipated high costs may inhibit
such actions, their values may tilt the scales in favor of coercive action to achieve the desired
goal. Lastly, while the means to achieve each of the aforementioned goals may differ, many
instances involve all three desired outcomes.
This theory provides a plausible explanation for the police-citizen encounter that
escalates to the use of non-physical coercion, physical force, and potentially the abuse of
authority. It offers an explanation for both the behavior of the police officer and that of the
citizen during an interaction. First, in terms of police officer conduct, because of the
asymmetrical power relationship, police expect deference from all citizens (Alpert & Dunham,
2004). Moreover, as the asymmetry increases (i.e., the lower the social capital of the citizen), the
more deference and respect is expected by an officer. Thus, the theory proposes that a hostile and
disrespectful citizen demeanor, “contempt of cop,” would be received as an affront to not only
the police officer’s social identity, but his or her official position and societal expectations in
general, which would warrant a response to re-establish their authority. The theory further asserts
that the motivation to force compliance and save face is substantially increased with the presence
of onlookers or peer officers. According to the theory, threats, physical force, and punishments
are all coercive means that one might employ to compel compliance. However, the theory also
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posits that coercion will be utilized for retribution when their social identity has been threatened.
Consequently, a police officer engaged in an enforcement encounter with a recalcitrant and
disrespectful citizen would be likely to engage in coercive tactics, and perhaps
verbal/psychological and/or legal/civil rights abuse of authority. Tedeschi and Felson (1994)
assert that noncontingent threats are often used for retribution in such cases. “A noncontingent
threat is coercive action that is usually intended to frighten or humiliate the target person. Fear
and humiliation are harms imposed on the target by the threatener; hence, noncontingent threats
may be conceived as a form of punishment” (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994, p. 169). Furthermore, the
theory predicts that “contempt of cop” situations have a high potential to escalate to use of
physical force or even a physical abuse of authority.
Tedeschi and Felson’s theory not only predicts the police officer’s behavior in such
interactions, but the citizen’s as well. As indicated earlier, when officers begin encounters with
an aggressive/coercive approach, the likelihood of suspect noncompliance and resistance
increases (Terrill, 2003), and citizens treated disrespectfully by officers are significantly less
likely to comply with the officer’s requests (Mastrofski et al., 1996). The theory makes clear that
these officer behaviors are going to be particularly problematic with poor young inner-city
minorities, among whom social identities are of great importance. Anderson’s (1994) Code of the
Streets is highly informative in this regard. According to Anderson, central to this code of poor
inner-city youth and young adults is respect. They value it highly and vigorously protect their
reputation of being tough by demanding it and retaliating when they sense they have been
disrespected. Standing up to authority figures is especially indicative of toughness. Therefore,
the social interactionist theory of coercive actions predicts that police officers entering an
encounter aggressively, coercively, or in a disrespectful manner with this element are likely to
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face noncompliance, resistance, or perhaps even physical assault. Tedeschi and Felson (1994)
assert that individuals perform somewhat of a cost benefit analysis in the decision-making
process and that anticipated high costs (e.g., arrest, discipline, etc.) may inhibit one from
engaging in a coercive action. However, they point out that the more the desired outcome or goal
is valued, the more cost an individual is willing to endure and that often mental scripts will
override any fear of costs.
While social interactionist theory of coercive actions offers an explanation of how the
dynamics of the police-citizen enforcement encounter can lead to the outcomes of concern (use
of force, abuse of authority, and citizen complaints), protection of social identities is a
particularly problematic phenomenon for police officers, and becoming more so as American
society is increasingly scrutinizing officer behavior. Although fighting words doctrine—the legal
concept that prohibits the use of language that would likely offend another to the point it could
cause a breach of peace and upon which disorderly conduct statutes and ordinances were
based—was established in the U.S. Supreme Court 1942 Chaplinsky v New Hampshire decision,
in Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974), disorderly conduct ordinances that prohibit foul
language against police were ruled unconstitutional (Egan, 1999; c.f., Epps, 2019).2 The case law
clearly states that citizens have a constitutional right to criticize and express displeasure with
government and its representatives and police officers are required to have a “thicker skin” than
members of the general public. Technology may be of assistance in deterring hasty use of force
and abuse of authority by increasing tolerance, procedurally just behavior and use of deescalation techniques. The ability to observe police officer-citizen encounters in what has been a

2

The 2019 U.S. Supreme Court Nieves v Bartlett decision limits First Amendment retaliation
claims against police to those instances in which no probable cause for arrest existed.
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low-visibility environment is thought to be key. Are BWCs a solution?
Effects of being observed.
Ariel and colleagues (2015) have proffered two theories to explain the anticipated
positive impact of BWCs on officer behavior, deterrence and objective self-awareness, which
they apply simultaneously. This theoretical framework is based upon the notion that the power to
control the behavior of individuals lies in the ability to observe them—Foucault’s (1980) social
theory of panopticism (based on Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon), which asserts that surveillance
is key for that kind of power.
Deterrence theory.
The most basic explanation is that BWCs are a means of oversight and monitoring of
officer behavior and performance serving as the source of surveillance power mentioned above.
The concept of deterrence is central to classical criminological theory, and according to Akers
and Sellers (2013):
The basic premise in classical criminology is that actions are taken and decisions are
made by persons in the rational exercise of free will. All individuals choose to obey or
violate the law by a rational calculation of the risk of pain versus potential pleasure
derived from an act (p. 15).
However, the theoretical perspective has been elaborated upon and expanded into a modern
version known as rational choice theory, which asserts that deterrence from all kinds of deviant
behaviors occurs as a result of more than just legal sanctions/punishments, but through myriad
unpleasant consequences (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Paternoster, 2010). Furthermore, scholars
have recognized that punishment avoidance, and even vicarious punishment avoidance can
influence the decision to engage in deviant behavior (Stafford & Warr, 1993).
Ariel and colleagues (2015) contend that surveillance of officer behavior via BWC
captured video deters officers from hastily using force, abusing their authority, or otherwise
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engaging in unprofessional conduct. BWCs are anticipated to have a deterrent effect on these
behaviors as any use of force is generally considered an unfavorable outcome to be avoided
whenever possible, and any abuse of authority or unprofessional conduct is grounds for
disciplinary action. The authors assert that BWC captured video of an incident involving
unnecessary or excessive force, other abuses of authority, or unprofessional conduct meets the
three basic tenets of deterrence theory: (1) There is a level of certainty that misconduct captured
on video will be discovered should a citizen complaint be filed, supervisory audit take place, or
the video be subject of prosecutorial review for evidentiary purposes; (2) captured video
provides the means for celerity in an investigation, disposition of a complaint, and subsequent
disciplinary action; and (3) severity is addressed in that any disciplinary record adversely affects
a police officer’s career, and, in cases of more serious misconduct (such as excessive force and
other civil rights violations), not only potential termination and revocation of their peace officer
license, but perhaps criminal prosecution. Katz and colleagues (2014, 2015) cited this likely
deterrent effect in a randomized controlled trial of BWCs at the Phoenix, Arizona Police
Department. However, the devices are not only thought to deter officers from engaging in
misconduct, but some assert that BWCs also serve as a stimulus to increase professionalism and
courtesy, which has been referred to as a “civilizing effect” (White, 2014), and procedurally just
behavior (Hedberg et al., 2017). This notion is derived from another related but unique
theoretical perspective, objective self-awareness theory. Ariel and colleagues (2015) assert that
the devices produce a state of objective self-awareness that enhances the deterrent effect.
Objective self-awareness theory.
The central assumption of Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) objective self-awareness theory
is that one becomes keenly self-aware when he or she knows they are being observed and
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subsequently tend to modify their behavior to conform to social expectations. The theory is
comprised of four concepts: (1) state of consciousness; (2) self-evaluation; (3) standards of
correctness; and (4) conformity. The first, state of consciousness, is dichotomous consisting of
subjective and objective states of awareness. Duvall and Wicklund (1972) posit:
When attention is directed inward and the individual’s consciousness is focused on
himself, he is the object of his own consciousness—hence ‘objective’ self-awareness.
When attention is directed away from himself he is the ‘subject’ of the consciousness that
is directed toward external objects, thus the term ‘subjective’ self-awareness (p. 2).
The second concept, self-evaluation, refers to a process that takes place in the state of objective
self-awareness in which one examines their behavior critically in comparison with the third
concept, standards of correctness. According to Duvall and Wicklund (1972):
The notion of self-evaluation is predicated on the existence of a psychological system of
standards of correctness that is possessed by each person… A standard is defined as a
mental representation of correct behavior, attitudes, and traits (p. 3).
Examples of standards of correctness include rules of etiquette such as table manners,
appropriate language for present company, and proper comportment at a funeral (Duvall &
Wicklund, 1972). The final concept is conformity, which Duvall and Wicklund (1972) define as,
“a change in the person’s attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors in the direction of the differing attitudes,
beliefs, or behaviors of other people who are present in the same situation” (p. 57).
Duvall and Wicklund (1972) postulate the following propositions. First, the two
conscious states are mutually exclusive. One cannot simultaneously focus conscious attention on
him or herself and an external stimulus. However, the theory posits that one may “oscillate”
between the two conscious states. Second, that the subjective state of awareness is the primary
or default conscious state. According to Duvall and Wicklund (1972):
the environment is normally a strong enough stimulus to draw attention toward it, which
means the self is totally excluded from attention. In order that the person become
objectively self aware, it is necessary to create conditions that remind him of his status as
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an object in the world” (p. 7).
Third, Duvall and Wicklund (1972) assert that stimuli such as seeing oneself in a mirror can be
sufficient to trigger objective self-awareness, but that being observed by another person is the
strongest stimulus. Lastly, when one enters the state of objective self-awareness one
automatically engages in self-assessment comparing behavior to the previously mentioned
standard of correctness. If one discovers a discrepancy between the two, then he or she will
either conform his or her behavior to the standard of correctness, or flee the situation causing the
objective self-awareness state (Duvall & Wicklund, 1972). According to Duvall & Wicklund
(1972), “awareness of the self as an object acts as a feedback system which forces the individual
to alter aspects of himself in the direction of his conception of what a correct person should be”
(p. ix).
The effects of being observed (or even the perception of being observed) on compliance
behaviors has been studied in a variety of contexts, such as productivity of industrial laborers
(Landsberger, 1958), handwashing behaviors of public restroom users (Munger & Harris, 1989),
employee handwashing in healthcare facilities (Bolton, Rivas, Prachar, & Jones, 2015), parentchild interactions (Gardner, 2000), doctor-patient interactions (Redman, Dickinson, Cockburn,
Hennrikus, & Sanson-Fisher, 1989), patient care quality in nursing homes (Schnelle, Ouslander,
& Simmons, 2006), littering (Ernest-Jones, Nettle, & Bateson, 2011), and honor system
collection boxes for coffee (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006) to name a few. While objective
self-awareness theory has historically been applied and tested in direct observation situations
(Wicklund, 1975; Silva & Duval, 2001), the notion among law enforcement practitioners and
many academics alike is that video monitoring of officer activity would have essentially the
same effect, and perhaps a greater impact due to the capturing of behavior via video recording

43
(Farrar & Ariel, 2013; Harris, 2010; Kassin, Kukucka, Lawson, & DeCarlo, 2014; Schellenberg,
2000; White, 2014).
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the desired behaviors that are anticipated as a result of
objective self-awareness via BWCs define procedural justice, and the tenets of procedural justice
and de-escalation techniques overlap. According to Todak and James (2018):
The notion from procedural justice that citizens want to be treated by police with dignity
and respect is echoed in the “respect” and “human” tactics which involve talking to
citizens as people and minimizing the use of authoritative voice and “cop talk.” Dignity
and respect for citizens and their rights can also be shown through the “compromise”
tactic. Sometimes, a small adjustment to charges can significantly improve a person’s
situation while still achieving justice. Demonstrating the fairness and neutrality
components of procedural justice can be achieved using the “honesty” tactic. By
providing a clear explanation for the decisions being made, officers demonstrate to
citizens that they are applying the law fairly. Finally, the “listen” and “empower” tactics
legitimize citizens’ concerns and engage them as partners in the decision-making process
(p. 517).
These are the very behaviors that the objectively self-aware police officer would arguably
engage in which, in turn, should aid in de-escalation and result in fewer use of force incidents
and citizen complaints. An anticipated result referred to by White (2014) as a “civilizing effect,”
which falls in line with the paradigm shift from a “warrior” to “guardian” mindset recommended
by The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) to address the current police
legitimacy crisis.
In summation, the preceding theoretical framework established the behaviors that
BWCs are anticipated to deter, those behaviors they are anticipated to promote, and the means by
which these anticipated behavioral changes are believed to be achieved. Although BWCs have
been implemented by U.S. police agencies on a large scale just in the last few years with very
little evidence of their effectiveness, researchers have been quick to respond. Several randomized
controlled trials and quasi-experimental studies have been conducted to test the impact of the
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devices on use of force and citizen complaints, which have produced mixed results.
Extant BWC Research
A total of 14 studies examining the impact of BWCs on use of force and/or citizen
complaints have been conducted in the United States, which include randomized controlled trials
of the devices at the Rialto, CA Police Department, Mesa, AZ Police Department, Phoenix, AZ
Police Department, Las Vegas, NV Police Department, Orlando, FL Police Department, Denver,
CO Police Department, Spokane, WA Police Department, Washington, DC Police Department,
Arlington, TX Police Department, Milwaukee, WI Police Department, Hallandale Beach, FL
Police Department, and the Boston, MA Police Department. In addition, quasi-experimental
evaluations of the impact of BWCs on use of force have been conducted at the Tampa, FL Police
Department and an unnamed agency in the Northwest U.S. Eighteen publications have been
generated from these studies, ten of which have been published in peer reviewed journals.
Summaries of these studies and the associated publications are listed in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Extant Research Examining the Impact of BWCs on Use of Force & Citizen
Complaints
DV - Use of Force Reports Only
Jennings, Fridell, Lynch,
Jetelina, & Gonzalez (2017)1

Tampa, FL

• Research Design: Quasiexperimental evaluation [3/2015
– 2/2016]
• Agency: Tampa Police
Department - large agency (1000
sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Individual
officer and treatment vs. control
groups
• Sample: Treatment group BWC
equipped (n = 60 officers) /
control group (n = 60 officers)
• Measure: Use of force reports
• Analysis: PSM and t-test
• Results: BWC equipped
officers had significantly less use
of force reports than control
officers, both during the
evaluation period and pre/post
BWC implementation

Koslicki, Makin, & Willits
(2019)1

Northwest, US

• Research Design: Quasiexperimental evaluation [pre
BWC 1/2009 – 3/2013 / post
BWC 4/2013 – 5/2016]
• Agency: Unnamed – midsize or
small agency (< 100 sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Aggregated
monthly use of force reports
• Measure: Monthly rate of use
of force reports per 1,000 calls for
service
• Analysis: Interrupted time
series
• Results: Statistically significant
increase in use of force reports in
the 3 years following BWC
implementation
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DV - Citizen Complaints Only
Goodison & Wilson (2017)

Arlington, TX

• Research Design: 6-month
randomized controlled trial
[10/2015 – 3/2016]
• Agency: Arlington Police
Department - large agency (635
sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Shift (12hour) – all officers on shift BWC
equipped
• Sample: 9,730 shifts randomly
assigned to treatment condition
(4,893 treatment / 4,837 control)
• Measure: Citizen complaints
filed (rate per shift)
• Analysis: Descriptive only
• Results: BWC equipped
officers had a 38% drop in citizen
complaints compared to the same
six months prior to BWC
implementation

Hedberg, Katz, & Choate
(2017)1;
Katz, Choate, Ready, & Nŭno
(2014)

Phoenix, AZ

• Research Design: 15 month
randomized controlled trial
[4/2013 – 7/2014]
• Agency: Phoenix Police
Department - large agency (3000
sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Incident
• Sample: Patrol areas (1
experimental / 1 control) within 1
precinct
• Measure: Citizen complaints
filed (rate per incident)
• Analysis: GLM regression
• Results: BWC equipped
officers significantly less likely to
have citizen complaints filed
against them
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Mesa Police Department
(2013)

Mesa, AZ

• Research Design: 12-month
quasi-randomized controlled trial
[10/2012 – 9/2013]
• Agency: Mesa Police
Department - large agency (800
sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment
and control groups (aggregated
citizen complaints filed)
• Sample: Treatment group BWC
equipped (n = 50 officers) /
control group (n = 50 officers)
• Measure: Citizen complaints
filed
• Analysis: Descriptive only
• Results: BWC equipped
officers had 48% reduction in
citizen complaints of misconduct
and 75% reduction in use of force
complaints filed against them

DV - Both Use of Force Reports & Citizen Complaints
Ariel (2017)1

Denver, CO

• Research Design: 6-month
randomized controlled trial
[7/2014 – 12/2014]
• Agency: Denver Police
Department - large agency (1500
sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Patrol district
• Sample: 1 treatment district (n
= 119 officers) / 5 control
districts (n = 513 officers)
• Measures: Aggregated Use of
force reports and citizen
complaints filed
• Analysis: Adjusted odds ratios
• Results: Statistically significant
lower odds of citizen complaints,
no effect on use of force
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Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland
(2015)1;
Farrar & Ariel (2013);
Sutherland, Ariel, Farrar, &
De Anda (2017)1

Rialto, CA

• Research Design: 12-month
randomized controlled trial
[2/2012 – 1/2013]
• Agency: Rialto Police
Department - midsize agency
(115 sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Shift (12hour) – all officers on shift BWC
equipped
• Sample: 54 officers / 988 shifts
randomly assigned to treatment
condition (489 treatment /499
control)
• Measures: Use of force reports
and citizen complaints filed (rate
per shift)
• Analysis: Poisson and
interrupted time series
• Results: Statistically significant
reductions in use of force and
citizen complaints

Braga, Barao, McDevitt, &
Zimmerman (2018)

Boston, MA

• Research Design: 12-month
randomized controlled trial
[9/2016 – 8/2017]
• Agency: Boston Police
Department - large agency (2000
sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment
and control groups (aggregated
use of force reports and citizen
complaints filed)
• Sample: Treatment group BWC
equipped (n = 140 officers) /
control group (n = 141 officers)
of gang unit
• Measures: Aggregated use of
force reports and citizen
complaints filed
• Analysis: Independent samples
t-test and poisson
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Braga, Sousa, Coldren, &
Rodriguez (2018)1

Las Vegas, NV

• Results: No significant
difference between BWC
equipped/non-equipped officers
in either use of force reports or
citizen complaints
• Research Design: 19-month
randomized controlled trial
[3/2014 – 9/2015]
• Agency: Las Vegas Police
Department - large agency (2600
sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Individual
officers
• Sample: Treatment group BWC
equipped (n = 218 officers) /
control group (n = 198 officers)
• Measures: use of force reports
and citizen complaints filed
(binary 0 = no use of force/citizen
complaint or 1 = 1 or more)
• Analysis: z-test
• Results: BWC equipped
officers significantly less use of
force reports and citizen
complaints

Headley, Guerette, & Shariati
(2017)1

Hallandale Beach,
FL

• Research Design:12-month
quasi-randomized controlled trial
[1/2016 – 12/2016]
• Agency: Hallandale Beach
Police Department - midsize
agency (60 sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment
and control groups (aggregated
use of force reports and citizen
complaints filed)
• Sample: Treatment group BWC
equipped (n = 26 officers) /
control group (n = 25 officers)
• Measures: use of force reports
and citizen complaints filed (rate
per shift)
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Jennings, Lynch, & Fridell
(2015)1

Orlando, FL

Peterson, Yu, La Vigne, &
Lawrence (2018)

Milwaukee, WI

• Analysis: Independent samples
t-test
• Results: No significant
difference between BWC
equipped/non-equipped officers
in either use of force reports or
citizen complaints / no significant
reductions in either measure
pre/post BWC deployment
• Research Design: 12-month
randomized controlled trial
[3/2014 – 2/2015]
• Agency: Orlando Police
Department - large agency (700
sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment
and control groups (aggregated
use of force reports and citizen
complaints filed)
• Sample: Treatment group BWC
equipped (n = 46 officers) /
control group (n = 43 officers)
• Measures: use of force reports
and citizen complaints filed
• Analysis: Independent samples
t-test
• Results: BWC equipped
officers significantly less use of
force reports and citizen
complaints than control officer
group and significant difference
pre/post BWC implementation
• Research Design: 15-month
randomized controlled trial
[10/2015 – 12/2016]
• Agency: Milwaukee Police
Department - large agency (1800
sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment
and control groups (aggregated
use of force reports and citizen
complaints filed)
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White, Gaub, & Todak (2017)1 Spokane, WA

• Sample: Treatment group BWC
equipped (n = 252 officers) /
control group (n = 252 officers)
• Measures: Use of force reports
and citizen complaints filed
• Analysis: Poisson and logistic
regression
• Results: No significant
reduction in use of force reports
and citizen complaints pre/post
BWC implementation / no
significant difference between
treatment and control officer
groups
• Research Design: 6-month
randomized controlled trial
[5/2015 – 10/2015]
• Agency: Spokane Police
Department - large agency (300
sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment
and control groups rate of use of
force reports and citizen
complaints filed per 1,000 calls
for service per month
• Sample: Treatment group BWC
equipped (n = 82 officers) /
control group (n = 67 officers)
• Measures: Use of force reports
and citizen complaints filed
converted to monthly rate per
1,000 calls for service
• Analysis: Independent and
paired samples t-test
• Results: No significant
reduction in use of force reports
and citizen complaints pre/post
BWC implementation / no
significant difference between
treatment and control officer
groups
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Yokum, Ravishankar, &
Coppock (2017)

Washington, DC

• Research Design: 6-month
randomized controlled trial
[5/2015 – 10/2015]
• Agency: District of Columbia
Police Department - large agency
(3800 sworn)
• Unit of analysis: Individual
officer
• Sample: Treatment group BWC
equipped (n = 1,189 officers) /
control group (n = 1,035 officers)
• Measures: Use of force reports
and citizen complaints filed
• Analysis: WLS regression
• Results: Null, no significant
treatment effect on use of force
reports or citizen complaints filed
•

Notes: 1Published in peer reviewed journal
Impact of BWCs on use of force.
The impact of BWCs on use of force has been examined in 11 of the 14 U.S. studies,
showing mixed results. These include nine randomized controlled trials (Denver, CO – Ariel,
2017; Rialto, CA – Ariel et al., 2015, Farrar & Ariel, 2013, Sutherland et al., 2017; Boston, MA Braga, Barao, et al., 2018; Las Vegas, NV - Braga, Sousa, et al., 2018; Hallandale Beach, FL Headley et al., 2017; Orlando, FL – Jennings et al., 2015; Milwaukee, WI – Peterson et al., 2018;
Spokane, WA – White et al., 2017; Washington, DC – Yokum et al., 2017) and two quasiexperimental evaluations (Tampa, FL - Jennings, et al., 2017; unnamed agency in Northwest,
U.S. – Koslicki et al., 2019), all of which utilized officer completed use of force reports (official
agency data) in the operationalization of the dependent variable. The first of these studies was
conducted in Rialto, CA by Farrar and Ariel (2013) between February 2012 and January 2013.
The statistically significant findings of this small RCT (reduced use of force incidents by more
than 50 percent) are frequently cited in support of BWCs.
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Since this first study, three others have found statistically significant reductions in use of
force (Las Vegas, NV - Braga, Sousa, et al., 2018; Orlando, FL – Jennings et al., 2015; Tampa,
FL - Jennings, et al., 2017). However, twice as many (six) have found no significant differences
between BWC equipped officers and those in the control group and/or pre/post device
implementation in terms of use of force (Denver, CO – Ariel, 2017; Boston, MA - Braga, Barao,
et al., 2018; Hallandale Beach, FL - Headley et al., 2017; Milwaukee, WI – Peterson et al., 2018;
Spokane, WA – White et al., 2017; Washington, DC – Yokum et al., 2017). Moreover, one study
(Koslicki et al., 2019), the longest quasi-experimental evaluation to date (four years pre- and
three years post-BWC deployment at an unnamed Northwest U.S. agency), found a statistically
significant increase in use of force reports over the three years post BWC implementation.
Although the generalizability to U.S. policing is questionable, several international
studies have examined the impact of BWCs on use of force as well. These include two conducted
in Canada (Edmonton, AB - Edmonton Police Service, 2015; Toronto, ON - Toronto Police
Service, 2016), one in the United Kingdom (Birmingham, UK - Henstock & Ariel, 2017) and one
global/multi-site study (Ariel, Sutherland, Henstock, Young, Drover, Sykes, Megicks, &
Henderson, 2016). Of these four studies, one reported statistically significant reductions in use of
force (Henstock & Ariel, 2017) and two reported null results (Edmonton Police Service, 2015;
Toronto Police Service, 2016). Ariel and colleagues (2016), however, reported a significant
increase in use of force in their global/multi-site study, and found that this increase may be due
to officer discretion in camera activation. Collectively, the U.S. and international studies fail to
provide a definitive answer, thus the impact of BWCs on use of force remains unclear.
Impact of BWCs on citizen complaints.
The impact of BWCs on citizen complaints has been examined in 12 of the 14 U.S.
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studies, which, like the research examining the impact of BWCs on use of force, have also
produced mixed results. These include 10 randomized controlled trials (Arlington, TX –
Goodison & Wilson, 2017; Phoenix, AZ – Hedberg et al., 2017, Katz, et al., 2014; Denver, CO –
Ariel, 2017; Rialto, CA – Ariel et al., 2015, Farrar & Ariel, 2013, Sutherland et al., 2017;
Boston, MA - Braga, Barao, et al., 2018; Las Vegas, NV - Braga, Sousa, et al., 2018; Orlando,
FL – Jennings et al., 2015; Milwaukee, WI – Peterson et al., 2018; Spokane, WA – White et al.,
2017; Washington, DC – Yokum et al., 2017) and two quasi-experimental evaluations (Mesa,
AZ – Mesa Police Department, 2013; Hallandale Beach, FL – Headley et al., 2017), all of which
utilized official agency data (citizen complaints filed) in the operationalization of the variable.
Farrar and Ariel’s (2013) Rialto study was again the first of these studies chronologically and
found that BWC equipped officers experienced a 90% reduction in citizen complaints.
Since the Rialto study, six others have found statistically significant reductions in citizen
complaints (Arlington, TX – Goodison & Wilson, 2017; Phoenix, AZ – Hedberg et al., 2017,
Katz et al., 2014; Mesa, AZ – Mesa Police Department, 2013; Denver, CO – Ariel, 2017; Las
Vegas, NV - Braga, Sousa, et al., 2018; Orlando, FL – Jennings et al., 2015). However, five
studies found no significant differences in citizen complaint filings between BWC equipped
officers and those in the control group and/or pre/post device implementation (Boston, MA Braga, Barao, et al., 2018; Hallandale Beach, FL - Headley et al., 2017; Milwaukee, WI –
Peterson et al., 2018; Spokane, WA – White et al., 2017; Washington, DC – Yokum et al., 2017).
The impact of BWCs on citizen complaints has been the subject of several international
studies as well, two in Canada (Edmonton, AB – Edmonton Police Service, 2015; Toronto, ON –
Toronto Police Service, 2016), three in the United Kingdom (Portsmouth, UK – Ellis, Jenkins, &
Smith, 2015; London, UK – Goodall, 2007; London, UK – Grossmith, Owens, Finn, Mann,
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Davies, & Baika, 2015), one in Uruguay (Mitchell, Ariel, Firpo, Fraiman, Castillio, Hyatt,
Weinborn, & Sabo, 2018), and one global/multisite study (Ariel, Sutherland, Henstock, Young,
Drover, Sykes, Megicks, & Henderson, 2017). Of these seven studies, all but two (Edmonton
Police Service, 2015; Toronto Police Service, 2016) reported statistically significant reductions
in citizen complaints. Notwithstanding the earlier caveat concerning the generalizability of the
international studies to U.S. policing, although the results are a little more consistent than those
of the use of force research, the impact of BWCs on citizen complaints is also inconclusive.
Methodological issues and gaps in the extant BWC research.
As indicated in the two preceding sections, the data sources for the measures of use of
force and citizen complaints have been consistent across the extant research (official agency
data), however, a number of different metrics have been utilized. Use of force and citizen
complaints have been examined as simple count variables in aggregate by month, by year, or the
length of the study for individual officers in a few instances, and for treatment and control
groups in most. Rates have been calculated and used in some studies, which include rate of use
of force reports and/or citizen complaints per shift (Ariel, et al., 2015; Goodison & Wilson,
2017; Headley et al., 2017; Hedberg et al., 2017), and per 1,000 calls for service (Koslicki et al.,
2019; White et al., 2017). One study coded use of force reports and citizen complaints as binary
variables (0 = no use of force reports/citizen complaints and 1 = 1 or more) (Braga, Sousa, et al.,
2018). However, while the rates that have been utilized standardize the measure, and in one case
controls for call volume, they do not control for staffing. Calculating a rate per patrol hours
worked for the dependent variables would arguably control for staffing, while including both
rates of externally generated calls for service and officer-initiated activity per patrol hours
worked would control for exposure to the possibility of being involved in a use of force incident
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or named in a citizen complaint.
Second, while the extant studies have examined the frequency of use of force incidents,
the potential impact of BWCs on the level or severity of force utilized and frequency of citizen
injuries has not been explored. Likewise, little attention has been given to potential changes in
complaint dispositions. The only known study that has addressed the latter in any form is Braga
and colleagues (2018) who found that BWC equipped officers were less likely than no-equipped
officers to have complaints sustained, but the finding was not statistically significant. Lastly, the
majority of the analyses have been descriptive and/or independent sample t-test comparisons of
treatment and control groups. Only two of the U.S. studies employed time series analysis to
examine a substantial period of time pre- and post-BWC deployment (Rialto, CA – Sutherland et
al., 2017; Unnamed Northwest U.S. agency – Koslicki et al., 2019). Sutherland and colleagues
(2017) examined four years post-BWC implementation at the Rialto, CA Police Department and
found that the initial reductions in use of force and citizen complaints had been sustained.
However, Koslicki and colleagues’ (2019) analysis of four years pre and three years post BWC
implementation data from an agency in the Northwest U.S. indicated a significant increase in use
of force reports over the three years following device deployment. These are the only two known
studies that have examined long-term impact of the devices and have conflicting results. A
potential unintended consequence of equipping police officers with BWCs that is also scantly
addressed in the research literature is the possibility of a de-policing effect.
Potential De-policing
While several of the extant studies have demonstrated the potential positive effect of
BWCs on officer behavior, concerns have been raised that the devices may negatively impact
officer proactivity. Specifically, the devices may deter officers from engaging in proactive
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enforcement contacts, such as stop and frisks of suspicious persons and traffic stops (particularly
investigative traffic stops), a potential phenomenon that has been described as “camera-induced
passivity” (Wallace, White, Gaub, & Todak, 2018, p. 481). However, concerns of de-policing
first emerged post-Ferguson due to the increased scrutiny of police by the general public,
government officials, and advocacy groups, a potential phenomenon commonly referred to as the
“Ferguson effect.”
A report published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2017) asserts that, as a result
of the high-profile questionable deadly force incidents in recent years, law enforcement has felt a
“chill wind” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017). The report proposes that law enforcement
officers have not only perceived that “national politicians stood against them, but also that the
politicians’ words and actions signified that disrespect was acceptable in the aftermath of the
Brown shooting” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017, p. 3). Furthermore, it asserts that the
intense media coverage implying epidemic police misconduct and wrongdoing has led to a social
movement to challenge and discredit law enforcement actions. The study asserts that police
officers are demoralized and less proactive as a result—the de-policing phenomenon referred to
as the Ferguson effect. De-policing, in terms of a Ferguson effect, in particular, has been
identified as a form of dissent shirking. A concept found in the broader organizational behavior
literature, it refers to a process in which reducing one’s work activity serves as an emotionallyled form of silent protest (Chanin & Sheats, 2017). This concept is specifically applicable to
policing due to the highly discretionary nature of policing (i.e., engagement in self-initiated
enforcement activities).
A post-Ferguson de-policing phenomenon remains largely a matter of speculation, as
most of the evidence presented thus far has been anecdotal. For example, 86 percent of surveyed
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police officers in a Pew Research Center (2017) study indicated that the recent high-profile
police shootings of African American citizens has been problematic for policing, and 72 percent
reported being more reluctant to stop and question suspicious subjects (Morin, Parker, Stepler, &
Mercer, 2017). However, results of one empirical study that examined the issue has been
published in a peer reviewed journal. Shjarback, Pyrooz, Wolfe, and Decker (2017) analyzed
data from 118 Missouri law enforcement agencies (epicenter of the 2014 Ferguson incident) that
policed jurisdictions of 5,000 citizens or more using paired t-tests. According to Shjarback and
colleagues (2017):
We found consistent evidence of a racialized de-policing effect. Departments made fewer
vehicle/traffic stops, searches, and arrests in 2015 relative to 2014 in jurisdictions with
larger African –American populations. Thus, a major finding of this study is that
context—especially the racial compositions of cities—shapes de-policing behavior (p.
50).
There is widespread speculation that de-policing is responsible for recent increases in
violent crime (Mac-Donald, 2016). While the delay in the availability of data made it difficult to
address this question immediately, scholars have published some study results. Rosenfeld (2016)
conducted an analysis of de-policing effects and increased violent crime in a sample of large US
cities in a National Institute of Justice-sponsored study finding no connections between the two.
Similarly, Shjarback and colleagues (2017) found no significant impact on crime rates in their
study of Missouri agencies. However, due to the limited research this remains an open question
as well.
As mentioned, some have expressed concerns that BWCs could exacerbate de-policing
stemming from a Ferguson effect, or simply deter officers from engaging in self-initiated
enforcement encounters for fear of scrutiny. In either case, or both combined, Wallace and
colleagues (2018) suggest that this potential camera-induced passivity is due to the possibility of
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both internal and external scrutiny of their actions resulting from the BWC captured video. They
further suggest that an officer’s ability to limit his or her exposure to scrutiny is primarily limited
to discretionary activities, such as suspicious person (pedestrian) and traffic stops. As indicated
in a previous section of this chapter, enforcement contacts initiated by the officer is a correlate of
both use of force and citizen complaints. Thus, officers might become less proactive to protect
themselves. Although a handful of studies have examined the impact of BWCs on officer activity
in some form, only Wallace and colleagues (2018) have empirically examined de-policing and
BWCs specifically. Summaries of these studies and the associated publications are listed in
Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Extant Research Examining the Impact of BWCs on Officer Proactivity
DV – Self Initiated Activity
Headley, Guerette, & Shariati
(2017)1

Hallandale Beach,
FL

• Research Design: 12-month
quasi-randomized controlled trial
[1/2016 – 12/2016]
• Agency: Hallandale Beach
Police Department - midsize
agency (60 sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment
and control groups (aggregated
arrests, field contacts, and traffic
citations.
• Sample: Treatment group BWC
equipped (n = 26 officers) /
control group (n = 25 officers)
• Measures: aggregated arrests,
field contacts, and traffic citations
(percent change for treatment and
control groups pre and post BWC
implementation)
• Analysis: Independent samples
t-tests
• Results: Statistically significant
reduction in arrests but increase
in field contacts for BWC
equipped officers compared to
control group / no significant
reductions/difference in traffic
citations pre/post BWC
deployment for either group

Peterson, Yu, La Vigne, &
Lawrence (2018)

Milwaukee, WI

• Research Design: 15-month
randomized controlled trial
[10/2015 – 12/2016]
• Agency: Milwaukee Police
Department - large agency (1800
sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment
and control groups (aggregated
arrests, traffic stops, and subject
stops)
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• Sample: Treatment group BWC
equipped (n = 252 officers) /
control group (n = 252 officers)
• Measures: Aggregated arrests,
traffic stops, and subject stops for
the nine months prior to BWC
implementation and 9 months
post implementation for treatment
and control groups
• Analysis: Poisson and logistic
regression
• Results: BWC equipped
officers made 8% fewer subject
stops than control group officers
(statistically significant); no
significant differences in number
of arrests or traffic stops
Ready & Young (2015)1

Mesa, AZ

Wallace, White, Gaub, &
Todak (2018)1

Spokane, WA

• Research Design: 12-month
quasi-randomized controlled trial
[10/2012 – 9/2013]
• Agency: Mesa Police
Department - large agency (800
sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Individual
officer
• Sample: Treatment group BWC
equipped (n = 50 officers) /
control group (n = 50 officers)
• Measure: Officer completed
field contact reports (binary 0/1:
self-initiated; stop & frisk;
warning; citation; arrest)
• Analysis: HGLM logistic
regression
• Results: BWC equipped
officers were significantly more
likely to initiate encounters and
issue citations, but significantly
less likely to conduct stop &
frisks than control group officers
• Research Design: 6-month
randomized controlled trial
[5/2015 – 10/2015]
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• Agency: Spokane Police
Department - large agency (300
sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Individual
officer
• Sample: Treatment group BWC
equipped (n = 82 officers) /
control group (n = 67 officers)
• Measures: Computer assisted
dispatch recorded self-initiated
calls and arrests
• Analysis: HLM
• Results: No evidence of
statistically significant camerainduced passivity. Results showed
an increase of proactivity for
BWC equipped officers
White, Todak, & Gaub
(2018)1

Tempe, AZ

• Research Design: 13-month
randomized controlled trial
[11/2015 – 12/2016]
• Agency: Tempe Police
Department - large agency (342
sworn)
• Unit of Analysis: Treatment
and control groups aggregated
self-initiated calls
• Sample: Treatment group BWC
equipped (n = 101 officers) /
control group (n = 99 officers)
• Measures: Computer assisted
dispatch recorded self-initiated
calls converted to monthly rate
per 1,000 self-initiated calls for
treatment and control groups
• Analysis: Independent a nd
paired samples t-test
• Results: No significant
reduction in self-initiated calls /
no significant difference between
treatment and control officer
groups

Notes: 1Published in peer reviewed journal
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As documented in Table 2.2 above, results are mixed. Of the five studies, all of which
were randomized controlled trials, three found a statistically significant reduction in at least one
officer activity measure, two found a statistically significant increase in at least one activity
measure, and two had null findings. While Peterson et al. (2018) found a statistically significant
reduction in pedestrian stops among BWC equipped officers and Ready and Young (2015) found
that BWC equipped officers were significantly less likely to conduct stop and frisks, Headley et
al. (2017) found an increase in field contacts for BWC equipped officers compared to the control
group. Similarly, Headley et al. (2017) found a statistically significant reduction in arrests for
BWC equipped officers, while Peterson et al. (2018) found no significant reduction or difference
in arrests between that BWC equipped officers and those in the control group. Headley et al.
(2017) found no significant reductions or difference between treatment and control groups in the
issuance of citations pre/post BWC implementation and Peterson et al. (2018) found no
significant differences in terms of traffic stops, but Ready and Young (2015) found that BWC
equipped officers were significantly more likely to initiate encounters and issue citations.
Finally, Wallace et al. (2018) and White et al. (2018) found no evidence of camera-induced
passivity in Spokane, WA and no significant reduction in self-initiated activity in Tempe, AZ
respectively.
Of these few studies, arguably the Spokane, WA research conducted by Wallace and
colleagues (2018), which generated null findings, is the most comprehensive and focused on the
potential link between BWCs and de-policing. However, considering the racialized de-policing
effect found by Shjarback et al. (2017), it seems likely that Spokane’s relative lack of diversity
makes generalizability of these findings questionable. According to the U.S. Census Bureau
(2010) the total population of Spokane (as of the last official census - 2010) is 208,916 and is
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86.7 percent white, 2.3 percent African American, and 5 percent Hispanic. The second
methodological concern is the potential Hawthorne effect associated with a randomized
controlled trial, which is problematic in all five of these studies. While randomized controlled
trials are considered the “gold standard,” Koslicki and colleagues (2019) call attention to this
issue that seems highly likely to occur in the unique context of policing. Regarding the mixed
results of the extant BWC literature and the possibility of a Hawthorne effect, Koslicki et al.
(2019) state:
One explanation for these divergent results may relate to one of the greatest challenges
presented to experimental researchers, which is to say ‘that which we study, we
influence. In the context of RCTs, this Hawthorne effect occurs through research
subjects’ awareness of being observed by the researcher (Merrett 2007), and – though
there is some uncertainty as to the mechanisms and complexities behind the effect –
remains a well-documented phenomenon across scientific fields (McCambridge et al.
2014, Chen et al. 2015). With many of the aforementioned findings on the efficacy of
BWCs in changing police officer behaviour coming from RCTs, there is a likelihood that
researcher presence on BWC research sites may affect the influence of BWCs through
the duration of the trial (p. 5).
Although officers are being observed via the BWC video recordings, and, as set forth in the
theoretical framework, the devices are believed to alter officer behavior because of this
observation, Koslicki and colleagues argue the presence of researchers may introduce a
secondary Hawthorne effect due to the certainty that their activity is being monitored. They
argue that this potential problem could be avoided with a quasi-experimental research design.
De-policing, whether stemming from Ferguson effect dissent shirking, camera-induced
passivity for fear of public scrutiny, or a combination of the two, has generally been viewed in
negative terms. Accordingly, Wallace and colleagues (2018) state, “[t]he potential for BWCs to
alter police activity negatively is a serious concern that could short-circuit the primary benefits of
the technology” (p. 483). This negative connotation notwithstanding, some scholars suggest that
aggressive officer-initiated enforcement contacts negatively impact police legitimacy (Brunson,
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2007; Brunson & Miller, 2005; Epp et al., 2014). Therefore, reductions in these types of contacts
might serve to improve police-community relations (Sharback et al., 2017). Regardless of one’s
position on the issue, the extremely limited research examining the impact of BWCs on proactive
enforcement contacts is insufficient to provide a conclusive answer.
Chapter Summary
This chapter began with an overview of use of force, abuse of authority and citizen
complaints to further enlighten the problems on which BWCs are anticipated to have a positive
impact. The theoretical underpinnings of the presumed positive impact of the devices followed.
Tedeschi and Felson’s social interactionist theory of coercive actions makes the transactional
nature of the police officer-citizen enforcement encounter clear and explains how both the
officer’s and citizen’s conduct from the onset of the contact can be problematic and lead to an
undesirable outcome. Tedeschi and Felson’s theory concerning the dynamics of the policecitizen enforcement encounter was followed by the theoretical framework on which the
anticipated positive impact of BWCs on officer behavior is based. Deterrence and objective selfawareness theories were reviewed as they are the basis for BWC proponent claims that officers
will be less likely to abuse their authority to protect their social identity and engage in
procedurally just behaviors, including employing de-escalation techniques as a result of being
observed via BWC captured video. Then, the extant research that has examined the impact of
BWCs on officer behavior (use of force and citizen complaints specifically) was reviewed.
The extant research literature examining the impact of BWCs on use of force and citizen
complains has produced mixed results. While a few early randomized controlled trials indicated
that equipping officers with BWCs substantially reduced use of force incidents and citizen
complaints, several of the later studies found little or no impact on these outcomes. Of the 15
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extant studies that have examined the impact of BWCs on use of force, five have found that
BWCs significantly reduced use of force incidents (Braga, Sousa, et al., 2018; Farrar & Ariel,
2013; Henstock & Ariel, 2017; Jennings et al., 2015; Jennings et al., 2017). However, eight of
the studies produced null findings (Ariel, 2017; Braga, Barao, et al., 2018; Edmonton Police
Service, 2015; Headley et al., 2017; Peterson, et al., 2018; Toronto Police Service, 2016; White
et al., 2017; Yokum et al, 2017), and two studies indicated significant increases in use of force
post BWC deployment (Ariel et al., 2016; Koslicki et al., 2019). Likewise, the studies examining
the impact of BWCs on citizen complaints have produced mixed results. Of the 19 extant studies,
12 found that BWC equipped officers had significant reductions in citizen complaints filed
against them (Ariel, 2017; Ariel et al., 2017; Braga, Sousa, et al., 2018; Ellis et al., 2015; Farrar
& Ariel, 2013; Goodall, 2007; Goodison & Wilson, 2017; Grossmith et al., 2015; Hedberg et al.,
2017; Jennings et al., 2015; Mesa Police Department, 2013; Mitchell et al., 2018). However,
seven of the studies produced null findings (Braga, Barao, et al., 2018; Edmonton Police Service,
2015; Headley et al., 2017; Peterson et al., 2018; Toronto Police Service, 2016; White et al.,
2017; Yokum et al., 2017).
The review of the extant research literature regarding the impact of BWCs on use of force
and citizen complaints revealed that while official agency records were consistently used as the
data source across studies, a variety of metrics were utilized in analyses. Six specific
methodological issues/gaps in the research were identified. First, the rates computed and utilized
in prior studies do not account for staffing levels, and this potential confounding variable has not
been otherwise controlled for. Second, although the theoretical framework suggests that officers
might employ lower level force options more frequently when BWC equipped, potential changes
in the severity of force (citizen injuries) has not been explored. Third, only one study has

67
examined changes in the frequency of complaint dispositions (Braga, Sousa, et al., 2018), which
was during a 19-month randomized controlled trial. The long-term impact remains unknown.
Fourth, only two studies have examined the impact of BWCs on use of force and citizen
complaints for a period longer than the 12 to 19 month randomized controlled trials, and these
two studies, which utilized time series analysis, generated conflicting results (Sutherland et al.,
2017; Koslicki et al., 2019). Thus, reduction of use of force and citizen complaints, and the
sustainability of any reductions in these outcomes post BWC implementation, remains
undetermined. Fifth, although randomized controlled trials are considered the gold standard of
research, Koslicki et al. (2019) aptly argues that there is an especially high potential for a
Hawthorne effect among police officers due to the nature of the work, and this effect is likely
exacerbated by the testing of a technology developed for the surveillance of officer behavior. All
but one of the 14 studies conducted in the U.S. have been randomized controlled trials and
arguably susceptible to a Hawthorne effect. As Koslicki et al. (2019) point out, this potential
problem could be avoided with a quasi-experimental design. Lastly, the possibility that BWCs
could contribute to de-policing has received scant attention from researchers.
Although the potential for BWCs to negatively impact officer proactivity is a commonlycited concern, only five studies have examined officer activity in some form. Furthermore, only
one of those examined the possible phenomenon referred to as camera induced passivity
specifically (Wallace et al., 2018). Of these five studies (all of which were randomized
controlled trials), three found a statistically significant reduction in at least one officer activity
measure among the BWC equipped officers, which include: Pedestrian stops (Peterson et al.,
2018); stop and frisk (Ready & Young, 2015); and arrests (Headley et al., 2017). However, two
of them also found significant increases in at least one activity measure among the BWC
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equipped officers, these include: Field contacts (Headley et al., 2017); and citations (Ready &
Young, 2015). Two of the five studies generated null findings (Wallace et al., 2018; White et al.,
2018). Thus, the results are inconclusive. Since all five of these studies were randomized
controlled trials, the possibility of a Hawthorne effect cannot be ignored, especially in terms of
officer activity.
BWC advocates lauded the findings of Farrar and Ariel’s (2013) Rialto, California study
and Mesa, Arizona Police Department’s (2013) study, and the significant reductions in use of
force incidents (Rialto) and citizen complaints (Rialto & Mesa) are frequently cited in support of
claims that the devices improve police officer behavior. However, as the review of the extant
literature revealed, subsequent research has produced mixed findings, which is problematic
considering the potential negative impact of unrealistic expectations and the expense of BWC
program maintenance outlined in Chapter 1. The dissertation seeks to advance the current body
of research literature by addressing the six methodological issues and gaps listed above. Chapter
3 sets forth the methodology utilized for the study.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Utilizing 86 months of data (May 2010 through June 2017) the dissertation examines the
impact of BWCs on use of force and citizen complaints at the Newport News, Virginia Police
Department. This period includes 36 months pre-BWC implementation, 38 months of staggered
BWC device deployment to all 284 patrol personnel, and 12 months post full BWC deployment
to all patrol officers. As mentioned previously, NNPD deployed BWCs to patrol officers in
waves due to budget constraints. The staggered deployment began with a 10-device pilot in May
2013, and the deployment of an additional 44 BWCs by December of that year. The staggered
rollout continued with equipping another 30 patrol officers with BWCs by the end of 2014, and
175 more during 2015. The final 25 officers were BWC equipped in the first half of 2016 for a
total of 284. The incremental deployment of BWCs among all 284 patrol personnel, combined
with the fact that NNPD began implementation of BWCs more than one year prior to the
Ferguson incident, the increased scrutiny of law enforcement, and the rush to equip officers with
the devices that has followed, permits a unique examination of the impact of the devices.
The methodological design addresses the following research questions: (1a) Was the
frequency of use of force incidents reduced post BWC implementation and, if so, was the
reduction sustained? (1b) If the frequency of use of force incidents was reduced, was there an
incremental decline with waves of BWC implementation, or did any decline plateau or decay
over the course of implementation? (1c) Was there a change in the severity of force used
(frequency of suspect injury)? (1d) Did BWCs have a significant impact on these outcomes when
simultaneously considering staffing and volume of officer-initiated enforcement activity? (2a)
Was the frequency of citizen complaints reduced post BWC implementation and, if so, was any
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reduction sustained? (2b) If the frequency of citizen complaints was reduced, was there an
incremental decline with waves of BWC implementation, or did any decline plateau or decay
over the course of implementation? (2c) Was there a change in the proportion of sustained
complaints compared to those unfounded, unsubstantiated, or in which the officer was
exonerated? And (2d) did BWCs have a significant impact on these outcomes when
simultaneously considering staffing levels and volume of officer-initiated enforcement activity.
Sample & Data
Sample selection.
The current study utilizes a nonprobability purposive sample (Newport News, Virginia
Police Department) because of a confluence of three factors that allows for an important
contribution to the current body of knowledge concerning the efficacy of BWCs. First, BWC
implementation began at NNPD 15 months prior to the police legitimacy crisis that followed the
Ferguson incident and the subsequent rush to equip officers with BWCs. Second, implementation
of BWCs at NNPD occurred in several waves over the course of three years. Third, NNPD
granted the researcher unfettered access to the agency’s internal data necessary to address the
current gaps in the extant research. While a nonprobability purposive sample of a single midAtlantic agency imposes limitations in terms of generalizability, the Newport News Police
Department is representative of national averages in terms of diversity of sworn personnel.3 The
2013 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) Survey indicates
that 12.5% of sworn officers employed by local police departments are female, and

3

Although the proportion of NNPD officers who are racial minorities is larger than the national
average, African Americans are substantially under-represented in NNPD compared to the
proportion of the Newport News population.
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approximately 27% are racial minorities (Reaves, 2015). Descriptive data of NNPD and its 440
sworn personnel for the period of the study are contained in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: NNPD Descriptive Data (2010-2017)
M/%

S.D.

Range

44.43

2.80

40.43 – 47.41

2010-11 /
2016-17
43.09 / 44.08

Authorized number of sworn
personnel

430.00

8.66

420 - 440

420 / 440

Number of officers assigned to
patrol

269.86

6.08

258 - 278

273 / 270

Proportion of sworn personnel
female2

15.67%

-

-

-

Proportion of sworn personnel
African American2

15.67%

-

-

-

Proportion of sworn personnel
other racial minority2

13.33%

-

-

-

152,661.86

9,218.70

145,020 163,226

163,226 /
142,826

63,300.17 15,160.82

41,791 85,241

85,241 /
41,791

Descriptive
Annual budget1

Citizen generated calls for
service
Officer generated calls for
service
Use of force incidents

117.71

32.71

67 - 155

155 / 67

Citizen complaints

181.29

52.85

123 - 256

212 / 111

Notes: 1Millions of dollars; 2 Proportion of all sworn officers employed 2010 – 2017.
NNPD provides general law enforcement services to a diverse community of
approximately 180,000. The citizens of Newport News, Virginia are 49.0% white, 40.7% African
American, and 10.3% other races (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017). Additional descriptive data for
the City of Newport News are provided in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Newport News, Virginia, Descriptive Data (2010 – 2017)
Descriptive
Population1

M/%
180,935.86

S.D.
416.02

2010 / 2017
180,719 / 180,775

Proportion of population
white1

50.38%

0.66

49.00% / 49.00%

Proportion of population
African American1

40.40%

0.18

40.70% / 40.70%

Proportion of population with a
bachelor’s degree or higher1

23.89%

0.61

22.80% / 24.90%

5.61%

0.55

4.70% / 6.30%

15.13%

0.90

13.50% / 16.40%

50,565.38

537.92

49,562.00 / 51,082.00

454.13

27.81

488.15 / 499.07

3,136.88

118.02

3,359.20 / 3,041.74

Proportion of population
unemployed1
Proportion of population below
poverty level1
Median household income1
Violent crime rate2
Property crime rate2

Notes: 1U.S. Census Bureau (2019): American Fact Finder; 2Federal Bureau of
Investigation (2019) – UCR Publications: Crime in the United States.
The descriptive data provided in Table 3.1 (NNPD) shows that while the annual budget,
authorized number of sworn personnel, and number of officers assigned to patrol all remained
relatively stable, substantial changes in the volume of citizen- and officer-generated calls for
service, use of force incidents, and citizen complaints occurred. Between 2010 and 2017 citizen
generated calls for service decreased modestly (12.50 percent), but officer-generated calls for
service decreased by more than half (50.97 percent). During the same period NNPD experienced
major reductions in use of force incidents and citizen complaints, 56.77 and 47.64 percent
respectively. Regarding the City of Newport News, Table 3.2 shows that the population,
proportion of white and African American residents, median household income, and violent
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crime rate all remained relatively stable, but changes occurred in education level, unemployment,
proportion of the population below poverty level, and the property crime rate between 2010 and
2017. While the proportion of the population that held a bachelor’s degree or higher increased by
9.21 percent, the proportion of Newport News residents unemployed and below the poverty level
increased by 34.04 and 21.48 percent respectively. However, the property crime rate decreased
by 9.45 percent during the same period.
Data collection.
The researcher collected internal NNPD data from four sources for the period of May 1,
2010 through June 30, 2017, 86 months total: 36 months pre-BWC implementation (May 2010 –
April 2013), 38 months of staggered BWC device deployment to all 284 patrol personnel (May
2013 – June 2016), and 12 months post full BWC deployment (July 2016 – June 2017). These
data include: (1) NNPD computer assisted dispatch (CAD) data; (2) internal affairs data; (3);
City of Newport News Human Resources Department payroll and personnel data; and (4) NNPD
Training Division records of BWC assignments.
The CAD data is a log of all calls for service and self-initiated activity, which contains
the date, day of week, time, officer identification, how the activity was generated (officer
initiated or dispatched), description of the call/activity, location (street address, beat, and
precinct), and disposition of every call and reported activity/contact. The CAD data was
provided to the researcher by the NNPD Information Technology Department. NNPD utilizes IA
Pro software to record use of force incidents and formal citizen complaints. The following
information is extracted from officer completed and filed use of force reports and recorded in IA
Pro: Officer IDs; the types of force used; citizen resistance and assaults on officers; arrests
following use of force; citizens injured as a result of use of force; officers injured in use of force
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incidents; the reason for the use of force; and the type of service being rendered at the time force
was used.
IA Pro is also utilized for recording and tracking formal citizen complaints. Formal
complaints are classified as those that could result in punitive disciplinary action should they be
sustained. These complaints receive a full investigation. Conversely, informal complaints are of
a less serious nature that are handled at the precinct level but are documented in a log maintained
by the NNPD Internal Affairs Section of the Professional Standards Division. The citizen
complaint information contained in both the IA Pro database of formal complaints and the
informal complaint log includes: The date the incident occurred; the date the complaint was
received; the complainant; the officer against whom the complaint is filed; the offense type; the
IA investigator; the disposition; and conclusion date. The IA Pro database is also maintained by
the NNPD Internal Affairs Section of the Professional Standards Division, which provided the
researcher with reports containing use of force information and formal citizen complaint
information aggregated by month for the 86-month period being studied. The researcher was also
provided with a copy of the informal complaint log for the same period.
The City of Newport News Human Resources Department provided the researcher with
payroll and personnel records, which included detailed reports of hours worked by patrol officers
aggregated by month and a commissioned personnel record containing hire date, current
assignment, current rank, promotion date, date of termination/resignation/retirement (if
applicable), and demographic information (race and sex) for all officers employed during the 86
month period of interest. Lastly, the NNPD Training Division is responsible for maintaining the
NNPD BWC program including training officers in the use of the devices and detailed record
keeping of BWC assignments. The researcher was provided with the BWC assignment record
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beginning with the ten-device pilot in May 2013 through the achievement of full deployment to
all 284 commissioned officers assigned to the patrol division in June 2016.
Measures
Basis for calculated rates.
The use of force and citizen complaint frequency dependent variables and the officer selfinitiated enforcement activity and call for service control variables are calculated as rates per
regular patrol hours worked in each month. In addition to standardizing the measurements,
regular patrol hours worked reflects the staffing level and controls for personnel shortages.
Staffing levels are of importance because personnel shortages are likely to impact officer ability
to engage in self-initiated enforcement contacts, which, as indicated in Chapter 2, increase the
likelihood of use of force and citizen complaints. Conversely, staffing shortages may also limit
the amount of time an officer may dedicate to a call for service and also produce citizen
complaints. The mean number of regular patrol hours worked in a month during the period under
examination is 35,764.78 (sd = 1,702.85). Thus, rates are calculated per 1,000 regular patrol
hours worked.
Dependent variables.
Use of force.
The current study utilizes data extracted from internal NNPD use of force reports filed by
officers. Use of force is conceptualized according to the definition of reportable use of force
found in the Newport News Police Department Operational Manual. According to NNPD (2017)
policy OPS-110 – Use of Force:
A Use of Force Report (NNPD Form #83) will be prepared by the primary officer
employing the force while on-duty, acting in an official capacity or in the event that a
Departmental issued weapon/device is utilized in the following situations:
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a. Whenever an officer discharges a firearm or less-lethal munitions…
(Exceptions to this procedure are discharging a firearm at, or as part of the
following: organized shooting matches; authorized range training; legal,
personal practice and hunting).
b. When the use of force results in a visible injury or death of any person,
including officers.
c. When a subject complains that an injury has been inflicted as the result of an
application of force by an officer.
d. Whenever O.C. [oleoresin capsicum – commonly referred to as “pepper spray”
or popular brand name “Mace”] or CS/CN gas [commonly referred to as “tear
gas”] is employed.
e. In those situations where defensive or active resistance is employed against an
officer.
f. Whenever an impact weapon is employed in an offensive manner.
g. Whenever an ECD [electronic control device, commonly referred to by popular
brand name “Taser”] is employed in a police encounter with a suspect. (p. 8).
NNPD departmental policy requires the primary officer in a use of force incident to file
the use of force report and list only those other officers directly involved in the application of
force. In the current study use of force is operationalized by counting the number of use of force
reports filed in a given month (from the IA Pro database), regardless of the number of officers
involved in each incident. A separate use of force report is required for each subject when force
is used on more than one subject in the same incident. Therefore, the frequency of use of force
variable reflects the number of subjects upon whom force was used. The use of force frequency
variable is calculated as a rate per 1,000 regular patrol hours worked by month as follows:
Number of Use of Force Incidents Month x
(1,000)
Total Number of Patrol Hours Worked Month x
Severity of force.
The severity of force variable is represented by the number of use of force incidents
resulting in injuries to the citizen requiring medical attention (transported to a hospital for
treatment). Severity of force is extracted from the IA Pro reports and calculated as a proportion
of the total number of use of force incidents in a given month as follows:
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Severity of Force =

Number of Citizens Injured (Requiring Medical Attention)Month x
Total Number of Use of Force Incidents Month x

Citizen complaints.
The current study utilizes Farrar and Ariel’s (2013) definition of citizen complaints,
“incidents where the reporting party has filed a grievance… against [an officer for] alleged
misconduct or what they perceive as poor performance” (p. 7), which is consistent with NNPD’s
classification. NNPD receives citizen complaints via request for a supervisor on scene, walk-ins
to a precinct or headquarters, by telephone, email, website portal, or by U.S. mail. While clerks
at any of the precinct stations or headquarters building may take complaints from walk-ins via a
citizen complaint form or letter, and any officer, supervisor, or command staff member may
receive a complaint in person (which are then forwarded to the Internal Affairs Unit of the
Professional Standards Section), the latter means of filing are received directly by the Internal
Affairs Unit. Each complaint is entered in a log and after a preliminary investigation and
evaluation is recorded as either an informal or formal complaint. Informal complaints consist of
minor policy violations while formal complaints are more serious in nature and receive full
investigations. The latter are then entered into a database and tracked utilizing IA Pro software.
Both formal and informal citizen complaints are included in the current study’s
operationalization of the variable. However, citizen complaints often contain more than one
allegation against one or more officers. Such cases are counted as a single complaint when the
allegations are the same for each officer listed. Different allegations made against different
officers contained in the same complaint are counted as an individual complaint. The citizen
complaint frequency variable is calculated as a rate per 1,000 patrol hours worked by month as
follows:
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Number of Citizen Complaints Month x
(1,000)
Total Number of Patrol Hours Worked Month x
Citizen complaint dispositions.
NNPD records the disposition of citizen complaints in one of 5 categories as follows:
substantiated, not substantiated, unfounded, exonerated, or complainant refused to
cooperate/complaint withdrawn. However, citizen complaints may, and often do, contain more
than one allegation. Furthermore, as indicated in the previous chapters, BWC captured video is
expected to provide evidence for swifter and more accurate investigations of citizen complaints.
Thus, one would anticipate that there would be an increase in more conclusive dispositions (i.e.,
exonerated and substantiated). The frequencies of substantiated, not substantiated, unfounded,
and exonerated proportions during the pre-BWC period compared to the deployment and post
full implementation periods are examined.
Intervention/independent variable.
BWCs.
As previously mentioned, following the initial ten device pilot, NNPD deployed BWCs
incrementally over a 38-month period (May 2013 – June 2016) to achieve 100% implementation
(all 284 patrol officers equipped with the devices). Therefore, the BWC variable is computed
both as a binary (0 = pre-BWC implementation, May 2010 – April 2013; 1 = post-BWCs, May
2013 – June 2017) for ARIMA analysis, as well as a proportion of the 284 total for a given
month for VAR analysis as follows:
BWC Deployment =

Number of Officers BWC Equipped
Total Number of Officers to be Equipped (284)
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Control variables.
Officer Self-initiated enforcement activity.
Concerns have been raised that BWCs may have a de-policing effect through camera
induced passivity, and that reduced proactive enforcement activity might mediate a relationship
between BWCs and reduced use of force incidents and citizen complaints. Like Wallace and
colleagues (2018), the current study includes traffic stops, suspicious vehicle checks, and
suspicious person (pedestrian) stops/field interviews in the discretionary pro-active
investigative/enforcement activity measure. The CAD data was filtered to extract only the
aforementioned officer-initiated activities and officer assists are excluded. The self-initiated
enforcement activity variable is calculated as a rate per 1,000 patrol hours worked by month as
follows:
Number of Self − Initiated Enforcement Contacts Month x
(1,000)
Total Number of Patrol Hours Worked Month x
Calls for service.
Call for service volume (those calls dispatched to officers, not self-initiated) can have an
impact on the dependent variables through increased exposure to risk and impacts officer ability
to engage in self-initiated enforcement contacts. Thus, calls for service should be controlled for.
Calls for service in the current study are generated by any means other than officer initiated.
Only the original call was extracted from the CAD data. Duplicate dispatch assigned call
numbers are eliminated, as are calls cancelled by communications before an officer logs arrival.
Call for service volume is calculated as a rate per 1,000 patrol hours worked by month as
follows:
Number of Calls for Service (Dispatched)Month x
(1,000)
Total Number of Patrol Hours Worked Month x
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Ferguson incident.
As related in Chapter 2, there is wide-spread speculation that the increased public
scrutiny of police following the August 2014 shooting of Michael Brown by a Ferguson,
Missouri police officer deterred officers across the U.S. from engaging in proactive enforcement
activities, a de-policing phenomenon dubbed the “Ferguson effect.” As time series analysis is
sensitive to historical events, the Ferguson incident is controlled for with the variable coded as
follows: Pre-Ferguson (prior to August 2014) = 0; post Ferguson (August 2014 and after) = 1.
Seasonality.
As crime, calls for service, and proactive activities are subject to seasonal increases
(generally higher in volume during the warmest months), seasonality will be controlled for
utilizing monthly average temperatures for the period under examination4, or the use of a
seasonal statistical model as described in the analytic strategy section below.
Analytic Strategy
The impact of BWCs on each of the dependent variables is assessed with a series of t
tests and two different time series techniques, autoregressive integrated moving average time
series analysis (ARIMA, SARIMA if the data fits a seasonal model) and vector autoregression
analysis (VAR) using STATA/IC 16.0. Time series analysis is the appropriate statistical
technique to test the impact of an intervention and additional explanatory variables over time as
the modeling produces a valid and reliable result by distinguishing the impact of the intervention
from other factors on the dependent variable (McDowall, McCleary, Meidinger, & Hay, 1980).

4

Average monthly temperatures for the 86-months examined were obtained from historical
weather records collected by the Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport Weather
Station made available on the Weather Underground website:
https://www.wunderground.com/history/daily/us/va/newport-news/KPHF
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This is of importance because time series data is “serially dependent,” meaning that each time
point measurement is impacted by those that came before (McDowall et al., 1980; Ostrom,
1978). As McDowall and colleagues (1980) point out, ordinary least square regression assumes
that “adjacent error terms are uncorrelated… this assumption is seldom satisfied by time series
data, however, and when error terms are correlated, the standard errors of ordinary least squares
parameter estimates are biased” (p. 12). In short, the authors warn that erroneous statistically
significant results are common when time series data is analyzed using OLS regression.
ARIMA time series analysis has been utilized to assess the impact of several
interventions in the criminology and criminal justice field. For example, it has been used to
assess the impact of reducing the legal blood alcohol concentration (BAC) to .08 on traffic
fatalities in New Jersey (Chamlin, 2016), to evaluate the effects of the New York Juvenile
offender law that certifies violent offenders to be tried in criminal court (Singer & McDowall,
1988), and to assess the impact of New York’s sex offender registration law (Sandler, Freeman,
& Socia, 2008). In terms of BWC research, it has been utilized in the Rialto, California study
(Sutherland et al., 2017) and in a study of an unnamed Northwest U.S. agency (Koslicki et al.,
2019), the former evaluating the impact of the devices on use of force and citizen complaints, the
latter on use of force only. VAR, a multivariate time series technique that allows for examination
of how several endogenous variables impact one another over time, has been utilized extensively
in financial policy analysis, but less so in other fields. Corman, Joyce, and Lovitch’s (1987)
examination of crime, deterrence, and unemployment, Enders and Sandler’s (1993) study of the
effectiveness of antiterrorism policies, and Witt and Witte’s (2000) research on crime,
incarceration, and the labor supply are three examples of the utilization of VAR analysis in
criminological research.
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ARIMA requires a series of diagnostic tests prior to the actual analysis to assess the
fitness of the data and make necessary adjustments to address any pre-intervention trends,
autocorrelation, moving average, and/or seasonality. The assumption is that the pre-intervention
time series reflects only ‘white noise’ (no pattern or ‘signal’), and the goal of the aforementioned
diagnostics is to identify and correct for violations of that assumption before proceeding with the
analysis (Andrews, Dean, Swain, & Cole, 2013).
The process of specifying the model is comprised of the series of the following diagnostic
tests. First, a plot of the time series must be examined to reveal any trends in the dependent
variables pre-intervention. Then a correlogram is generated and examined for a slow decay to
zero, which also indicates a trend. However, an augmented Dickey-Fuller test is utilized to
confirm whether or not a trend exists. The null hypothesis of the Dickey-Fuller test is that a
trend, or unit root, exists. Therefore, a significant result indicates no trend. If the test result is not
significant, indicating the existence of a trend, the data is differenced (d) = 1, and a subsequent
Dickey-Fuller test of the differenced variable is performed to ensure the trend is resolved.
Assessment of the pre-intervention series for auto regression, AR (p), and moving
average, MA (q) follows. To diagnose AR, a partial autocorrelation (PAC) graph is generated
and inspected for spikes outside of the 95% confidence level in early lags. A lack of such spikes
indicates an AR of 0, however, if such spikes exist, an issue with auto regression is indicated,
which requires specification, AR (p) = 1, 2, etc. To diagnose MA, an autocorrelation (AC) plot is
generated and examined for spikes outside of the 95% confidence level in early lags and a
correlogram is generated to reveal any significant q statistics. If neither are detected, an MA of 0
is indicated, but spikes on the AC plot and significant q statistics require a q specification in the
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model, MA (q) = 1, 2, etc. Lastly, the series are examined for seasonality.5 The current study’s
monthly observations require examination for 12-month seasonality, which would manifest in
spikes at lags 12, 24, 36, etc. in the series. ARIMA models with an annual seasonal pattern (12month) are specified (p, d, q) (P, D, Q)12, where “P” symbolizes auto regression (AR) of the
seasonal component, “D” symbolizes differencing of the seasonal component, “Q” symbolizes
moving average (MA) of the seasonal component, and “12” indicates the number of lags for
seasonal differencing.
Following diagnosis and specification, an ARIMA (or SARIMA if indicated) model of
each dependent variable and BWCs coded simply as 0 for pre-implementation (May 2010 –
April 2013), and 1 for all months after the beginning of BWC implementation (May 2013 – June
2017) is analyzed.
The second analytic technique, VAR, is the ideal multivariate time series analysis when
data contains variables that are expected to impact one another in a “system” (Sims, 1980).
Essentially, these variables are all treated as endogenous in the system, which reflects a vector of
two or more, it is autoregressive in that it contains lagged values of the variables, and the
stochastic error terms are referred to as impulses or shocks (Lutkepohl, 2007; Sims, 1980). The
basic premise of VAR modeling is that “the dependent variable is a function of its lagged values
and the lagged values of the other variables in the model” (Adeleye, 2018). VAR is particularly
ideal for the current study as it also allows for the inclusion of independent exogenous variables
in what is referred to as VARX modeling. This allows for the examination of the impact of the
staggered deployment of BWCs on the focal variables. The VAR/VARX analyses consist of two

5

Diagnoses of seasonality were confirmed utilizing the auto-ARIMA function in R 3.6.1
statistical software.
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models. First, the five focal dependent variables (use of force rate, severity of force, citizen
complaint rate, substantiated complaint dispositions, and exonerated complaint dispositions) and
the two other system variables (calls for service rate, and self-initiated enforcement activity rate)
are examined as an endogenous system in a VAR (model 1). Second, the exogenous variables
(BWC proportion, Ferguson incident, and monthly average temperature) are added in a full
VARX model (model 2).
Utilization of VAR is contingent upon certain requirements. First, the variables contained
in the endogenous system must be cointegrated and stationary by the first difference. Second, all
the variables included in the model must have equivalent lags. Third, it is crucial that the optimal
lag length is examined. Lastly, the ordering of the endogenous system is important. Ensuring that
these requirements are met is crucial because, first, if the variables in the endogenous system are
nonstationary, the regression estimates may be spurious (c.f. Fanchon & Wendel, 1992; Sims,
1980). Second, inclusion of variables with different numbers of lags, and/or specifying too few
or too many lags may also produce erroneous regression estimates. Too many lags results in a
loss of degrees of freedom and multicollinearity, while too few lags may produce specification
errors (Adeleye, 2018). Third, the proper ordering of the endogenous variables in the system is
important as different ordering likely generates different results. Thus, like ARIMA modeling,
VAR requires a series of diagnostic tests and ordering determination per the prescribed schema.
First, testing for cointegration and stationarity of the variables to be included in the
endogenous “system” is required. In the current study cointegration of the endogenous system
variables is determined utilizing the Stata/IC 16.0 Johansen test for cointegration and the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test is utilized to confirm stationarity. Second, a vector autoregression
specification optimization test must be performed to select the optimal lag length for the analysis
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by choosing the lowest appropriate information criterion value. The Stata/IC 16.0 vector
autoregression specification optimization test (varsoc) generates four information criterion
values, final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn
information criterion (HQIC), and Schwartz-Bayesian information criterion (SBIC). According
to a study conducted by Hacker and Abdulnasser (2008), the most reliable information criterion
for optimal lag-length selection for VAR analyses is the Schwartz-Bayesian information criterion
(SBIC). Thus, the SBIC values are used in the current study. Third, the correct ordering of the
variables to be included in the endogenous system must be determined utilizing the Cholesky
ordering method.
The Cholesky ordering method requires the analyst to identify the first and last variables
listed in the system as follows. The first variable is the contemporaneous exogenous variable. It
does not respond contemporaneously to impulses or shocks in any of the other variables,
however, changes in the contemporaneous exogenous variable impacts every other variable in
the system contemporaneously. The variable ordered last, referred to as the contemporaneous
endogenous variable, reacts to all the other variables at time t, but the impact of changes in the
contemporaneous endogenous variable is not manifest in the other system variables until t1.
The current study includes the following five dependent variables: Use of force rate;
severity of force (use of force incidents resulting in citizen injury); citizen complaint rate;
substantiated complaint proportion; and exonerated complaint proportion, each of which are
included in a VAR endogenous system along with calls for service rate and self-initiated
enforcement activity rate. Calls for service rate is the obvious contemporaneous exogenous
variable. It does not likely respond contemporaneously to impulses or shocks in the self-initiated
enforcement activity rate, or any of the dependent variables to be included in the models. At the
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other end of the spectrum, each of the dependent variables are the obvious contemporaneous
endogenous variable. Use of force rate, severity of force, citizen complaint rate, substantiated
complaint proportion, and exonerated complaint proportion are all likely to be impacted by the
endogenous system variables at time t, but the impact of changes in these dependent variables are
not likely to impact the other system variables until t1. Thus, the Cholesky ordering of the
endogenous system in both the model 1 VAR and model 2 VARX analyses is as follows: First,
calls for service rate, second, self-initiated enforcement activity rate, and third, dependent
variable y1,2,3,4,5. The exogenous regressor variables to be examined in the VARX analyses
include BWC proportion, the Ferguson incident, and the average monthly temperature.
Three post estimation tests are recommended for VAR analysis (Adeleye, 2018). First, a
Breusch–Godfrey serial correlation LM test should be conducted to ensure there is no
autocorrelation in the residual errors. Second, a Jarque-Bera test should be conducted to ensure
the errors are normally distributed, and lastly, a check of the stability of the VAR estimates
should be conducted ensuring the modulus of each eigenvalue is less than one.
In addition, the statistically significant b coefficients generated by the VAR/VARX
analyses are converted to Cohen’ d to determine effect size utilizing Apel and Hsu’s (2017)
formula as follows:
1

𝑑=𝛽×
√

2
2
(𝑇𝑃𝑟𝑒 − 1) ∙ 𝑆𝑌𝑃𝑟𝑒
+ (𝑇𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 1) ∙ 𝑆𝑌𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑃𝑟𝑒 + 𝑇𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 2

In summary, the analysis is comprised of the examination of the descriptive statistics, the
diagnosis, specification, and estimation of the ARIMA models, and the specification, estimation,
and interpretation of the VAR/VARX models for each of the following dependent variables: use
of force rate, severity of force, citizen complaint rate, substantiated complaint proportion, and
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exonerated complaint proportion. The results are reported in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Basis for calculated rates—regular patrol hours worked.
The regular patrol hours worked in a month ranged from 32,584.16 to 39,690.28 (m =
35,764.78, sd = 1,712.83) and decreased 7.30% from the pre-BWC period to the post-BWC
period. The descriptive statistics for the pre-BWC, BWC deployment, and post full BWC
deployment periods of the study are contained in Table 4.1, and the time series is graphed in
Figure 4.1. The time series graph shows the beginning of the downward trend coinciding with
the beginning of BWC implementation.
Table 4.1: NNPD Monthly Regular Patrol Hours Descriptive Statistics (May 2010 – June
2017)
Period

M

SD

Range

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)

36,741.14

1,003.77

34,750.66 –
38,737.02

BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)

35,378.04

1,803.41

32,584.16 –
39,690.28

Post-BWC
34,060.40
1,105.06
33,104.12 –
(July 2016 – June 2017)
36,310.54
Notes: n = 86 months; M = mean number of regular patrol hours worked in a month during
corresponding period.
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Figure 4.1: NNPD Monthly Regular Patrol Hours Worked (May 2010 – June
2017)
Dependent variable—use of force rate.
The monthly use of force rate ranged between 0.030 and 0.589 per 1,000 regular patrol
hours worked (m = 0.266, sd = 0.118) and the pre-BWC and post-BWC period means reflect a
decrease of 58.01%. The descriptive statistics for the pre-BWC, BWC deployment, and post full
BWC deployment periods of the study are contained in Table 4.2, and the time series is graphed
in Figure 4.2. The time series graph indicates an overall downward trend during the 86-month
period under examination, however, a clear decline is observed in the BWC implementation and
post BWC period trend line compared to that of the pre-BWC period.
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Table 4.2: NNPD Monthly Use of Force Rate per 1,000 Regular Patrol
Hours Worked Descriptive Statistics (May 2010 – June 2017)
Period
Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)

#UOF
437

M
0.331

SD
0.090

Range
0.159 – 0.518

BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)

330

0.243

0.115

0.030 – 0.589

Post BWC
57
0.139 0.048 0.059 – 0.211
(July 2016 – June 2017)
Notes: n = 86 months; #UOF is the number of use of force incidents that
occurred during the corresponding period; M, SD, and Range = rate per
1,000 regular patrol hours worked in a month during the corresponding
period.

Figure 4.2: NNPD Monthly Use of Force Rate per 1,000 Regular Patrol Hours
Worked (May 2010 – June 2017)
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Dependent variable—severity of force (citizen injuries).
The monthly severity of force measure (monthly proportion of use of force incidents
resulting in citizen injury requiring medical attention) ranged from 0.000 to 1.000 (m =0.473, sd
= 0.194) and the data indicates a nominal decrease of 0.62% between the pre-BWC and postBWC periods. The descriptive statistics for the pre-BWC, BWC deployment, and post full BWC
deployment periods of the study are contained in Table 4.3, and the time series is graphed in
Figure 4.3. The overall trend line shows the proportion of use of force incidents resulting in
citizen injury remained relatively stable; however, a downward trend is observed in the pre-BWC
period, and conversely, an upward trend beginning with BWC implementation.
Table 4.3: NNPD Monthly Proportion of Use of Force Incidents Resulting in Citizen
Injury Descriptive Statistics (May 2010 – June 2017)
Period
Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)

#UOF
437

#Injured
207

M
0.482

SD
0.160

Range
0.154 – 0.857

330

156

0.463

0.216

0.000 – 1.000

Post-BWC
57
25
0.479
0.209
0.250 – 1.000
(July 2016 – June 2017)
Notes: n = 86 months; #UOF is the number of use of force incidents that occurred during the
corresponding period; #Injured is the number of citizens injured as a result of use of force
incidents during the corresponding period. M, SD, and Range = proportion of use of force
incidents resulting in citizen injuries that required medical attention during the corresponding
period.
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Figure 4.3: NNPD Monthly Proportion of Use of Force Incidents Resulting in
Citizen Injury (May 2010 – June 2017)
Dependent variable—citizen complaint rate.
The monthly citizen complaint rate ranged between 0.000 and 0.944 per 1,000 regular
patrol hours worked (m = 0.408, sd = 0.198) and the pre-BWC and post-BWC period means
reflect a decrease of 47.39%. The descriptive statistics for the pre-BWC, BWC deployment, and
post full BWC deployment periods of the study are contained in Table 4.4, and the time series is
graphed in Figure 4.4. While the graph indicates an overall downward trend, a stark contrast is
observed between the pre-BWC period and after BWC implementation began. The graph
indicates a marked trend of increasing citizen complaints during the pre-BWC period, followed
by a notable decreasing trend during the BWC implantation and post-BWC periods.
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Table 4.4: NNPD Monthly Citizen Complaint Rate per 1,000 Regular Patrol Hours
Worked Descriptive Statistics (May 2010 – June 2017)
Period
Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)

# of
# of
M
Complaints Allegations
660
821
0.498

502

588

0.368

SD

Range

0.172

0.109 – 0.944

0.203

0.000 – 0.907

Post-BWC
107
167
0.262 0.088 0.120 – 0.361
(July 2016 – June 2017)
Notes: n = 86 months; # of Complaints is the number of citizen complaints that were filed
against officers during the corresponding period; # of Allegations is the number of
allegations contained in the filed complaints during the corresponding period; M, SD, and
Range = rate per 1,000 regular patrol hours worked in a month during the corresponding
period.

Figure 4.4: NNPD Monthly Citizen Complaint Rate per 1,000 Regular Patrol
Hours Worked (May 2010 – June 2017)
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Dependent variable—citizen complaint disposition proportions.
The monthly proportion ranges, means, and standard deviations for each of the four
citizen complaint dispositions for the 86-month period under examination are as follows:
Unfounded allegations ranged between 0.000 and 1.000 (m =0.504, sd = 0.233), decreasing by
19.20% between the pre-BWC and post-BWC periods; not substantiated allegations ranged
between 0.000 and 0.692 (m =0.162, sd = 0.156), decreasing by 40.00% between the pre-BWC
and post-BWC periods; substantiated allegations ranged between 0.000 and 0.700 (m =0.122, sd
= 0.142), increasing by 40.35% between the pre-BWC and post-BWC periods; and exonerated
allegations ranged between 0.000 and 0.500 (m =0.101, sd = 0.111), increasing by 115.38%
between the pre-BWC and post-BWC periods. The descriptive statistics for the pre-BWC, BWC
deployment, and post full BWC deployment periods of the study are contained in Table 4.5, and
the time series are graphed in Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 respectively. The graphs show an
overall downward trend in unfounded dispositions, not substantiated dispositions remained
relatively stable, and increasing trends in substantiated and exonerated dispositions.
Table 4.5: NNPD Monthly Citizen Complaint Disposition Proportion Descriptive
Statistics (May 2010 – June 2017)
Period

Unfounded

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)

0.526

Not
Substantiated
0.150

BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)

0.504

0.109

Substantiated

Exonerated

0.171

0.078

0.156

0.106

Post-BWC
0.425
0.090
0.240
0.168
(July 2016 – June 2017)
Notes: n = 86 months; Unfounded, Not Substantiated, Substantiated, and Exonerated are the
proportions of citizen complaint allegations that received the respective disposition during the
corresponding period; Rows may not total 1.000 due to citizen complaints withdrawn or
dismissed due to a complainant’s failure to cooperate.
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Figure 4.5: NNPD Monthly Proportion of Unfounded Citizen
Complaints (May 2010 – June 2017)

Figure 4.6: NNPD Monthly Proportion of Not Substantiated Citizen
Complaints (May 2010 – June 2017)
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Figure 4.7: NNPD Monthly Proportion of Substantiated Citizen
Complaints (May 2010 – June 2017)

Figure 4.8: NNPD Monthly Proportion of Exonerated Citizen
Complaints (May 2010 – June 2017)
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Independent variable—BWCs.
The descriptive statistics of NNPD’s 38-month staggered deployment of 284 BWCs
(May 2013 – Jun 2016) to all patrol personnel are contained in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: NNPD BWC Deployment Descriptive Statistics (May 2010 – June 2017)
Period/Month

# of Additional
Officers BWC
Equipped
0

Total BWCs
Deployed
0

0.000

May 2013

10

10

0.035

Jun 2013

5

15

0.053

Jul 2013

15

20

0.070

Aug 2013

1

21

0.074

Sep 2013

6

27

0.095

Oct 2013

26

53

0.187

Nov 2013

1

54

0.190

Dec 2013

0

54

0.190

Jan 2014

2

56

0.197

Feb 2014

2

58

0.204

Mar 2014

3

61

0.215

May 2014

19

80

0.282

Aug 2014

2

82

0.289

Sep 2014

0

82

0.289

Oct 2014

0

82

0.289

Nov 2014

1

83

0.292

May 2010 – Apr 2013

Proportion of Full
Deployment (284)
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Period/Month

Total BWCs
Deployed

Dec 2014

# of Additional
Officers BWC
Equipped
1

84

0.296

Jan 2015

0

84

0.296

Feb 2015

1

85

0.299

Mar 2015

38

123

0.433

Apr 2015

0

123

0.433

May 2015

4

127

0.447

Jun 2015

1

128

0.451

Jul 2015

0

128

0.451

Aug 2015

0

128

0.451

Sep 2015

0

128

0.451

Oct 2015

30

158

0.556

Nov 2015

91

249

0.877

Dec 2015

10

259

0.912

Jan 2016

1

260

0.915

Feb 2016

2

262

0.923

Mar 2016

8

270

0.951

Apr 2016

0

270

0.951

May 2016

11

281

0.989

3

284

1.000

Jun 16

Proportion of Full
Deployment (284)

Jul 2016 – Jun 2017
0
284
1.000
Notes: n = 86 months: 36-months pre-BWC (May 2010 – April 2013); 38-month
incremental BWC deployment period (May 2013 – June 2016); 12-month post-BWC
period (July 2016 - June 2017).
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Control variable—self-initiated enforcement activity rate.
The monthly self-initiated enforcement activity rate ranged between 85.717 and 223.033
per 1,000 regular patrol hours worked (m = 148.395, sd = 35.920) and the pre-BWC and postBWC period means reflect a decrease of 43.83%. The descriptive statistics for the pre-BWC,
BWC deployment, and post full BWC deployment periods of the study are contained in Table
4.7, and the time series is graphed in Figure 4.9. The latter shows a slight downward trend during
the pre-BWC period, which became more pronounced at the beginning of BWC implementation.
Table 4.7: NNPD Monthly Self-Initiated Enforcement Activity Rate per
1,000 Regular Patrol Hours Worked Descriptive Statistics (May 2010 –
June 2017)
Period

M

SD

Range

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)

181.032 16.742

153.526 – 223.033

BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – Jun 2016)

132.224 25.157

95.579 – 191.043

Post-BWC
101.693 9.470
85.717 – 120.383
(Jul 2016 – June 2017)
Notes: n = 86 months; M, SD, and Range = rate per 1,000 regular patrol
hours worked in a month during the corresponding period.
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Figure 4.9: NNPD Monthly Self-Initiated Enforcement Activity Rate per
1,000 Regular Patrol Hours Worked (May 2010 – June 2017)
Control variable—calls for service rate.
The monthly calls for service rate ranged between 269.653 and 517.487 per 1,000 regular
patrol hours worked (m = 355.734, sd = 39.272) and the pre-BWC and post-BWC period means
reflect a decrease of 5.70%. The descriptive statistics for the pre-BWC, BWC deployment, and
post full BWC deployment periods of the study are contained in Table 4.8, and the time series is
graphed in Figure 4.10. The graph indicates a slight downward trend overall.
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Table 4.8: NNPD Monthly Calls for Service Rate per 1,000 Regular
Patrol Hours Worked Descriptive Statistics (May 2010 – June 2017)
Period

M

SD

Range

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)

366.835 44.129

285.585 – 517.487

BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – Jun 2016)

348.313 33.110

278.604 – 406.424

Post-BWC
345.930 31.152
269.653 – 389.235
(Jul 2016 – June 2017)
Notes: n = 86 months; M, SD, and Range = rate per 1,000 regular patrol
hours worked in a month during the corresponding period.

Figure 4.10: NNPD Monthly Calls for Service Rate per 1,000 Regular Patrol
Hours Worked (May 2010 – June 2017)
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Control variable—average monthly temperature.
The monthly average temperature ranged between 33.10° Fahrenheit and 81.64°
Fahrenheit during the 86-month period under examination (m = 60.76, sd = 14.17). The
descriptive statistics are contained in Table 4.9.

103
Table 4.9: Monthly Average Temperatures in Newport News, Virginia (May 2010 –
June 2017)
Month

Temp

Month

Temp

Month

Temp

Month

Temp

05/2010

69.91

03/2012

56.67

01/2014

38.04

11/2015

54.42

06/2010

79.17

04/2012

57.63

02/2014

42.13

12/2015

53.81

07/2010

81.02

05/2012

68.35

03/2014

47.32

01/2016

38.51

08/2010

77.82

06/2012

72.50

04/2014

60.15

02/2016

42.94

09/2010

73.57

07/2012

80.94

05/2014

70.20

03/2016

53.97

10/2010

61.05

08/2012

76.82

06/2014

77.93

04/2016

56.584

11/2010

49.22

09/2012

69.77

07/2014

80.18

05/2016

64.02

12/2010

33.10

10/2012

60.71

08/2014

78.06

06/2016

73.64

01/2011

33.84

11/2012

46.73

09/2014

74.67

07/2016

80.38

02/2011

43.95

12/2012

48.62

10/2014

65.26

08/2016

80.01

03/2011

47.91

01/2013

43.45

11/2014

49.60

09/2016

74.51

04/2011

61.22

02/2013

43.34

12/2014

46.00

10/2016

62.47

05/2011

67.32

03/2013

45.53

01/2015

40.21

11/2016

49.49

06/2011

75.38

04/2013

60.52

02/2015

34.06

12/2016

43.07

07/2011

79.70

05/2013

68.55

03/2015

48.43

01/2017

43.28

08/2011

77.34

06/2013

74.58

04/2015

61.21

02/2017

49.03

09/2011

72.03

07/2013

81.64

05/2015

72.73

03/2017

48.60

10/2011

58.72

08/2013

77.38

06/2015

80.49

04/2017

64.32

11/2011

52.65

09/2013

71.49

07/2015

78.65

05/2017

65.85

12/2011

47.22

10/2013

64.34

08/2015

76.24

06/2017

75.25

01/2012

43.73

11/2013

50.87

09/2015

72.57

02/2012

44.61

12/2013

46.94

10/2015

59.50

Notes: n = 86 months; Source: Weather Underground website: https://www.wunderground.
com/ history/daily/us/va/newport-news/KPHF
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t Tests
The first stage of the analysis consisted of t tests to examine each of the dependent
variables for significant differences between the pre-BWC, BWC deployment, and post-BWC
period means. Cohen’s d was then calculated for each t test result to examine the effect sizes.
The results of the t tests and corresponding Cohen’s d are presented in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: Dependent Variable t Test Results and Effect Sizes for pre-BWC vs.
BWC Deployment vs. Post-BWC Periods
Variable

Period

M

Use of Force
Rate

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
vs.
BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)

0.331

BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)
vs.
Post-BWC
(July 2016 – June 2017)

0.243

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
vs.
Post-BWC
(July 2016 – June 2017)

0.331

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
vs.
BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)

0.482

BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)
vs.
Post-BWC
(July 2016 – June 2017)

0.463

Severity of
Force

Mean
Difference

t

Cohen’s d

0.088

3.585**

0.84

0.104

4.369***

1.16

0.192

9.149***

2.61

0.019

0.425

0.10

-0.016

-0.221

0.07

0.243

0.139

0.139

0.463

0.479
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Variable

Citizen
Complaint
Rate

Substantiated
Complaint
Dispositions

Period

M

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
vs.
Post-BWC
(July 2016 – June 2017)

0.482

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
vs.
BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)

0.498

BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)
vs.
Post-BWC
(July 2016 – June 2017)

0.368

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
vs.
Post-BWC
(July 2016 – June 2017)

0.498

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
vs.
BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)

0.171

BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)
vs.
Post-BWC
(July 2016 – June 2017)

0.156

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
vs.
Post-BWC
(July 2016 – June 2017)

0.171

Mean
Difference

t

Cohen’s d

0.003

0.053

0.02

0.129

2.903**

0.68

0.106

2.493*

0.67

0.236

4.452***

1.69

0.002

0.046

0.01

-0.054

-0.999

0.29

-0.052

-0.934

0.28

0.479

0.368

0.262

0.262

0.156

0.240

0.240
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Variable

Period

M

Exonerated
Complaint
Dispositions

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
vs.
BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)

0.078

BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)
vs.
Post-BWC
(July 2016 – June 2017)

0.106

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
vs.
Post-BWC
(July 2016 – June 2017)

0.078

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
vs.
BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)

366.835

BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)
vs.
Post-BWC
(July 2016 – June 2017)

348.313

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
vs.
Post-BWC
(July 2016 – June 2017)

366.835

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
vs.
BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)

181.032

Calls for
Service Rate

Self-Initiated
Enforcement
Activity Rate

Mean
Difference

t

Cohen’s d

-0.044

-1.912

0.44

-0.086

-2.236*

0.71

-0.130

-3.986***

1.17

0.106

0.168

0.168

18.522

2.021*

0.47

2.382

0.216

0.07

20.904

1.488

0.53

48.808

9.637***

2.25

348.313

345.930

345.930

132.224
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Variable

Period

M

BWC Deployment
(May 2013 – June 2016)
vs.
Post-BWC
(July 2016 – June 2017)

132.224

Pre-BWC
(May 2010 – April 2013)
vs.
Post-BWC
(July 2016 – June 2017)

181.032

Mean
Difference

t

Cohen’s d

30.531

6.075***

1.58

79.339

15.276***

5.71

101.693

101.693

Notes: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
The t test results reported in Table 4.10 indicate statistically significant reductions in the
pre-BWC vs. BWC deployment and the BWC deployment vs. post-BWC period use of force rate
means. The corresponding Cohen’s d values of 0.837 and 1.158 indicate large and very large
effect sizes respectively.6 The calculated Cohen’s d of 2.606 for the statistically significant preBWC vs. Post-BWC t test result indicates a huge effect size associated with the overall 58
percent reduction in the use of force rate between the pre-BWC and post-BWC periods. While
the t tests indicated no statistically significant changes in the pre-BWC, deployment, and postBWC period severity of force means, the increase in the proportion of use of force incidents
resulting in citizen injury between the BWC deployment and post-BWC periods is noteworthy.
In terms of citizen complaint measures, the t test results indicate statistically significant
reductions in the pre-BWC vs. BWC deployment, and the BWC deployment vs. Post-BWC
period citizen complaint rate means. The corresponding Cohen’s d values of 0.677 and 0.667
respectively indicate a medium effect size. Like the use of force rate pre-BWC vs. post-BWC t

6

Cohen (1988) defined a small effect size as d = 0.20 or less, medium effect size as d > .20 and
< 0.80, and large effect size as d ≥ 0.80. Sawilowsky (2009) expanded Cohen’s scale to include
very large as d ≥ 1.20 and huge ≥ 2.00.
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test result, the calculated Cohen’s d of 1.688 for the statistically significant pre-BWC vs. postBWC citizen complaint rate indicates a huge effect size associated with the overall reduction of
more than 47 percent. While the t tests indicated no statistically significant differences in the preBWC, BWC deployment, post-BWC, or the pre-BWC vs. post-BWC means of substantiated
complaint dispositions, nor in the difference between the pre-BWC and BWC deployment means
of exonerated complaint dispositions, there was a statistically significant increase between the
BWC deployment and post-BWC periods for the latter, and the calculated Cohen’s d of 0.705
indicates a medium effect size. Furthermore, the calculated Cohen’s d of 1.172 for the
statistically significant pre-BWC vs. post-BWC exonerated complaint disposition reflects a very
large effect size associated with the overall increase in exonerations of more than 115 percent.
Lastly, t tests were conducted on the two additional variables included in the
VAR/VARX endogenous system, calls for service rate and self-initiated enforcement activity
rate. The t test results indicated a statistically significant reduction in the calls for service rate
between the pre-BWC and BWC deployment periods. However, the results showed no
statistically significant differences between the BWC deployment period and the post-BWC
period, nor between the pre-BWC and post-BWC periods, which suggests that calls for service
remained relatively stable over the entire 86-month period under examination. The t test results
for the self-initiated enforcement activity rate indicated statistically significant reductions
between all three periods with huge effect size of 2.25 and very large effect size of 1.58
respectively. The statistically significant t test result for the nearly 44 percent decrease in the
self-initiated enforcement activity rate between the pre-BWC and post-BWC periods generated a
Cohen’s d of 5.71, also indicating a huge effect size.
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ARIMA Diagnostics of Dependent Variables
Use of force rate.
A downward trend is observed in the plot of the pre-intervention series (Figure 4.2) and
the autocorrelation (AC) plot reflects a slow decay to zero (Appendix A). However, the
significant result of an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Appendix A) indicates no unit root. The
spikes outside the 95% confidence level of early lags in the autocorrelation (AC) plot indicates
potential specification of MA (q) = 1 or 2 and a partial autocorrelation (PAC) plot (Appendix A)
reveals both spikes outside of the 95% confidence level in early lags indicating the potential need
for an AR (p) = 1 or 2 specification. No indication of a seasonal pattern was observed in the plots
of the lags.
Notwithstanding the significant augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the correlogram indicated
a slow decay to zero in the AC plot and differencing was required to achieve white-noise in the
pre-series (d = 1 eliminated the trend). L1 of the MA (q) specification was significant and
retained (q = 1), however, L1 of the AR (p) was not significant therefore not retained (p = 0). A
check for a SARIMA model found no fit for the data to a seasonal component. Thus, the final
ARIMA model for use of force rate was specified (0, 1, 1). A correlogram (Appendix A)
confirmed this specification produces a stationary pre-series (white noise) and insignificant q
statistics.
Severity of force.
Figure 4.3 shows a downward trend in the severity of force variable (monthly proportion
of use of force incidents resulting in citizen injury). However, the autocorrelation (AC) plot does
not reflect a slow decay to zero (Appendix A), and the significant result of an augmented
Dickey-Fuller test (Appendix A) indicates no unit root. The lack of significant spikes in early
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lags of the autocorrelation (AC) plot suggests an MA (q) = 0, while a partial autocorrelation
(PAC) plot (Appendix A) reveals 2 spikes outside of the 95% confidence level at lags 12, 16, and
24, indicating the potential need for an AR (p) specification, and/or for a seasonal pattern.
Neither the L1 of the AR (p), nor the L1 of the MA (q) specifications were significant.
Therefore, neither were retained (p = 0 and q = 0 respectively). A check for a SARIMA model
found no fit for the data to a seasonal component. Thus, the final ARIMA model for citizen
complaint rate was specified (0, 0, 0). A correlogram (Appendix A) confirmed this specification
produces a stationary pre-series (white noise) and insignificant q statistics.
Citizen complaint rate.
An upward trend is observed in the plot of the pre-intervention series of the citizen
complaint rate (Figure 4.4), and the autocorrelation (AC) plot (Appendix A) shows a slow decay
to zero indicating a trend. The result of an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Appendix A) also
indicates that there is a unit root requiring differencing (d = 1). The autocorrelation (AC) plot
indicates spikes above the 95% confidence level in early lags, as does the partial auto correlation
(PAC) (Appendix A), indicating the potential need for specification of MA (q) = 1 or 2 and AR
(p) = 1 or 2 respectively. No seasonal pattern was detected in the plots of the lags.
The differencing (d = 1) eliminated the trend and both L1 and L2 of the AR (p)
specification were significant and retained. (p = 2). An MA (q) = 1 specification was not
significant and, therefore, was specified as q = 0. A check for a SARIMA model found no fit for
the data to a seasonal component. Thus, the final ARIMA model for citizen complaint rate was
specified (2, 1, 0). A correlogram (Appendix A) confirmed this specification produces a
stationary pre-series (white noise) and insignificant q statistics.
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Substantiated complaint disposition.
Figure 4.7 shows an upward trend in substantiated complaints. However, the
autocorrelation (AC) plot does not reflect a slow decay to zero (Appendix A), and the significant
result of an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Appendix A) indicates no unit root and therefore no
need for differencing (d = 0). The lack of significant spikes in early lags of the autocorrelation
(AC) plot suggests an MA (q) = 0, while a partial autocorrelation (PAC) plot (Appendix A)
reveals 2 spikes outside of the 95% confidence level at lags 14 and 20, indicating the potential
need for an AR (p) specification, and/or for a seasonal pattern.
L1 of the AR (p) specification was insignificant and therefore not retained (p = 0). A
check for a SARIMA model found no fit for the data to a seasonal component. Thus, the final
ARIMA model for substantiated complaint disposition proportion was specified (0, 0, 0). A
correlogram (Appendix A) confirmed this specification produces a stationary pre-series (white
noise) and insignificant q statistics.
Exonerated complaint disposition.
While an upward trend was indicated in the plot of the pre-intervention series by the preintervention trend line (Figure 4.8), the AC plot (Appendix A) does not reflect a slow decay to
zero and the results of an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Appendix A) were significant,
indicating that the pre-series was stationary (no unit root) and that differencing was not required
(d = 0). The significant spike at lag 5 in the AC plot indicates the potential need for an MA (q)
specification of 1, and the PAC plot (Appendix A) reveals 2 spikes outside of the 95%
confidence level at lags 5, 13, 14, 19, and 24 indicating the potential need for an AR (p)
specification, and/or for a seasonal pattern.
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Notwithstanding the significant augmented Dickey-Fuller test, a correlogram indicated a
slow decay to zero in the AC plot and differencing was required to achieve white-noise in the
pre-series (d = 1 eliminated the trend). L1 of the MA (q) specification was significant and
retained (q = 1), however, L1 of the AR (p) was not significant therefore not retained (p = 0). A
check for a SARIMA model found no fit for the data to a seasonal component. Thus, the final
ARIMA model for exonerated complaint disposition proportion was specified (0, 1, 1). A
correlogram (Appendix A) confirmed this specification produces a stationary pre-series (white
noise) and insignificant q statistics.
ARIMA Results
The results of the ARIMA models for each of the outcome variables are presented in
Table 4.10. The results demonstrate a poor fit of the data to ARIMA models with insignificant
Wald statistics for all but the citizen complaint rate and substantiated complaint proportion. As
shown in Table 4.10, BWCs failed to emerge as a significant predictor of any of the dependent
variables notwithstanding the 50 months following the beginning of BWC implementation. This
is likely due to the failure to capture the impact of the incremental deployment of BWCs, for
which VAR analysis is ideal.
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Table 4.11: ARIMA Model 1 Results
Dependent Variable
Use of Force Rate
ARIMA (0, 1, 1)

Wald 𝑿𝟐
2.69 (p = 0.261)

Independent Variable
BWCs

b
0.061

SE
0.044

Severity of Force
ARIMA (0, 0, 0)

0.11 (p = 0.741)

BWCs

-0.015

0.047

Citizen Complaint Rate
ARIMA (2, 1, 0)

65.51 (p < 0.000)

BWCs

0.079

0.122

Substantiated Complaints
ARIMA (0, 0, 0)

67.31 (p < 0.000)

BWCs

0.011

0.035

Exonerated Complaints
0.320 (p = 0.854)
ARIMA (0, 1, 1)
Notes: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

BWCs

-0.023

0.041
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VAR/VARX Diagnostics and Results
As described in the analytic plan presented in Chapter 3, the VAR/VARX analyses
consist of two models. First, the five focal dependent variables (use of force rate, severity of
force, citizen complaint rate, substantiated complaint dispositions, and exonerated complaint
dispositions) and the two other system variables (calls for service rate, and self-initiated
enforcement activity rate) are examined as an endogenous system in a VAR (model 1). Second,
the exogenous variables (BWC proportion, Ferguson incident, and monthly average temperature)
are added in a full VARX model (model 2). A Johansen test for cointegration was conducted on
all seven endogenous variables to be included in system, which indicated six cointegrating
equations. Second, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were conducted on each of the endogenous
variables to ensure they were stationary by the first difference (see Appendix B). The diagnostics
for each of the models are documented followed by the results of each analysis.
Model 1 – VAR analysis of endogenous system.
Model specification.
Cholesky ordering sequence = calls for service rate, self-initiated enforcement activity
rate, use of force rate, severity of force, citizen complaint rate, substantiated complaint
disposition, and exonerated complaint disposition.
Vector autoregression specification optimization.
A vector autoregression specification optimization test (results presented in Appendix B)
indicated an optimal lag of 1 (lowest SBIC value of 14.306) for the specified endogenous
variable system.
VAR results.
The results of the model 1 VAR are presented in Table 4.12.
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Model 2 – full model VARX analysis.
VARX model specification.
Cholesky ordering sequence = calls for service rate, self-initiated enforcement activity
rate, use of force rate, severity of force, citizen complaint rate, substantiated complaint
disposition, and exonerated complaint disposition; exogenous variables = BWC proportion,
Ferguson incident, and monthly average temperature.
Vector autoregression specification optimization.
A vector autoregression specification optimization test indicated an optimal lag of 1
(lowest SBIC value of 11.335) for the specified severity of force target variable system
(Appendix B).
VARX results.
The results of model 2 (full VARX model) are presented in Table 4.13.
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Table 4.12: Model 1 –VAR Results
Dependent Variable
Calls for Service Rate

Regressor
Self-Initiated Activity Rate
Use of Force Rate
Severity of Force
Citizen Complaint Rate
Substantiated Complaints
Exonerated Complaints

Self-Initiated Activity Rate

Cohen’s d
-

b
-0.256
-3.640
7.451
-0.249
5.337
-33.329

SE
0.175
26.171
14.592
14.983
19.853
25.583

95% Conf. Interval
-0.599
0.086
-54.935
47.655
-21.149
36.051
-29.616
29.118
-33.574
44.249
-83.471
16.814

Calls for Service Rate
Use of Force Rate
Severity of Force
Citizen Complaint Rate
Substantiated Complaints
Exonerated Complaints

-0.640
8.156
0.617
-7.971
-0.681
5.245

0.050
15.438
8.608
8.838
11.711
15.091

-0.162
-22.102
-16.253
-25.294
-23.634
-24.334

0.034
38.414
17.488
9.352
22.272
34.823

-

Use of Force Rate

Calls for Service Rate
Self-Initiated Activity Rate
Severity of Force
Citizen Complaint Rate
Substantiated Complaints
Exonerated Complaints

0.000
-0.000
0.027
0.129*
0.049
-0.169

0.000
0.001
0.061
0.063
0.083
0.107

-0.000
-0.002
-0.093
0.006
-0.114
-0.379

0.001
0.001
0.147
0.252
0.213
0.042

0.39
-

Severity of Force

Calls for Service Rate
Self-Initiated Activity Rate
Use of Force Rate
Citizen Complaint Rate
Substantiated Complaints
Exonerated Complaints

0.000
-0.000
-0.138
-0.118
-0.282
-0.303

0.001
0.001
0.191
0.110
0.145
0.187

-0.001
-0.003
-0.513
-0.333
-0.567
-0.670

0.002
0.002
0.238
0.097
0.003
0.064

-
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Cohen’s d
2.50
-

Dependent Variable
Citizen Complaint Rate

Regressor
Calls for Service Rate
Self-Initiated Activity Rate
Use of Force Rate
Severity of Force
Substantiated Complaints
Exonerated Complaints

b
-0.000
0.000
0.460*
0.001
0.213
-0.075

SE
0.001
0.001
0.180
0.101
0.137
0.176

95% Conf. Interval
-0.001
0.001
-0.002
0.002
0.106
0.814
-0.196
0.198
-0.056
0.481
-0.420
0.271

Substantiated Complaints

Calls for Service Rate
Self-Initiated Activity Rate
Use of Force Rate
Severity of Force
Citizen Complaint Rate
Exonerated Complaints

-0.000
0.000
0.099
-0.178*
0.002
0.178

0.000
0.001
0.152
0.845
0.087
0.148

-0.001
-0.001
-0.198
-0.344
-0.169
-0.112

0.001
0.002
0.396
-0.013
0.169
0.469

1.15
-

Exonerated Complaints

Calls for Service Rate
Self-Initiated Activity Rate
Use of Force Rate
Severity of Force
Citizen Complaint Rate
Substantiated Complaints

0.000
0.001
-0.272**
0.134*
0.007
0.208**

0.000
0.001
0.100
0.056
0.057
0.076

-0.000
-0.001
-0.468
0.025
-0.106
0.059

0.001
0.002
-0.076
0.243
0.119
0.357

2.47
1.22
1.89

Notes: * p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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Table 4.13: Model 2 –VARX Results
Cohen’s d
0.03

Dependent Variable
Calls for Service Rate

Regressor
Self-Initiated Activity Rate
Use of Force Rate
Severity of Force
Citizen Complaint Rate
Substantiated Complaints
Exonerated Complaints
BWC Proportion
Ferguson Incident
Monthly Avg. Temp.

b
-0.140
-3.502
11.208
-19.168
-21.712
-30.622
4.511
-9.919
1.253***

SE
0.151
27.296
12.521
14.732
17.652
23.564
12.848
9.722
0.225

95% Conf. Interval
-0.437
0.157
-57.001
49.997
-13.334
35.749
-48.042
9.707
-56.309
12.885
-76.808
15.563
-20.670
29.692
-28.974
9.137
0.811
1.694

Self-Initiated Activity Rate

Calls for Service Rate
Use of Force Rate
Severity of Force
Citizen Complaint Rate
Substantiated Complaints
Exonerated Complaints
BWC Proportion
Ferguson Incident
Monthly Avg. Temp.

-0.030
4.089
-1.410
-11.101
-1.709
-1.935
16.098
-14.632*
-0.106

0.062
18.272
8.382
9.862
11.816
15.774
8.601
6.508
0.151

-0.152
-31.724
-17.838
-30.431
-24.868
-32.852
-0.759
-27.388
-0.402

0.092
39.903
15.019
8.228
21.451
28.982
32.955
-1.876
0.190

0.64
-

Use of Force Rate

Calls for Service Rate
Self-Initiated Activity Rate
Severity of Force
Citizen Complaint Rate
Substantiated Complaints
Exonerated Complaints
BWC Proportion
Ferguson Incident
Monthly Avg. Temp.

0.000
0.001
0.047
0.056
0.067
0.089
0.049
0.037
0.001

-0.000
-0.002
-0.085
-0.169
-0.085
-0.144
-0.263
-0.157
-0.001

0.001
0.001
0.101
0.049
0.177
0.205
-0.073
-0.013
0.002

0.51
0.26
-

0.000
-0.000
0.008
-0.060
0.046
0.030
-0.168**
-0.085*
0.000
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Cohen’s d
1.65
0.84
-

Dependent Variable
Severity of Force

Regressor
Calls for Service Rate
Self-Initiated Activity Rate
Use of Force Rate
Citizen Complaint Rate
Substantiated Complaints
Exonerated Complaints
BWC Proportion
Ferguson Incident
Monthly Avg. Temp.

b
0.000
-0.000
-0.183
-0.174
-0.324*
-0.374
0.172
-0.165*
0.000

SE
0.001
0.001
0.229
0.123
0.148
0.197
0.108
0.081
0.002

95% Conf. Interval
-0.001
0.002
-0.003
0.002
-0.632
0.265
-0.416
0.068
-0.614
-0.034
-0.760
0.013
-0.039
0.383
-0.325
-0.006
-0.003
0.004

Citizen Complaint Rate

Calls for Service Rate
Self-Initiated Activity Rate
Use of Force Rate
Severity of Force
Substantiated Complaints
Exonerated Complaints
BWC Proportion
Ferguson Incident
Monthly Avg. Temp.

-0.000
0.000
0.069
-0.020
0.141
0.039
-0.009
-0.195**
0.002

0.001
0.001
0.202
0.093
0.131
0.174
0.095
0.072
0.002

-0.002
-0.002
-0.327
-0.201
-0.115
-0.302
-0.196
-0.336
-0.001

0.001
0.002
0.465
0.162
0.397
0.381
0.177
-0.054
0.006

1.06
-

Substantiated Complaints

Calls for Service Rate
Self-Initiated Activity Rate
Use of Force Rate
Severity of Force
Citizen Complaint Rate
Exonerated Complaints
BWC Proportion
Ferguson Incident
Monthly Avg. Temp.

-0.001*
0.001
0.171
-0.177*
-0.037
0.091
0.167*
-0.117
0.003

0.001
0.001
0.176
0.081
0.095
0.152
0.083
0.063
0.001

-0.002
-0.001
-0.174
-0.336
-0.224
-0.207
0.004
-0.240
0.000

-0.000
0.003
0.516
-0.019
0.149
0.389
0.329
0.006
0.006

0.01
1.14
1.08
-
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Dependent Variable
Exonerated Complaints

Regressor
Calls for Service Rate
Self-Initiated Activity Rate
Use of Force Rate
Severity of Force
Citizen Complaint Rate
Substantiated Complaints
BWC Proportion
Ferguson Incident
Monthly Avg. Temp.

Notes: * p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001

b
0.000
0.001
-0.157
0.129*
0.058
0.218**
0.119*
-0.035
-0.001

SE
0.000
0.001
0.118
0.540
0.064
0.076
0.055
0.042
0.001

95% Conf. Interval
-0.000
0.001
-0.001
0.002
-0.387
0.074
0.023
0.235
-0.067
0.183
0.069
0.368
0.010
0.227
-0.117
0.047
-0.003
0.001

Cohen’s d
1.17
1.98
1.08
-
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VAR results.
The VAR analysis (model 1) examined the impact of each of the variables in the
endogenous system on one another absent exogenous variables. Table 4.13 lists each of the
system variables in the Cholesky ordering schema in the first column, calls for service rate, selfinitiated activity rate, use of force rate, severity of force, citizen complaint rate, substantiated
complaints, and exonerated complaints. The endogenous system regressors and exogenous
variables are listed in the second column, and the corresponding b coefficients, standard errors,
95 percent confidence intervals, and Cohen’s d values of effect size in the columns that follow.
The results of the post estimation Breusch–Godfrey serial correlation LM, Jarque-Bera, and
VAR estimate stability tests indicated no autocorrelation in the residual errors, that the errors are
normally distributed, and that the modulus of each eigenvalue was less than one respectively.
Neither the first variable in the endogenous system, calls for service rate (the
contemporaneously exogenous variable), nor the second variable, self-initiated enforcement
activity rate, were significantly impacted by any of the other system variables. However, the
negative impacts of the calls for service rate (b = -0.640), citizen complaint rate (b = -7.971), and
substantiated complaint disposition proportion (b = -0.681) and the positive impact of exonerated
complaint disposition proportion (b = 5.245) on the self-initiated enforcement activity rate are
noteworthy.
In terms of the focal dependent variables, citizen complaint rate emerged as having a
statically significant impact on the use of force rate (b = 0.129, p = 0.040) with a Cohen’s d of
0.39 indicating a small effect size. While none of the other variables in the endogenous system
had a statistically significant impact on severity of force, of interest are the negative impacts of
the citizen complaint rate (b = -0.118), substantiated complaint dispositions (b = -0.282) and
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exonerated complaint dispositions (b = -0.303). Use of force rate emerged as the only variable in
the endogenous system having a statistically significant impact on the citizen complaint rate (b =
0.460, p = 0.011) with the Cohen’s d of 2.50 indicating a huge effect size. However, the positive
impact of substantiated complaint dispositions (b = 0.213) and negative impact of exonerated
complaint dispositions (b = -0.075) are also noteworthy. Of the endogenous system variables,
perhaps contrary to logic, severity of force had a statistically significant negative impact on
substantiated complaints (b = -0.178, p = 0.035) with a Cohen’s d of 1.15 indicating a very large
effect size, and though not statistically significant, exonerated complaint dispositions had a
positive impact on substantiated complaint dispositions (b = 0.178). Conversely, severity of force
had a statistically significant positive impact on exonerated complaint dispositions (b = 0.134, p
= 0.016) with a Cohen’s d of 1.22 also indicating a very large effect size. While substantiated
complaint dispositions had a statistically significant positive impact on exonerated complaints (b
= 0.208, p = 0.006) with a Cohen’s d of 1.89 indicating a very large effect size, use of force rate
had a statistically significant negative impact (b = -0.272, p = 0.006) with a Cohen’s d of 2.47
indicating a huge effect size.
VARX results.
The VARX analysis (model 2) examined the impact of each of the variables in the
endogenous system on one another and the impact of the exogenous variables on each in the
endogenous system. The format of Table 4.14 is consistent with that of 4.13 for model 1 except
for the inclusion of the exogenous variables in the regressor column. The results of the post
estimation Breusch–Godfrey serial correlation LM, Jarque-Bera, and VAR estimate stability tests
indicated no autocorrelation in the residual errors, that the errors are normally distributed, and
that the modulus of each eigenvalue was less than one respectively.
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Consistent with the model 1 VAR analysis, neither the first variable in the endogenous
system, calls for service rate (the contemporaneously exogenous variable), nor the second
variable, self-initiated enforcement activity rate, were significantly impacted by any of the other
system variables. However, of the exogenous variables, monthly average temperature had a
positive impact on calls for service rate (b = 1.253, p = 0.000) with a Cohen’s d of 0.03
indicating a small effect size, and the Ferguson incident had a statistically significant negative
impact on the self-initiated enforcement activity rate (b = -14.632, p = 0.025) with a Cohen’s d
of 0.64 indicating a medium effect size. Although not statistically significant, the negative
impact of the Ferguson incident on the calls for service rate (b = -9.919) and the negative impact
of severity of force (b = -1.410), citizen complaint rate (b = -11.101), and both substantiated (b =
-1.709) and exonerated (b = -1.935) complaint dispositions is of interest. Likewise, the positive
impact of BWC proportion on the self-initiated enforcement activity rate, though not statistically
significant, is noteworthy.
While none of the endogenous system variables had a statistically significant impact on
the use of force rate, two of the exogenous variables emerged as significant. BWC proportion
had a negative impact on the use of force rate (b = -0.168, p = 0.001) with a Cohen’s d of 0.51
indicating a medium effect size, as did the Ferguson incident (b = -0.085, p = 0.020) with a
Cohen’s d of 0.26 indicating a small effect size. Of the endogenous system variables
substantiated complaint dispositions had a statistically significant negative impact on severity of
force (b = -0.324, p = 0.028) with a Cohen’s d of 1.65 indicating a very large effect size. Of the
exogenous variables, the Ferguson incident emerged as statistically significant having a negative
impact (b = 0.165, p = 0.042) with a Cohen’s d of 0.84 indicating a large effect size. While not
statistically significant, the negative impacts of the use of force rate (b = -0.183), citizen
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complaint rate (b = -0.174), and exonerated complaint dispositions (b = -0.374) are of interest as
well.
The Ferguson incident was the sole variable to emerge as statistically significant in
regard to the citizen complaint rate, curiously having a negative impact (b = -0.195, p = 0.007)
with the Cohen’s d of 1.06 indicating a large effect size. Like the use of force rate, the citizen
complaint rate was not significantly impacted by any of the other endogenous system variables.
However, though not statistically significant and minimal, the negative impact of BWC
proportion (b = -0.009) and severity of force (b = -0.020) are noteworthy, as are the positive
impacts of the use of force rate (b = 0.069), substantiated complaint dispositions (b = 0.141), and
exonerated complaint dispositions (b = 0.039).
In terms of the complaint disposition variables, calls for service had a minimal but
statistically significant negative impact on substantiated complaint dispositions (b = -0.001, p =
0.044) with a Cohen’s d of 0.01 indicating a very small effect size, but negligible on exonerated
complaint dispositions. Neither the self-initiated enforcement activity rate, nor the use of force
rate had a statistically significant impact on either disposition. However, the positive impact of
the use of force rate on substantiated complaint dispositions (b = 0.171) and, conversely, the
negative impact on exonerated complaint dispositions (b = -0.157) is also of interest. Severity of
force emerged as statistically significant for both dispositions, but curiously having a negative
impact on substantiated complaint dispositions (b = -0.177, p = 0.028) with a Cohen’s d of 1.14
indicating a large effect size and a positive impact on exonerated complaint dispositions (b =
0.129, p = 0.017) with a Cohen’s d of 1.17 also indicating a large effect size. Although not
statistically significant, interestingly, the citizen complaint rate had a negative impact on
substantiated complaint dispositions (b = -0.037), but a positive impact on exonerated complaint
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dispositions (b = 0.058). Substantiated complaints emerged as statistically significant having a
positive impact on exonerated complaint dispositions (b = 0.218, p = 0.004) with a Cohen’s d of
1.98 indicating a very large effect size, while exonerated complaint dispositions did not have a
statistically significant impact on substantiated complaint dispositions (b = 0.091). Of the
exogenous variables, BWC proportion had a statistically significant positive impact on both
substantiated complaint dispositions (b = 0.167, p = 0.045) with a Cohen’s d of 1.08 indicating a
large effect size, and exonerated complaint dispositions (b = 0.119, p = 0.032) with a Cohen’s d
of 1.08 indicating a large effect size as well. While the Ferguson incident did not have a
significant impact on either disposition, the direction was negative for both but more impactful
for substantiated complaint dispositions (b = -0.117) than exonerated complaint dispositions (b =
-0.117). The results of the post estimation Breusch–Godfrey serial correlation LM, Jarque-Bera,
and VAR estimate stability tests indicated no autocorrelation in the residual errors, that the errors
are normally distributed, and that the modulus of each eigenvalue was less than one respectively.
These results, limitations of the study, conclusions, implications, and future research needs are
discussed in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
While several randomized controlled trials have examined the impact of BWCs on use of
force in the past few years, the results are mixed. Only a handful of studies have examined these
impacts over a substantial period of time. Sutherland and colleagues (2017) examined four years
post BWC implementation at the Rialto, CA Police Department and found that the initial
reductions in use of force and citizen complaints had been sustained. Conversely, Koslicki and
colleagues’ (2019) analysis of four years pre- and three years post-BWC implementation data
from an unnamed agency in the Northwest U.S. indicated a significant increase in use of force
reports over the three years following device deployment. Furthermore, adequate controls for
officer-initiated enforcement activity and staffing have not been included in the extant research,
and the potential impact on citizen complaint dispositions have received scant attention. The
Newport News, Virginia Police Department’s experience with BWCs offered a unique
opportunity to address these gaps in the research.
The objective of this dissertation was to explore the impact of a staggered rollout of
BWCs with multiple deployments on the frequency and severity of use of force and the
frequency and outcomes of citizen complaints while controlling for staffing and officer-initiated
enforcement activity. This overarching objective was broken down into ten research questions,
which were posed in Chapter 1. This chapter begins by addressing each of those research
questions in turn, followed by a discussion of the results, how the findings build on the extant
body of knowledge, and the implications of the findings. The chapter concludes with the
limitations of the study, suggestions for future research, and final conclusions.
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Answers to the Research Questions
1. What were the effects of BWCs on use of force?
The descriptive statistics indicated that the mean use of force rate decreased by 58.01%
between the pre-BWC period (May 2010 through April 2013) and the post-BWC period (July
2016 – June 2017). Similar to the Rialto, CA (Farrar & Ariel, 2013), Orlando, FL, (Jennings et
al., 2015), Tampa, FL (Jennings et al., 2017), and Las Vegas, NV (Braga et al., 2018) studies, the
findings in the current study indicated that BWCs were a significant factor in the notable
decrease in use of force.
1a. If the frequency of use of force incidents was reduced, was the reduction
sustained?
Similar to Sutherland and colleagues’ (2017) follow-up study of the Rialto, CA results,
but in stark contrast to Koslicki and colleagues’ (2019) results, the reduced use of force rate in
the current study appears to remain stable during the 12-month (July 2016 through June 2017)
post-BWC period (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2).
1b. If the frequency of use of force incidents was reduced, was there an incremental
decline with waves of BWC implementation, or did any decline plateau or decay
over the course of implementation?
A relatively continuous decline is observed during the BWC implementation period,
which appears to flatten during the post-BWC (full deployment) period (see Figure 4.2).
1c. Was there a change in the severity of force used (monthly proportion of use of
force incidents resulting in citizen injuries)?
The monthly proportion of use of force incidents resulting in citizen injuries decreased
nominally between the pre-BWC and post-BWC periods overall. However, distinct spikes of
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1.00 proportions occurred in the post-BWC period and none of that magnitude occurred prior to
BWC implementation (see Figure 4.3). The analysis results indicated that BWCs were not a
significant factor in severity of force.
1d. Did BWCs have a significant impact on these outcomes when simultaneously
considering staffing and volume of officer-initiated enforcement activity?
The proportion of BWCs was statistically significant factor in the reduced use of force
rate while controlling for officer-initiated enforcement activity rate, calls for service rate, neither
of which were statistically significant.
2. What were the effects of BWCs on the frequency of citizen complaints?
The descriptive statistics indicated that the mean citizen complaint rate decreased by
47.39% between the pre-BWC period (May 2010 through April 2013) and the post-BWC period
(July 2016 – June 2017). Contrary to the Rialto, CA (Farrar & Ariel, 2013), Mesa, AZ (Mesa
Police Department, 2013), Phoenix, AZ (Katz et al., 2014), Orlando, FL, (Jennings et al., 2015),
Denver, CO (Ariel, 2017), Arlington, TX (Goodison & Wilson, 2017), and Las Vegas, NV
(Braga et al., 2018) studies, the proportion of BWCs was not statistically significant in the
notable reduction in the citizen complaint rate. However, the results of the analysis indicated that
the Ferguson incident was a significant factor in that reduction.
2a. If the frequency of citizen complaints was reduced, was the reduction sustained?
Notwithstanding the findings above, the reduced citizen complaint rate in the current
study appears to remain stable.
2b. If the frequency of citizen complaints was reduced, was there an incremental
decline with waves of BWC implementation, or did any decline plateau or decay
over the course of implementation?
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A relatively continuous decline is observed during the BWC implementation period,
which, like the use of force rate, appears to flatten during the post-BWC (full deployment) period
(see Figure 4.4).
2c. Was there a change in the proportion of sustained complaints compared to those
unfounded, not substantiated, or in which the officer was exonerated?
Both unfounded and not substantiated complaint disposition proportions decreased (by
19.20% and 40.00% respectively) while proportions of substantiated and exonerated complaint
dispositions increased (40.35% and 115.38% respectively). While BWC proportion did not
emerge as a statistically significant factor in the substantiated complaint disposition increase (as
noted just beyond statistical significance), it had a statistically significant impact in the
exonerated disposition increase.
2d. Did BWCs have a significant impact on these outcomes when simultaneously
considering staffing and volume of officer-initiated enforcement activity?
While BWC proportion was the sole statistically significant factor in the exonerated
complaint proportion model, calls for service rate emerged as significant in the substantiated
complaint proportion model.
Discussion
The theoretical framework first proposed by Farrar and Ariel (2013) to predict the impact
of BWCs on officer behavior was reviewed in Chapter 2. First, Tedeschi and Felson’s (1994)
social interactionist theory of coercive actions explains how the dynamics of police-citizen
interactions can lead to the outcomes of concern (use of force, abuse of authority, and citizen
complaints) and verbal/psychological, legal/civil rights, or physical abuse of authority. In
summary, police and citizens have an asymmetrical power relationship in which officers expect
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deference from all citizens (Alpert & Dunham, 2004). Moreover, the lower the social capital of
the citizen, the more deference and respect is expected by an officer. Thus, the theory proposes
that a hostile and disrespectful citizen demeanor, “contempt of cop,” would likely be met with
coercive means to compel compliance, such as threats, physical force, or punishments. The
theory also posits that coercion will be utilized for retribution when the officer’s social identity
has been threatened. In short, a police officer engaged in an enforcement encounter with a
recalcitrant and disrespectful citizen would be likely to engage in coercive tactics, and perhaps
verbal/psychological, legal/civil rights, and/or physical abuse of authority. However, Farrar and
Ariel (2013) assert that BWCs deter officers from acting on these impulses through what Duvall
and Wicklund (1972) termed objective self-awareness.
According to Duvall and Wicklund (1972), one becomes keenly self-aware when he or
she knows they are being observed and subsequently tend to modify their behavior to conform to
social expectations. This state of objective self-awareness, produced by having their actions
recorded by a BWC, would not only result in deterring officers from engaging in the
aforementioned retaliatory coercive actions, but likely increase procedurally just professional
behavior. Specifically, this phenomenon is expected to result in officer attentiveness to treating
all citizens fairly, with dignity and respect, and attempting to deescalate before utilizing force
when possible. This impact on officer behavior is, in turn, is expected to decrease use of force
incidents and citizen complaints.
The review of applicable literature in Chapter 2 also generated several expectations that,
in turn, guided the inclusion of several variables in addition to BWCs thought to impact the focal
outcomes in the current study. While the results demonstrated a poor fit of the data to ARIMA
models (likely due to the failure to capture the impact of the incremental deployment of BWCs),
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VAR/VARX was ideal with post-estimation tests demonstrating good fit and reliable results.
VAR/VARX analysis, which has rarely been employed in criminology and criminal justice
research, allowed for a unique examination of the impacts of those variables included in the
endogenous system. Utilizing the VARX results, the impacts of those variables on the focal
variables, and on one another, is examined in comparison to previous findings in the research
and support for the related theoretical frameworks is assessed. First, for the ease of reference,
Table 4.14 presents the relationships between variables as negative or positive regardless of
statistical significance.
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Table 5.1 – VARX Analysis - Variable Relationships
Regressor
Variable

Use of Severity Citizen
Substantiated Exonerated Calls for Self-Initiated
Force of Force Complaints Complaints Complaints Service Activity

Use of
Force

+
-

+

+

-

-

-

-*

+

+

-

-

+

-

-

+*

-

-

-

-

Severity of
Force

+

Citizen
Complaints

-

-

Substantiated
Complaints

+

-*

+

Exonerated
Complaints

+

-

+

+

Calls for
Service

+

+

-

-*

+

Self-Initiated
Activity

-

-

+

+

+

-

Ferguson
Incident

-*

-*

-*

-

-

-

-*

Monthly
Avg. Temp.

+

+

+

+*

-

+*

-

+*

+

+

BWCs
-*
+
+*
Notes: * indicates statistically significant relationship.

-

Use of force frequency.
The results of the VARX analysis indicated that both BWCs and the Ferguson incident
were statistically significant contributors to the 58 percent decrease in the use of force rate
between the pre-BWC period and the post full implementation of BWCs, and Cohen’s d
calculations indicated a medium effect size for both. However, contrary to previous research
regarding the correlates of police use of force, self-initiated activity was not a significant
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predictor of the use of force rate (see Bolger, 2015). This finding is interesting considering the
nearly 44 percent decrease in the officer-initiated activity rate between the pre-BWC and post
full BWC deployment periods. Likewise, although thought to be impactful, none of the other
variables included in the VARX endogenous system (calls for service rate, severity of force,
citizen complaint rate, substantiated complaint dispositions, or exonerated complaint
dispositions), nor the other exogenous variable (monthly average temperature) had a significant
impact on the use of force rate.
While the current study’s findings are similar to those previous studies listed in the
answer to research question 1 above as to the positive impact of BWCs on a notable decrease in
use of force, they are in stark contrast to Koslicki and colleague’s (2019) finding of an increase
in use of force over 3 years post-BWC deployment. Furthermore, the current study’s finding of
the concurrent Ferguson incident’s significance in the use of force reduction (which has not been
previously controlled for) is noteworthy. Collectively, these findings may suggest that the
combined effects of increased public scrutiny of police use of force incidents following the
Ferguson incident, and the implementation of BWCs not only decreased use of force frequency
at NNPD overall, but that officers may have been particularly careful in how they handled
interactions that they had initiated, even prior to the Ferguson incident.
The VARX results indicated that severity of force, substantiated complaint dispositions,
exonerated complaint dispositions, calls for service rate, and monthly average temperature all
had a positive impact on the use of force rate. While the positive relationship of exonerated
complaints, calls for service, and monthly average temperature are consistent with previous
research reviewed in Chapter 2, at first glance the positive impact of severity of force and
substantiated complaints seems to defy logic. However, the positive impact of substantiated
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complaint dispositions suggests that fewer of these complaints were related to force after BWC
implementation began, which is supported by the negative impact of the overall citizen
complaint rate. This remains a matter of speculation, however, as the types of allegations were
not examined in the current study. The self-initiated activity rate and the Ferguson incident had a
negative impact as well. While, as mentioned above, the negative impact of the self-initiated
activity rate on the use of force is incongruent with previous research (see Bolger, 2015), the
negative impact of the Ferguson incident is to be expected considering the increased public
scrutiny of use of force in general across the country. These results concerning the influence of
BWCs and the Ferguson incident seem to support the theoretical framework.
Severity of force.
The current study is the first known to examine the impact of BWCs on severity of force
and, as such, was exploratory in nature. The finding that the proportion of use of force incidents
resulting in citizen injury spiked post BWC implementation is curious. As an anticipated benefit
of BWCs is reduced use of force incidents, and the current study found that was the case at
NNPD, one might expect that the severity of force would be reduced as well. However,
substantiated complaint disposition proportion and the Ferguson Incident did have statistically
significant negative impacts on severity of force with Cohen’s d calculations indicating a very
large effect size and large effect size respectively. In addition, although not statistically
significant, BWCs had a positive impact.
These findings seem to be contradictory at first glance, however, they may be
reconcilable. The negative impact of substantiated complaint dispositions and the Ferguson
incident are intuitive. It seems logical that officers would not only avoid use of physical force
when possible but also endeavor to use minimal force when it is required in light of the public
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scrutiny of any use of force post-Ferguson. The finding that BWCs increase severity of force, on
the other hand, is counterintuitive. However, it seems likely that two factors may be in play that
would potentially explain this finding. First, perhaps a large proportion of the use of force
reduction was at the lower end of the force continuum and more of the force that is used
following the implementation of BWCs is in response to serious resistance. Second, having
evidence of citizen resistance captured on BWC recorded video may make officers less inclined
to attempt to negotiate for cooperation. In any event, this remains a matter of speculation as
neither the types of force nor citizen resistance were examined in the current study.
In addition to substantiated complaint dispositions and the Ferguson incident, the use of
force rate, citizen complaint rate, exonerated complaint dispositions, and self-initiated activity
rate all had a negative impact on severity of force. While one would intuitively predict the
negative impacts of the citizen complaint rate, substantiated complaint dispositions, and the
Ferguson incident, and these impacts fall in line with the abuse of authority literature, the similar
impacts of exonerated complaint dispositions and self-initiated activity are puzzling. Lacking
additional data, including surveys of officers, one can only speculate as to the sources of these
impacts. Perhaps officers avoid receiving a complaint, especially an allegation of unnecessary or
excessive force regardless of the outcome, such that even exonerations negatively impact
severity of force. In terms of the negative impact of self-initiated activity, it is plausible that
officers react more quickly utilizing lower levels of force to control a subject when they have
initiated a contact. But again, this remains a matter of speculation as the types of force were not
examined in the current study.
Citizen complaint frequency.
While BWCs did have a negative impact on the citizen complaint rate, they were not a
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statistically significant factor in the model. Based on the findings of Lersch (2002) and Lersch
and Mieczkowski (1996) that officers who engage in more proactive (officer-initiated) and
aggressive enforcement activities receive more citizen complaints, one would think that this
reduction is also likely a function of the nearly 44 percent decrease in the officer-initiated
activity rate. However, while the officer-initiated activity rate had a positive impact on the
citizen complaint rate, it was not a statistically significant factor in the model either. However,
the Ferguson incident’s statistically significant negative impact with a Cohen’s d calculation
indicating a large effect size is notable.
As stated earlier, these findings suggest that NNPD officers may have been particularly
careful in how they handled interactions that they initiated, even prior to BWC implementation
and the Ferguson incident. This seems to be supported by Terrill and Ingram’s (2016) findings
that discourtesy makes up a substantial proportion of citizen complaints. However, the Ferguson
incident’s statistical significance with a Cohen’s d calculation indicating a large effect size
suggests that officers were more courteous and professional overall following the event. Perhaps
officers are more concerned about citizen captured video of their actions and potential public
scrutiny than BWC captured video.
The use of force rate, substantiated complaint dispositions, exonerated complaint
dispositions, and monthly average temperature also had positive impacts on the citizen complaint
rate. The positive impact of the use of force rate on the citizen complaint rate is predictable based
on Terrill and Ingram’s (2016) finding that a large proportion of citizen complaints are
allegations of improper force. Likewise, the findings of Brandl and colleagues (2001), that some
citizens may believe that officers protect one another and filing a complaint would be futile,
supports the notion that when citizens see complaints substantiated, that they may be encouraged
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to report perceived misconduct. With increased contacts between officers and citizens, as well as
increased use of force incidents, the positive impact of the monthly average temperature on the
citizen complaint rate is also logical. However, the positive impact of exonerated citizen
complaints on the overall citizen complaint rate seems counterintuitive, especially in light of
Brandl and colleague’s (2001) findings. Although a matter of speculation, perhaps exonerations
motivated Newport News citizens to file complaints rather than simply feeling defeated.
Particularly in the post-Ferguson era. With more than 40 percent of the Newport News
population African American, perhaps movements such as Black Lives Matter influenced
citizens in such a way that exonerations were questioned and angered citizens, and ultimately
generated more citizen complaints.
Severity of force had a negative relationship with the citizen complaint rate. While
counterintuitive as well, this finding might suggest that the more severe force incidents were
justified and produced fewer citizen complaints. Collectively, the results concerning the citizen
complaint rate do not offer much support for the theoretical framework as it applies to BWCs.
However, findings pertaining to the impact of the Ferguson incident seem applicable to the
support of the theoretical concepts.
Substantiated and Exonerated complaint dispositions.
As related in Chapter 1, BWC advocates have anticipated that the captured video would
aid in complaint investigations by providing an objective record of an encounter (While, 2014).
A logical extension of this notion is that the two dispositions that reflect a high level of
uncertainty about allegations of misconduct (unfounded and not substantiated) should be reduced
and the more definitive dispositions (substantiated and exonerated) should increase. The current
study’s findings reflect exactly that.
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Exonerations more than doubled and BWC proportion was a statistically significant
factor with the inclusion of the other explanatory variables. The proportion of substantiated
complaints and severity of force also had a significant impact on exonerations. The latter
significant positive relationship between severity of force and exonerated complaints supports
the earlier suggestion that more severe force incidents were justified and not only produced
fewer citizen complaints, but also more exonerations when complaints were filed in these
instances. In addition, the calls for service rate, and the self-initiated activity rate had a positive
impact on exonerations while the Ferguson incident had a negative impact. These first findings
further suggest that officers were more professional overall, but the latter suggests that citizen
complaints may have been investigated more thoroughly or officer actions were subjected to
greater scrutiny post-Ferguson.
BWCs were a statistically significant factor in the 40 percent increase in substantiated
complaints as well, as were severity of force, calls for service rate, and monthly average
temperature. As in the case of exonerations, BWC captured video likely provided evidence
enhancing internal investigators’ ability to determine what occurred, and thus producing these
more definitive dispositions. The negative impact of severity of force on substantiated complaint
dispositions further supports the suggestion that the more severe force incidents were justified in
many cases. The calls for service rate had a negative impact on substantiated complaints,
meaning the higher the call volume, the fewer substantiated complaints. This suggests that
perhaps when officer have more time to engage in an interaction, the greater the possibility of
engaging in some form of misconduct, perhaps an abuse of authority. The positive relationship
between average monthly temperature and substantiated complaints is not surprising as warmer
temperatures coincide with more outdoor contacts with higher potential for more aggressive
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policing of disorder.
Calls for service rate.
The calls for service rate remained fairly stable during the study period and the results
indicated that the only statistically significant factor was the monthly average temperature. The
seasonality of crime and calls for service is well documented, and therefore this is to be
expected. However, although not statistically significant, the negative impact of the Ferguson
incident on the calls for service rate is noteworthy. It suggests that citizens were less likely to call
for police services post Ferguson. Based on the findings of Kochel (2019) regarding the impact
of the events on African American attitudes regarding police in particular, this impact might be
explained by the proportion of Newport News citizens who are African Americans, more than 40
percent.
Self-initiated activity rate.
The only statistically significant variable that impacted the self-initiated activity rate in
the VARX model was the Ferguson incident with a negative relationship. The results indicated
that the Ferguson incident was the sole significant factor among the variables in the nearly 40
percent reduction in self-initiated activity. This finding falls in line with those of the Pew
Research Center (2017), Morin and colleagues (2017), and Shjarback and colleagues (2017), all
of whom indicated a de-policing effect related to the Ferguson incident. The results of these
studies indicated that the reduction in self-initiated activities is tied to officer fears of public
scrutiny of aggressive policing techniques.
Although not statistically significant, two other findings are notable. First, BWCs were
positively related to the self-initiated activity rate which is important to the ongoing potential
BWC induced passivity debate. Like Headley and colleagues (2017), Ready and Young (2015),
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Wallace and colleagues (2018) and White and colleagues (2018), all of whom found either a
positive impact or null findings, the dissertation found no evidence of BWC induced passivity.
Second, the citizen complaint rate had a negative impact on self-initiated activity but, as
indicated earlier, self-initiated activity had a nominal impact on citizen complaints. This suggests
that officers might believe that self-initiated activities produce more complaints even though the
findings indicate that is not the case at NNPD during this 86-month period.
Discussion summary.
In summary, the results indicated that BWCs were a statistically significant factor in the
substantial reduction of use of force (58 percent) and increases in both substantiated (40 percent)
and exonerated (115 percent) citizen complaint dispositions, but not in the 47 percent reduction
in citizen complaints. In addition, there was no plateau in these outcomes during the staggered
BWC implementation period, but rather continuous trends that seemed to level off after full
implementation was achieved. While the results offer some support for the theoretical framework
proposed by Farrar and Ariel (2013) and subsequently embraced by BWC advocates, as
discussed, inclusion of the Ferguson incident control variable complicates application of the
theories to the impact of BWCs on use of force and citizen complaints. These results suggest
some important implications and future research needs, but several limitations must be
acknowledged first.
Limitations
While the dissertation contributes to the current body of knowledge as outlined above,
there are several limitations that must be noted. Although likely not an exhaustive list, foremost,
the study utilizes a nonprobability purposive sample, a single large mid-Atlantic municipal
police department purposively selected based on the length of experience with BWCs and
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officers were not randomly selected to be equipped with BWCs through the staggered
deployment of the devices. Supervisors and command staff assigned the devices to officers as
they deemed appropriate. These facts alone may limit the generalizability of the results. Second,
the study utilizes secondary data, internal agency records that were not collected with the
purposes of the researcher in mind. That fact, combined with the “low visibility” nature of police
work, means that some omissions in the CAD data and use of force reporting are likely.
However, the latter may be less likely post-BWC implementation due to video documentation.
Nevertheless, the researcher had to rely on the data collection and recording techniques utilized
by the agency, which had been gathered for the internal purposes of NNPD, not for the purposes
for which the investigator intended to utilize it.
Third, there are methodological issues related to time series analysis which must be
noted. While time-series analysis is a quasi-experimental design which suffers relatively few
threats to the validity of the results, there are a few specific potential threats that must be
considered. First, that of history. According to Cook and Campbell (1979), ‘history’ refers to
“the possibility that forces other than the treatment under investigation came to influence the
dependent variable immediately after [the treatment was introduced]” (p. 211). Another potential
threat to validity is in regard to changes in policy or procedures during the post ‘interruption’
period, a threat that Cook and Campbell (1979) refer to as “instrumentation.” In addition, the
possibility of seasonal variations must be considered, and such patterns accounted for (Cook &
Campbell, 1979). While no major changes in policy were discovered and seasonality is
controlled for, as with any law enforcement agency of similar size, promotions, retirements,
resignations, and shifts in responsibilities resulted in various changes in supervisory and
command staff assignments over the 86-month period of the study. The possibility that such

142
changes may have impacted department culture and contributed to the results of the study must
be considered. In addition, time series-based models require a minimum of 50 observations as a
rule of thumb (Box & Tiao, 1975). While the current study includes 86, the study would have
been more robust with an increased number of observations, particularly post-BWC.
Fourth, the Ferguson incident was utilized as a proxy measure for a potential de-policing
effect. While, as stated earlier, it was arguably a watershed moment in the current police
legitimacy crisis, there have been several high-profile incidents both before and after. Therefore,
it might not capture the cumulative effects of these incidents. And fifth, while the results seem to
offer support for the proposed theoretical framework regarding the anticipated impact of BWCs
on use of force and citizen complaints, the actual testing of theory was a delimitation of the
dissertation. Thus, the mechanism of the BWC impacts remains an open question. As suggested
by White (2014) and others, it is possible that BWCs have an impact on citizen behavior as well.
Implications
Notwithstanding the aforementioned limitations, there are five specific implications
derived from the results of this study. First, a handful of extant studies have sought to identify
correlates of officer acceptance (buy-in) of BWCs. The most salient issue identified to date has
been that of organizational justice (see Ariel et al. 2014; Gaub, et al., 2016; Jennings et al., 2014;
Katz et al., 2014; Kyle & White, 2016; Pelfrey & Keener, 2016; Smykla, Crow, Crichlow, &
Snyder, 2015; Young & Ready, 2015), which has generally been discovered through surveys of
officer attitudes. Recommendations that law enforcement leadership executives ensure high
levels of organizational justice in their agency prior to BWC implementation abound based on
these findings. However, empirical evidence of direct benefits of BWCs for the officer has been
lacking. The importance of the current study’s finding that exonerations more than doubled
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(115.38% increase), and that BWCs were a significant factor in that increase cannot be
overstated. Law enforcement leadership should utilize this information to relieve officers’
apprehensions about the devices and bolster buy-in.
Second, the significant impact on both of the more conclusive complaint dispositions
(substantiated and exonerated) and coinciding decreases in the less conclusive complaint
dispositions indicates that BWC captured video does indeed aid in complaint investigations. This
is an anticipated benefit of BWCs that has received little empirical support (see Lum et al.,
2015). Third, there is a dearth of knowledge regarding staggered rollouts of BWCs, which is not
uncommon due to budget constraints. The results of the current study indicate that the impact of
BWCs on use of force frequency and complaint resolution begin to manifest with the start of
implementation. Moreover, the benefits increased sequentially with implementation and were
sustained long term. Law enforcement leadership should consider staggered implementation if
their budgets do not allow a full deployment.
Fourth, notwithstanding the specific limitation concerning utilizing the Ferguson incident
as a proxy measure noted above, the results of the current study indicate that the Ferguson
incident was a significant factor in a substantial (nearly 40 percent) reduction in the officer selfinitiated activity rate. However, there was no indication of camera induced passivity. While some
law enforcement leaders may view this as problematic, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Brunson
(2007) and Epp and colleagues (2014), among others, suggest that aggressive officer-initiated
enforcement contacts negatively impact police legitimacy and Sharback and colleagues (2017)
suggest that reductions in these types of contacts might serve to improve police-community
relations.
Lastly, the finding regarding the impact of BWCs on severity of force must be fully
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understood as this is likely counter to expectations of the public. While the increased proportion
of use of force incidents resulting in citizen injury can be disturbing at first glance.
Understanding the underlying fact that some use of force will always be necessary due to
resistance and issues of safety is paramount. The reductions in use of force are likely attributable
to those that could have been avoided through de-escalation or were unnecessary, but this
remains a matter of speculation and will be addressed in the concluding future research needs
section below.
Future Research Needs
The mixed results of the extant research regarding the impact of BWCs on use of force
and citizen complaints—the two anticipated benefits of the devices most important for improving
police legitimacy—are problematic. The lack of studies that examine those impacts long term is
even more problematic given the continuing rapid implementation of BWC programs at
substantial expense and with the high expectations of the public concerning their effectiveness.
Although the current study produced some results consistent with the anticipated benefits and in
line with the proposed theoretical framework. The inclusion of additional variables in a
multivariate time series analysis demonstrated that there are other relevant factors that must be
considered, and which may guide future research.
The current study examined the impact of BWCs on severity of force and complaint
dispositions. The importance of the findings cannot be overstated but also reveal more questions
to be answered. Future studies should examine specific types of force in order to investigate the
impact of BWCs on severity of force further. Regarding the latter, the significant increases in
both substantiated complaints and officer exonerations support this anticipated benefit of BWCs,
which until now has received little empirical support. However, specific types of allegations

145
were not examined, and as stated in the discussion, there may be important nuances in terms of
dispositions still to be discovered. While these results provide further evidence of the value of
BWCs, considering this is a single study of a single agency, more research in this area is crucial.
Perhaps most important, while the theoretical framework first proposed by Farrar and
Ariel (2013) has been reiterated in several of the studies that followed (including this one), it has
not been tested. The data available to the investigator did not allow a test of the theory in this
study, although the results seem to support it. Such research is a crucial need as the relationship
between BWCs and reductions in use of force and citizen complaints is not fully understood.
While a test of the theoretical framework would likely require direct observation of officer
behavior prior to BWC implementation (thus time consuming and expensive), post-BWC
observation could feasibly be conducted by coding BWC captured video, which might make
such a study possible.
Conversely, null and negative results of several studies indicate that additional
explanatory variables need to be explored. Research to identify variables that differentiate
agencies that experience reductions from those that do not is the next logical step. Without
further research to both understand how the devices can produce the desired benefits, and
establish realistic expectations regarding their effectiveness, BWCs could ultimately further
erode police legitimacy.
Final Conclusions
Law enforcement agencies continue to adopt BWCs at a rapid rate. While BWC research
initially trailed introduction of the devices in large numbers, scholars have employed aggressive
research agendas generating results from several studies in just a few years’ time. Although this
dissertation contributes to that rapidly developing body of knowledge, it also reveals additional
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gaps in need of empirical research. As technological advances continue and occur more quickly,
it is increasingly important for research to keep pace. May the information contained in this
dissertation aid in that emerging research.
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APPENDIX A
ARIMA DIAGNOSTICS
Use of Force Rate ARIMA Diagnostics
Autocorrelation (AC) Plot of Use of Force Rate Pre-Series

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Use of Force Rate
Pre-Series
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root

Test
Statistic
Z(t)

-3.477

Number of obs

=

33

Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% Critical
5% Critical
10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-3.696

MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0086

-2.978

-2.620
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Partial Autocorrelation (PAC) Plot of Use of Force Rate Pre-Series
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Correlogram of Use of Force Rate Pre-Series –
ARIMA (0, 1, 1)
LAG
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0.0709
-0.1249
0.0634
0.1567
0.0979
-0.1526
0.0644
-0.0578
0.0648
-0.0224
0.0425
-0.1499
-0.1028
0.1318
0.0090
0.0001
0.0238
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-0.0067
-0.0349
-0.0578
-0.1078
-0.2447
0.0201
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0.0188
0.0498
-0.0348

PAC
0.0134
0.1256
0.0502
-0.0152
0.0061
0.0404
-0.1090
-0.0908
-0.0879
0.2584
0.1663
-0.1657
-0.0160
-0.1488
0.0668
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0.1940
-0.2712
0.0222
0.0694
0.0490
-0.1180
-0.1018
-0.0526
0.0175
0.1996
-0.0302
0.0022
0.0232
-0.3443
-0.0621
-0.1616
-0.2048
-0.0101
-0.0754
0.0619
0.0897
-0.0832
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0.0546

Q

Prob>Q
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Severity of Force ARIMA Diagnostics
Autocorrelation (AC) Plot of Citizen Injury Proportion Pre-Series

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Citizen Injury
Proportion Pre-Series
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root

Test
Statistic
Z(t)

-3.311

Number of obs

=

33

Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% Critical
5% Critical
10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-3.696

MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0144

-2.978

-2.620
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Partial Autocorrelation (PAC) Plot of Citizen Injury Proportion
Pre-Series

178
Correlogram of Citizen Injury Proportion Pre-Series –
ARIMA (0, 0, 0)
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PAC
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0.0037
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-0.0009
0.1265
0.0002
-0.0125
-0.0723
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-0.0673
-0.0439
-0.2372
0.0176
-0.1441
0.0021
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0.2279
-0.1011
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0.0888
0.0352
-0.1313
-0.2747
0.0111
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0.1210
-0.0116
-0.1416
-0.0832
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-0.0383
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0.0241
-0.1398
-0.0970
-0.1392
0.0517
0.0205

Q

Prob>Q

.00161
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1.5937
1.5937
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2.9139
2.9214
3.6339
3.7574
3.9486
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7.0488
8.2983
8.5749
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14.429
14.723
14.736
15.19
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15.228
17.569
18.302
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0.8996
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0.8573
0.7743
0.8097
0.8365
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Citizen Complaint Rate ARIMA Diagnostics
Autocorrelation (AC) Plot of Citizen Complaint Rate Pre-Series

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Citizen Complaint
Rate Pre-Series
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root

Test
Statistic
Z(t)

-2.293

Number of obs

=

33

Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% Critical
5% Critical
10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-3.696

MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.1742

-2.978

-2.620
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Partial Autocorrelation (PAC) Plot of Citizen Complaint Rate Pre-Series

181
Correlogram of Citizen Complaint Rate Pre-Series –
ARIMA (2, 1, 0)
LAG
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

AC
-0.0120
-0.1526
-0.1797
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-0.0676
-0.2143
0.0213
0.0165
0.0358
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-0.0374
0.1453
-0.2086
-0.0792
-0.1079
0.0095
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0.0149
0.1525
0.1080
-0.0320
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-0.0750
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0.0085
0.0252
-0.1718
0.1404
0.0034
-0.0027
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0.2631
-0.0126
-0.1463
0.0131
0.0982
0.0051

PAC
-0.0119
-0.1548
-0.1909
0.0378
-0.1405
-0.2796
-0.0226
-0.0988
-0.0699
0.0565
-0.0339
0.0333
0.0062
0.1946
-0.1910
0.0075
-0.1450
-0.1021
-0.0794
-0.0496
0.0272
0.0844
-0.0444
-0.0033
-0.0600
-0.1003
0.1256
-0.0683
-0.2250
0.2659
-0.3022
-0.1270
-0.3388
-0.4496
0.1388
-0.3394
-0.0030
0.5762
-0.0267
0.1953

Q

Prob>Q

.01269
2.0888
5.0018
5.4101
5.8326
10.13
10.173
10.199
10.324
10.748
10.861
11.213
11.356
13.555
18.152
18.825
20.091
20.101
20.106
20.131
22.817
24.187
24.309
24.336
25.03
25.065
25.074
25.156
29.053
31.702
31.704
31.705
37.757
38.691
48.926
48.95
52.248
52.275
53.826
53.83

0.9103
0.3519
0.1717
0.2477
0.3228
0.1193
0.1790
0.2513
0.3249
0.3775
0.4550
0.5108
0.5810
0.4834
0.2547
0.2778
0.2696
0.3272
0.3883
0.4498
0.3538
0.3375
0.3869
0.4425
0.4607
0.5153
0.5703
0.6193
0.4623
0.3815
0.4312
0.4814
0.2608
0.2661
0.0592
0.0735
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Substantiated Citizen Complaint Disposition ARIMA Diagnostics
Autocorrelation (AC) Plot of Substantiated Complaint Disposition
Proportion Pre-Series

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Substantiated
Complaint Disposition Proportion Pre-Series
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root

Test
Statistic
Z(t)

-4.043

Number of obs

=

35

Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% Critical
5% Critical
10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-3.682

MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0012

-2.972

-2.618
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Partial Autocorrelation (AC) Plot of Substantiated Complaint Disposition
Proportion Pre-Series
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Correlogram of Substantiated Complaint Disposition
Proportion Pre-Series – ARIMA (0, 0, 0)
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24
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26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

AC
-0.0471
0.1521
0.1043
-0.1021
0.0667
0.0283
0.0280
0.0717
-0.0101
-0.0539
-0.0810
-0.1523
-0.0287
0.1780
0.0344
0.0849
0.0364
-0.0727
0.0489
-0.2269
0.1423
-0.0901
-0.0268
-0.0383
-0.1791
-0.1220
-0.1074
-0.1565
0.0398
-0.1317
-0.0102
-0.0365
-0.0618
-0.1052
-0.0040
0.0105
0.0417
0.0295
-0.0333
0.0614

PAC
-0.0555
0.1785
0.1332
-0.1534
0.0448
0.0738
0.0438
0.0752
-0.0151
-0.1033
-0.1481
-0.1963
0.0173
0.3451
0.1017
-0.0040
-0.0066
-0.1229
0.1355
-0.3205
0.1484
-0.1638
-0.1421
-0.1593
-0.1320
-0.0879
-0.1707
-0.2181
0.0916
-0.1112
-0.0718
-0.2290
-0.0726
-0.4432
-0.3385
-0.4274
-0.1511
-0.1348
-0.2732
-0.0688

Q

Prob>Q

.1974
2.2824
3.2737
4.2362
4.6525
4.7284
4.8038
5.3027
5.3128
5.6016
6.2641
8.6366
8.7222
12.053
12.179
12.958
13.104
13.691
13.961
19.867
22.225
23.186
23.272
23.451
27.432
29.308
30.787
33.985
34.195
36.538
36.552
36.739
37.285
38.895
38.897
38.914
39.182
39.32
39.499
40.119

0.6568
0.3194
0.3513
0.3750
0.4597
0.5791
0.6839
0.7248
0.8062
0.8476
0.8552
0.7336
0.7936
0.6020
0.6654
0.6758
0.7292
0.7490
0.7859
0.4663
0.3866
0.3913
0.4450
0.4933
0.3347
0.2973
0.2800
0.2014
0.2322
0.1910
0.2265
0.2585
0.2784
0.2587
0.2985
0.3399
0.3722
0.4106
0.4476
0.4650
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0
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0
1
[Autocorrelation] [Partial Autocor]
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Exonerated Citizen Complaint Disposition ARIMA Diagnostics
Autocorrelation (AC) Plot of Exonerated Complaint Disposition
Proportion Pre-Series

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Exonerated
Complaint Disposition Proportion Pre-Series
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root

Test
Statistic
Z(t)

-5.492

Number of obs

=

35

Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% Critical
5% Critical
10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-3.682

MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000

-2.972

-2.618
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Partial Autocorrelation (AC) Plot of Exonerated Complaint Disposition
Proportion Pre-Series
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Correlogram of Exonerated Complaint Disposition
Proportion Pre-Series – ARIMA (0, 1, 1)
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24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

AC
0.0252
0.0459
-0.1904
0.0064
0.2348
0.0928
0.0445
-0.0994
-0.0777
0.0350
-0.0393
-0.0106
0.0780
0.0915
0.0117
-0.0668
0.0402
-0.0577
0.2261
-0.0071
-0.0087
-0.1983
-0.0987
0.1274
-0.0935
-0.0651
-0.0803
-0.1492
-0.0289
-0.0974
-0.0542
0.0658
0.0705
0.0173
-0.1596
-0.0506
0.1067
0.1603
0.0052
-0.0629

PAC
0.0255
0.0463
-0.1963
0.0175
0.3066
0.0428
0.0339
-0.0082
-0.1007
-0.0106
-0.1706
-0.0733
0.2197
0.2097
-0.0173
-0.0614
0.1098
-0.2052
0.2445
-0.0388
-0.0814
-0.2796
-0.1939
0.2453
-0.2460
-0.1410
0.0834
-0.1276
-0.1544
-0.1827
-0.2404
0.2702
0.3532
-0.3839
-0.1547
0.1012
0.4221
0.4214
0.0107
0.4138

Q

Prob>Q

.05586
.24365
3.5126
3.5164
8.6139
9.4206
9.6085
10.556
11.144
11.265
11.419
11.43
12.055
12.927
12.941
13.419
13.595
13.963
19.692
19.698
19.707
24.32
25.482
27.449
28.527
29.058
29.879
32.765
32.876
34.152
34.554
35.158
35.865
35.909
39.678
40.064
41.819
45.863
45.867
46.518

0.8132
0.8853
0.3191
0.4754
0.1255
0.1513
0.2119
0.2281
0.2660
0.3373
0.4089
0.4925
0.5231
0.5323
0.6068
0.6419
0.6955
0.7315
0.4133
0.4770
0.5399
0.3307
0.3259
0.2840
0.2842
0.3085
0.3196
0.2445
0.2828
0.2748
0.3018
0.3209
0.3356
0.3791
0.2693
0.2946
0.2695
0.1784
0.2088
0.2218

-1
0
1 -1
0
1
[Autocorrelation] [Partial Autocor]
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APPENDIX B
VAR/VARX DIAGNOSTICS
Johansen Test for Cointegration
Johansen tests for cointegration
Trend: constant
Number of obs =
Sample: 2010m6 - 2017m6
Lags =

maximum
rank
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

parms
7
20
31
40
47
52
55
56

LL
-661.1019
-609.11343
-568.24782
-534.81071
-507.89821
-490.16267
-478.26805
-476.33788

eigenvalue
.
0.70573
0.61770
0.54468
0.46913
0.34118
0.24412
0.04440

trace
statistic
369.5280
265.5511
183.8199
116.9457
63.1207
27.6496
3.8603

85
1

5%
critical
value
124.24
94.15
68.52
47.21
29.68
15.41
3.76

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Stationarity
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Calls for Service Rate
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root

Test
Statistic
Z(t)

-4.248

Number of obs

=

84

Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% Critical
5% Critical
10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-3.532

-2.903

-2.586

MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0005

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Self-Initiated Enforcement
Activity Rate – 1st Difference
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root

Test
Statistic
Z(t)

-8.737

Number of obs

=

83

Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% Critical
5% Critical
10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-3.534

MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000

-2.904

-2.587
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Use of Force Rate
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root

Test
Statistic
Z(t)

-3.590

Number of obs

=

84

Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% Critical
5% Critical
10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-3.532

-2.903

-2.586

MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0060

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Severity
of Force
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root

Test
Statistic
Z(t)

-6.335

Number of obs

=

84

Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% Critical
5% Critical
10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-3.532

-2.903

-2.586

MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Citizen Complaint
Rate
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root

Test
Statistic
Z(t)

-4.619

Number of obs

=

84

Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% Critical
5% Critical
10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-3.532

-2.903

-2.586

MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0001

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Substantiated Complaint
Proportion
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root

Test
Statistic
Z(t)

-5.145

Number of obs

=

84

Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% Critical
5% Critical
10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-3.532

MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000

-2.903

-2.586
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Exonerated Complaint
Proportion
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root

Test
Statistic
Z(t)

Number of obs

=

84

Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
1% Critical
5% Critical
10% Critical
Value
Value
Value

-5.185

-3.532

-2.903

-2.586

MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000

Vector Autoregression Specification Optimization for Model 1 – VAR Analysis
Selection-order criteria
Sample: 2010m9 - 2017m6
lag
0
1
2
3
4

LL
-578.534
-463.161
-426.97
-388.9
-352.892

Number of obs

LR

230.75
72.382
76.14
72.015*

df

p

FPE

AIC

49
49
49
49

0.000
0.017
0.008
0.018

.003758
.000748*
.001048
.00146
.002281

14.2813
12.6625*
12.9749
13.2415
13.5583

=

HQIC

82
SBIC

14.3638
13.3223*
14.2122
15.0561
15.9504

14.4868
14.3061*
16.0566
17.7614
19.5164

Endogenous:
CFSRT system
TOTSIARTvariables
UOFRT CITINJPN
SBSTNPN
EXNRTPN
Notes:
Endogenous
includedCMPTRT
= calls
for service
rate, self-initiated
enforcement activity rate, use of force rate, severity of force, citizen complaint rate,
substantiated complaint disposition, and exonerated complaint disposition.

Vector Autoregression Specification Optimization for Model 2 – VARX Analysis
Selection-order criteria
Sample: 2010m10 - 2017m6
lag
0
1
2
3
4

LL
-538.548
-300.869
-252.038
-207.549
-165.563

LR

475.36
97.663
88.978
83.972*

Number of obs

df

p

FPE

AIC

64
64
64
64

0.000
0.004
0.021
0.048

.0001
1.4e-06*
2.1e-06
3.8e-06
8.3e-06

13.495
9.20665*
9.58118
10.0629
10.6065

=

HQIC
13.5899
10.0606*
11.1942
12.435
13.7376

81
SBIC
13.7315
11.335*
13.6015
15.9752
18.4106

Notes: Endogenous system variables included = calls for service rate, self-initiated
enforcement activity rate, use of force rate, severity of force, citizen complaint rate,
substantiated complaint disposition, and exonerated complaint disposition;
exogenous variables = BWC proportion, Ferguson incident, and monthly average
temperature.
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